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Financial and macroeconomic surveillance involves the construction of 
metrics and models defining what represents ‘strong’ economic fundamentals 
and how this translates to growth. The conduct of surveillance is also driven by 
the notion that countries should be held accountable to the international 
community for the external impact of their internal policy decisions. Whilst 
surveillance is portrayed as a technical and apolitical exercise, it is also a political 
statement on what constitutes economic growth and what its sources and 
consequences are. This thesis examines the expansion of regional (East Asia 
through ASEAN+3) and global (IMF) surveillance frameworks after the global 
financial crisis to illustrate how the seemingly technical process of surveillance 
is a political exercise as well. Specifically, it argues that the mathematical models 
underpinning surveillance are a useful political resource in two ways: First, the 
emergence of different surveillance models to support regional and global 
surveillance gives technical justifications for competing political assertions on 
the risks to economic growth. Second, the proliferation of overlapping 
surveillance models simultaneously defines and displaces accountability in 
global economic governance. 
  Mathematical modelling involves the construction and maintenance of a 
false dichotomy between the technical and the political. Despite its prevailing 
problems, the appeal of surveillance as a technocratic regulatory project has not 
wavered as its models can be used to justify the growing demands for and 
limitations of technical interventions in global economic governance. This thesis 
contributes to related studies on the politics of metrics and models in economic 
policy by examining these two parallel yet contradictory processes as a product 
of methodological choices specific to the practice of mathematical formalism. It 
does so by developing an interdisciplinary approach drawing from philosophy of 
science, economic sociology, and IPE literature to trace the interplay between 
technical and political logics in mathematical modelling.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
In 1999, it was confidently proclaimed that ‘[b]y almost any market test, 
economics is the premier social science’ (Lazear 2000, 1). After the 2007 global 
financial crisis, the new assessment was that ‘economics has the awkward 
distinction of being both the most influential and the most reviled social science’ 
(Chernomas and Hudson 2016, cited in Fourcade 2018, 1). The drastic shift in the 
discipline’s reputation should not come as a surprise as the crash provided 
considerable fodder for attacks against economics and economists. Even before 
the dust had settled, mainstream media—which had traditionally shied away 
from such technical matters—was publishing articles with bold titles such as 
‘How did economists get it so wrong?’ (Krugman 2009) and ‘What went wrong 
with economics?’ (The Economist 2009b). Yet, as noted by above, such 
condemnations1 had no discernible impact on the influence of economics as a 
discipline. Instead, the direction of post-crisis policy reform served to cement the 
authority of economic expertise even further as the crash was diagnosed as a 
‘socio-technical failure’ that can be remedied with sophisticated technical 
interventions (Engelen et al. 2012, 361). One such example is the intensification 
of financial and macroeconomic surveillance (henceforth referred to simply as 
‘surveillance’) at both regional and global levels. 
As one of the main pillars of global economic governance, surveillance 
presents an important case for analysing the seemingly contradictory 
developments that have shaped post-crisis policies to date. Contradictions 
emerge in several ways. With respect to economics, recent surveillance reform is 
                                                        
1 Ricardo Reis (2018) is one exception to this trend, as he evaluates the use of macroeconomics 
in research, policy, forecasting, and teaching. Relative to other fields, Reis does not agree that 




a product of rising demands for economic expertise and growing recognition of 
its limitations. From the perspective of ideational analysis, changes in regional 
and global surveillance both support and contest shared understandings of what 
it means to be ‘good’ economic citizens and what constitutes ‘strong’ economic 
fundamentals. There are parallels in the context of post-hegemonic global 
economic governance, as regional surveillance is simultaneously depicted as 
complement and competition to its global counterpart. Whilst these points are 
valid in certain respects, it is also important to move beyond the conventional 
framing of these debates in terms of distinct and conflicting dynamics. By 
studying these processes in isolation, we neglect the constitutive character of 
various dimensions of global economic governance; in doing so, we run the risk 
of reducing unforeseen outcomes in times of crises to contradictions or 
anomalies. This thesis offers a provocation as it seeks to understand these three 
ostensibly separate and paradoxical developments as a manifestation of one 
process with its own mechanisms for coherence and resilience, specifically the 
politics of economic methodology.  
Focusing on the expansion of regional and global surveillance frameworks 
after the global financial crisis, this thesis seeks to illustrate how the seemingly 
technical process of surveillance is a political exercise as well. Specifically, it 
argues that the mathematical models underpinning surveillance are a useful 
political resource in two ways. First, the emergence of different surveillance 
models to support regional and global surveillance gives technical justifications 
for competing political assertions on the risks to economic growth. Second, the 
proliferation of overlapping surveillance models simultaneously defines and 
displaces accountability in global economic governance.  
This chapter begins the enquiry by locating the thesis’ specific interest—
regional and global surveillance—within and in contrast to relevant 
International Political Economy (IPE) debates. Section 1.1 provides a quick 
overview of relevant IPE debates on post-crisis global economic governance, 
followed by an outline of more specific discussions on regional (East Asia 
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through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three2 [ASEAN+3]) and 
global (International Monetary Fund [IMF]) surveillance and systemic risk. 
Section 1.2 illustrates how this thesis offers a different reading by foregrounding 
the importance of the politics of economic methodology. Section 1.3 presents the 
research questions and the thesis’ core empirical and conceptual contributions. 
Section 1.4 specifies the chosen methodology and data sources. The main 
findings and chapter structure are summarised in Section 1.5.  
 
1.1 The view from above: post-crisis global economic governance, 
surveillance, and systemic risk  
When the stability and functionality of the global economy hinge on 
common expectations and definitions of what constitutes the international 
financial system and the appropriate mechanisms for its regulation (Drezner and 
McNamara 2013), this raises the question of how a shared understanding is 
arrived at amongst multiple actors. Likewise, such concerns influence how 
consensus (or lack thereof) drives multilateral efforts such as surveillance. 
Financial and macroeconomic governance is a ‘profoundly intersubjective 
domain’ (Best 2005, 23), where the interplay between ideas and power are both 
the outcome and determinants of the global architecture. This is a familiar theme 
that permeates IPE scholarship on various aspects of global economic 
governance, particularly amongst those who subscribe to constructivist 
approaches. Yet it is rare to encounter studies that probe into the forms of 
reasoning and representation that gave rise to the economic ideas that dominate 
financial and macroeconomic regulation. Whilst the political implications of 
metrics (Broome and Quirk 2015; Mügge 2016) and influential economic models 
(Watson 2014; Braun 2014) have been raised, the politics inherent in 
methodological choices are seldom uncovered. This oversight might appear to be 
                                                        
2 Member countries include the core ASEAN countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) as well as China, 
Japan, and South Korea. 
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a consequence of disciplinary boundaries as the significance of methodological 
issues have not escaped scholars working within economic sociology and 
philosophy of science. However, given IPE’s interest in the interplay between 
ideas and power, a case can be made for a dialogue between IPE, economic 
sociology, and philosophy of science. If we accept that economic ideas are both a 
political resource and the subject of political contestation, then understanding 
the logics behind the form that these ideas take (e.g., mathematical formalism) is 
also as important as its content. The flawed yet persistent tendency towards 
mathematical modelling (and the attendant efforts to assert technical control 
over markets) merits closer investigation of its underlying logics of reasoning 
and representation, more so as it continues to underpin global economic 
governance without any signs of wavering.   
This section provides an overview of existing IPE accounts of post-crisis 
global economic governance, surveillance, and systemic crisis. Whilst many of 
the topics covered below will be expanded on in the subsequent chapters, this 
section frames the discussion around the notion of normative solidarity in 
surveillance and its repercussions for the rise of regional surveillance in East 
Asia. This is used to highlight the centrality and endurance of the principle of 
external accountability across regional and global surveillance. However, the 
incorporation of systemic risk in post-crisis surveillance creates new issues in 
terms of the application of external accountability. A deeper appreciation of 
these concerns requires foregrounding the politics of economic methodology in 
the analysis.  
Debates on the politics of economic ideas have made significant 
contributions to our understanding of the trajectory of post-crisis global 
economic governance. Over a decade has passed since the 2007 financial crisis, 
yet we are still uncovering various aspects of the pace and processes of change 
(or continuity) in its aftermath. For instance, Eric Helleiner argues that, despite 
expectations that the crisis would pave the way for transformative change in 
global economic governance, the crash turned out to be ‘a strangely conservative 
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event’ (Helleiner 2014, 2) in that the policy reform was still largely determined 
by the structural power of the United States. In another study, Mark Blyth (2013) 
uses Peter Hall’s (1993) seminal work to demonstrate that the global financial 
crisis ultimately fell short of pushing a third order paradigm shift. Blyth’s 
assessment steers clear of drawing state-centric lines of causality as Helleiner 
does as he lists the absence of viable alternatives, disciplinary incentives, and the 
consolidation of authority as reasons for the persistence of the status quo. These 
authors share a common denominator with the articles included in a volume 
edited by Andrew Baker and Geoffrey Underhill (2015), as they note how 
ideational analyses of post-crisis reform reveal how institutions and institutional 
settings frame the terms and prospects for policy action (Schmidt 2010; 
Campbell 2004). Studies focusing on financial crises as critical junctures that will 
act as tipping points for reform (Harberger 1993; Drazen and Grilli 1990; Drazen 
and Easterly 2001) have been countered by others claiming that critical 
junctures are insufficient in themselves, as such events only give rise to ideas and 
understandings that gain support and credibility given particular institutional 
contexts (Ashbee 2013). 
1.1.1 Surveillance 
As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, similar concerns about 
ideational and institutional constraints pervade most IPE literature on the IMF3 
and its surveillance operations. The conduct of global surveillance (i.e., 
multilateral surveillance as conducted by the IMF) is a core component of the 
Fund’s mission to monitor the international monetary system and review the 
economic and financial policies of its member countries. Surveillance evolved 
through the years to adapt to changing views of how the global economy 
operates and how national priorities and responsibilities respond in the process. 
As the gap between IMF surveillance in theory and in practice persists, various 
                                                        
3 Also see Park and Vetterlein (2010) and Chwieroth (2010), amongst others. Outside IPE, critical 
geographers have also investigated the IMF, as seen in E. Jeffrey Popke’s (1994) work on how 
IMF practices create discursive scripts that naturalise dominant narratives of modernisation and 
the global order.  
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scholars (for instance, see Lombardi and Woods 2008; Broome 2008; Moschella 
2010, 2012; Clift 2018) have offered different accounts of the continued 
relevance of IMF surveillance. Central to these interpretations is the importance 
of the IMF’s role in creating and maintaining the parameters of the shared 
normative basis of global economic governance. As Louis Pauly observes: 
‘For the delegated authority of the Fund to be considered legitimate in a 
world of integrating markets and still-sovereign polities, its behaviour 
would have to remain consistent with an underlying and broadly shared 
sense of the rightness of its prescriptions, which would in turn have to be 
deemed universally applicable, at least in principle’ (Pauly 2008, 190, italics 
added). 
However, evidence of ‘an underlying and broadly shared sense of the 
rightness of [the IMF’s] prescriptions’ is mixed. To be sure, perceptions vary 
across country groupings and across areas of IMF operations. For instance, a 
survey conducted by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) in 2009 
shows that authorities in large advanced economies were unsatisfied with the 
Fund’s work on international policy coordination, policy development, and 
outreach. Amongst large emerging economies, the problems identified were 
related to surveillance, which were seen as lacking value and evenhandedness. 
Specifically, the survey results show that 86% of respondents from large 
emerging economies believed that ‘surveillance was in the interest of the “largest 
IMF shareholders”’ (IEO 2011a, 35). A separate assessment of surveillance 
reports prepared by the IMF’s Asia-Pacific Department supports this finding 
(Montiel 2011). Nonetheless, commitment to IMF surveillance has yet to waver. 
Pauly qualifies his comment above as he states: 
‘In practice, the task of defending and deploying its authority would never 
be easy, straightforward, or finally accomplished, and the actual power of 
the Fund would remain ambiguous and variably applied. Nevertheless, 
agreement on the normative foundation of the core mission of the Fund 
sufficient for it to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances represented 
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a signal innovation in modern economic history’ (Pauly 2008, 190, italics 
added). 
 As debates continue regarding member countries’ perception of the value 
and relevance of IMF surveillance, this thesis presents an analysis of surveillance 
that converges with other studies in that it agrees that the endurance of the 
Fund’s role is built on a shared normative understanding. However, in light of the 
inconclusive evidence on the effectiveness of surveillance amongst member 
countries, this thesis employs a different conceptualisation of the basis of this 
shared norm. Similar to Pauly, the approach developed in this thesis supports the 
emphasis on the stated conduct of surveillance ‘for the benefit both of the 
international community as a whole and of individual member states’ (Crow, 
Arriazu, and Thygesen 1999, 17). In particular, the analysis that will unfold in the 
subsequent chapters highlights the significance of the principle of external 
accountability, which requires that countries be held accountable to other 
members of the international community in light of the external spillovers of 
their internal policy decisions (Pauly 1997). However, with no formal 
mechanisms for ensuring accountability, continued adherence to the principle of 
external accountability needs to be interpreted within specific parameters. As 
will be explained in Chapter 4, accountability in the context of global governance 
requires actors to justify their conduct to other involved parties (Held and 
Koenig-Archibugi 2004). With this reading, external accountability then calls for 
countries to justify the external impact of their internal policy decisions; 
surveillance can then be construed as a platform for policy justification and 
reputational management (Busuioc and Lodge 2016). This interpretation 
informs this thesis’ notion of surveillance as a tool for policy justification, which 
can then be used to account for the persistent relevance of surveillance despite 
disagreements regarding its effectiveness amongst member countries.  
Focusing on external accountability and policy justification also allows us 
to account for the emergence of regional surveillance platforms. On this point, 
this thesis parts ways with Pauly’s assessment that ‘the more serious challenge 
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to Fund surveillance is the potential erosion of normative solidarity represented 
by a proliferation of regional competitors and alternative forums’ (Pauly 2008, 
207). Granted, there are several reasons to believe that such fears are warranted. 
This is especially true in the case of East Asia, where the disastrous effects of the 
IMF’s intervention during the 1997 Asian financial crisis continue to shape 
regional initiatives even after two decades have passed. Chapter 2 will tackle the 
transformation of the discourse on economic growth in East Asia from the period 
before the 1997 downturn to 2018. Chapter 6 will discuss in greater detail how 
‘the IMF stigma’ looms large in the evolution of regional surveillance and how it 
both facilitated and constrained the various iterations of surveillance in East Asia 
through the years. However, in contrast to the case of the IMF, the concept of 
normative solidarity in East Asia takes a significantly different form. To the 
extent that a particular form of normative solidarity exists in East Asia, this can 
be traced to the so-called ‘ASEAN way’, which upholds the norms of non-
interference, non-alignment, and consensus decision-making. Moreover, the 
historical context behind the creation of ASEAN means that region-building is 
also an exercise in nation-building; likewise, consolidation of regional authority 
also acts to consolidate state authority.  
Hence, whilst conventional notions of normative solidarity in the IMF put 
emphasis on ‘an underlying and broadly shared sense of the rightness of its 
prescriptions’ (Pauly 2008, 190), this does not carry the same weight in ASEAN. 
Under the rubric of ASEAN, there have been a number of initiatives (with varying 
degrees of success, as outlined in Chapter 6) from the Manila Framework Group 
to the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). The Asian financial 
crisis triggered initial attempts at regional surveillance. In light of the failures of 
existing IMF surveillance in the run-up to the crisis, early studies highlighted how 
regional surveillance can complement global mechanisms as it can provide 
regional expertise and create a venue for peer review amongst other regional 
policymakers (Manzano 2001; Anas and Atje 2005). Despite these reasons, many 
observers were sceptical about the prospects of surveillance in East Asia, largely 
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due to resource and institutional limitations, leadership issues, and divergences 
in individual state interests (Hill and Menon 2012; Grimes 2012). These concerns 
persisted in the years immediately following the 2007 crisis but the noteworthy 
expansion of AMRO operations in recent years suggests that these fears may have 
been premature. The earlier rationale for regional surveillance should also be 
revisited, as the effectiveness of the peer review process has been questioned 
(Anas and Atje 2005). It is curious that in 2013, AMRO staff members Reza 
Siregar and Akkharaphol Chachitrchaidol gave an enthusiastic defence of the 
office’s decision not to publish reports and surveillance results as it: 
‘can foster an environment more conducive to an exchange of views and 
perspectives between the AMRO team and the members’ policymakers in a 
setting where authorities are more receptive and open to frank discussions 
and criticism… and prevents delays arising from requests for revision by 
the relevant country’s authorities’ (Siregar and Chabchitrchaidol 2013, 19–
20).  
Four years later, in the year of the 10th anniversary of the Asian financial 
crisis, AMRO abandoned this policy and began releasing its reports to the public. 
This new publication strategy is a core component of the office’s efforts to 
strengthen accountability mechanisms (AMRO 2018a). This development should 
be read as part of a broader shift in ASEAN’s strategic goals, as elaborated in 
Chapter 2. Whilst the centrality of the ASEAN way remains, the rationale of 
region-building now put more emphasis on asserting its place in the global 
economy (ASEAN 2015, 2017). Moreover, the rhetoric employed frames East 
Asia’s rising prominence in the global economy in terms of two dimensions: the 
first stresses the importance of maintaining domestic growth and strengthening 
internal (regional) resilience amidst external (global) risks; and the second 
underscores the region’s role as a key player in the global community and an 
acknowledgement of the responsibilities and influence that comes with it. 
It is tempting to read these changes as a reflection of regional vs. global 
tensions—an interpretation that aligns with those who view the rise of AMRO as 
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the reincarnation of proposals for an ‘Asian Monetary Fund’ (Kawai 2015). A 
similar assessment would also fit the mould of conventional explanations of 
regional cooperation as driven either by perceptions of shared national interests, 
or a reaction against a US-dominated global economic architecture.  The same 
can be observed if we analyse the rise of AMRO surveillance from the perspective 
of multi-layered governance.4 In this case, focus would be on explaining regional 
surveillance as a product of changes in the post-hegemonic global order. Multi-
layered governance has long been a feature of the global financial architecture 
but calls for increased cooperation have been joined by growing support for 
increased decentralisation in the years following the global financial crisis 
(Rodrik 2009; Sohn 2012). Global governance has been plagued by ‘gridlock’ 
(Hale, Held, and Young 2013) wherein emerging structural shifts make it more 
difficult for policy makers to cooperate across borders even as interdependence 
deepens. Difficulties in reconciling these issues have led to arguments that 
effective global financial governance need not always be equated with stronger 
international regulation (Helleiner and Pagliari 2011; Sohn 2012). This appears 
to be the more pragmatic alternative as we deal with a post-hegemonic world 
where the agenda for multilateral cooperation is ‘confronted with various and 
multi-layered levels of governance, plural actors, varying expectations, 
alternative values, different driving forces, and with unprecedented challenges 
as far as its efficiency and legitimacy are concerned’ (Telò 2012, 3). The channels 
for multilateral cooperation are being redefined in more restrictive terms, based 
on a form of collective action that encourages increasingly decentralised and 
networked based forms of multilateral cooperation (Higgott 2012). Against this 
backdrop, actors and institutions must choose between localising and globalising 
                                                        
4 A consensus on the use of ‘multi-level governance’ as an analytical framework has yet to be 
reached as scholars use the term in different contexts. Other terms such as ‘muti-tiered 
governance’, ‘polycentric governance’ and ‘spheres of authority’ are also being offered as 
alternative concepts (Bache and Flinders 2004). It is beyond the scope of this study to contribute 
to this debate. Whilst ‘multi-level governance’ may be more commonly used, it connotes a sense 
of hierarchy and vertically-structured levels of authority (Rosenau 2004). For purposes of this 
study, the term ‘multi-layered governance’ will be used to emphasise overlapping geographical 
and functional layers of governance. 
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goals as they juggle the conflicting forces between decentralisation and 
fragmentation, on the one hand, and globalisation and integration, on the other 
(Rosenau 2004).  
As the studies cited above emphasise tensions between local/regional and 
global forces, they appear to support Pauly’s aforementioned fears of ‘the 
potential erosion of normative solidarity’ (Pauly 2008, 207). However, as 
mentioned earlier, this thesis questions the validity of such qualms. In light of 
disagreements on the relevance and effectiveness of IMF surveillance amongst 
the Fund’s member countries, the notion that normative solidarity underpins 
widespread commitment to the practice of surveillance is arguably limited to the 
core objective of surveillance and the principle of external accountability. 
Focusing on regional and global tensions also cannot account for the 
simultaneous occurrence of the expansion of AMRO surveillance, the unexpected 
turn towards greater transparency, and AMRO’s repeated assertions that 
regional surveillance should complement global platforms. Yet given the 
aforementioned particularities underlying the ASEAN approach towards 
regional cooperation, the motivations for the region’s adherence to external 
accountability should be investigated further. The integration of systemic risk 
and spillover analysis in both AMRO and IMF surveillance—particularly the 
prominence of mathematical models in AMRO’s and the IMF’s surveillance 
outputs—also raises further questions that existing IPE literature has yet to 
address.  
1.1.2 Systemic risk 
Systemic risk and spillover analysis rose to the top of the post-crisis 
regulatory agenda and have consequently been incorporated into regional and 
global surveillance. Chapters 5 and 7 delve into these matters in greater detail; 
Chapter 6 focuses on macroprudential policy as a tool for mitigating systemic 
risk and analysing spillovers.  Systemic risk and macroprudential policies are 
concerned with the build-up and transmission of vulnerabilities and shocks 
between sectors and across borders. In the years following the 2007 crisis, 
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substantial progress has been made in systemic risk research; however, the 
complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities intrinsic to systemic risk have made 
it difficult to trace the origins and channels for spillovers and feedback loops. As 
the principle of external accountability drives the conduct of regional and global 
surveillance, systemic risk analysis in this context can be viewed as an implicit 
assessment of the sources and recipients of financial and macroeconomic risk. 
Surveillance thus becomes an exercise in policy justification as countries are 
compelled to justify the spillovers of their respective policies. When systemic risk 
analysis is represented as a mathematical model, the complexities, uncertainties, 
and ambiguities are necessarily minimised due to the constraints of 
mathematical formalism (as discussed in Chapter 4). Model-based surveillance 
thus becomes both precise (to the extent that specific features of systemic risk 
can be reduced to model variables) and inaccurate (in terms of providing a 
realistic representation of systemic risk). As regional and global surveillance 
offer multiple platforms for systemic risk analysis, they also offer multiple 
evaluations which can be used to justify (or deny) the external impact of 
countries’ internal policies.   
The existence of multiple overlapping surveillance assessments are 
potentially politically contentious in two ways. Aside from the possibility of 
having conflicting analyses of the sources of and risks to global stability, spatial 
representations and the demarcation of regional (internal)/global (external) 
space also contribute in light of what Shahar Hameiri calls the politics of risk 
management. This refers to ‘a unique form of territorial politics concerned with 
struggles over the scope of risk and the reach of political discussions’ (Hameiri 
2011, 383). As with this thesis, Hameiri sees transboundary risk governance as 
a conflict involving representations of risk and the geographical boundaries and 
governance arrangements that emanate from such representations. Outside the 
field of IPE, the works of sociologist Ulrich Beck (1997, 2009) also relate to this 
debate, as he is concerned with how ‘de-bounded risks’ are fundamentally 
changing modern societies and forms of governance. Whilst his arguments about 
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the cosmopolitan turn of the ‘world risk society’ are debatable, Beck’s points on 
‘relations of definition’ and how it involves conflicts over the economic and 
political consequences rooted in the technical construction of risk definition are 
helpful. His framework for relations of definition raises two questions that are 
particularly relevant to surveillance and systemic risk. He asks: 
‘What kind of knowledge or lack of knowledge of the causes, dimensions, 
actors, and so on is involved? Who lays down the causal norms… which 
decide when a cause-effect relation is to be recognised?... What counts as 
“proof” in a world where knowledge and lack of knowledge of risks are 
inextricably fused and all knowledge is contested and probabilistic?’ (Beck 
2009, 32).   
Beck’s concerns about the role of knowledge (or lack thereof) is pertinent 
in light of all the methodological roadblocks faced by systemic risk modelling. 
Studies on macroprudential policy are quite vocal on this point (A. Baker 2015; 
Borio 2010; Borio and Drehmann 2009); however, these problems are portrayed 
as temporary given the nascent stage of research on systemic risk and 
macroprudential policy (Viñals 2013). Moreover, such issues are acknowledged 
but downplayed in regional and global surveillance assessments as their 
authority is primarily based on their technical and ‘apolitical’ expertise.    
Herein lies the main interest of this thesis: If the discussion excludes 
methodological issues, then the case of surveillance and systemic risk appears to 
yield yet another reason to interpret the rise of regional surveillance in East Asia 
as a challenge to the normative solidarity that drives global economic 
governance. However, the preference of regional and global surveillance 
practitioners for model-based analysis makes such an observation problematic. 
Mathematical models are valued because of perceptions of its technical 
coherence and apolitical authority, and thus AMRO’s model-based surveillance 
analysis allows policy makers in East Asia to define and represent the sources of 
and risks to economic growth in their own terms, but in accordance with the 
parameters set for technical credibility that have been set and accepted as the 
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international standard. Hence, adherence to mathematical formalism lets 
countries in East Asia uphold their commitment to the principle of external 
accountability, but having their own regional platform for surveillance allows 
them to do so without compromising the ASEAN way.  
As useful as existing IPE literature has been, its tools and analytical 
frameworks provide inadequate guidance in exploring this particular terrain. 
This thesis aims to address this by proposing a framework for the study of the 
politics of economic methodology.  
  
1.2 The view from below: the politics of economic methodology 
Issues relating to economic methodology intersect with a wide range of 
topics already covered in IPE, including the politics of economic expertise (Ban 
2016; Seabrooke and Wigan 2016) and metrics (Broome and Quirk 2015; Mügge 
2016). The political implications of the use of macroeconomic models have also 
been tackled (Best and Widmaier 2006; Watson 2014), including analyses of 
specific institutional contexts such as the European Central Bank (Braun 2014) 
and the IMF (Clift 2018). Studies on the performativity of financial practices and 
models are also relevant, exemplified by the works of Donald MacKenzie (2008) 
and Marieke de Goede (2005). However, these scholars do not consider economic 
methodology in itself as a practice that determines how we produce knowledge 
and how such choices influence the particular features of the entities and factors 
we study (Jackson 2016). As argued above, the process of knowledge production 
and what gets included or excluded ‘in a world where knowledge and lack of 
knowledge of risks are inextricably fused and all knowledge is contested and 
probabilistic’ (Beck 2009, 32) are central to the politics of risk governance and 
representation.  
Following this, the analytical framework developed in this thesis focuses 
on the logics of reasoning and representation imposed by mainstream 
economics’ general tendency towards mathematical formalism. In contrast to 
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other related studies, this framework allows for an examination of claims of 
expertise and neutrality in models that is rooted in the methodological choices 
that shape knowledge production in economic policy. As such, the framework 
departs from existing literature by shifting the emphasis from the 
implementation of metric- or model-based economic policy to the process 
behind its design. Moreover, modelling design is investigated as a process that is 
driven not just by disciplinary and institutional constraints but by more 
fundamental methodological processes, as dictated by adherence to 
mathematical formalism. The latter approach facilitates an understanding of 
knowledge production that can also account for knowledge limitations, a 
pertinent concern especially given this thesis’ interest in systemic risk and 
macroprudential policy analysis.  
Drawing from literature on the philosophy of science (Mäki 2001a; Morgan 
2012; Reiss 2013), this approach starts from the premise that mathematical 
modelling involves setting ontological and technical constraints which 
determine the representation of ‘the economy’. However, limiting the discussion 
to perspectives from the philosophy of science reinforces the perception of 
economics and its tendency towards mathematical formalism as a problematic 
yet necessary compromise; mathematical formalism is thus portrayed as 
essential due to the demands of a consistent, universal economic logic. Insights 
from economic sociology and political theory are used to contest this narrative 
as they challenge the notion of the homogenous, impartial expert whose 
methodological choices should be viewed as simply a matter of scientific process.  
In the context of surveillance, the main concern is the representation of ‘the 
economy’ in mathematical models. As Timothy Mitchell (1998) argues, the state 
is deeply implicated in the measurement and technical construction of ‘the 
economy’ as it is a representation of a bounded object under government control; 
thus, the ontological and technical constraints in mathematical modelling 
effectively also set the boundaries in terms of state jurisdiction and 
accountability. Whilst Mitchell is referring to individual nation-states in this 
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instance, his broader point on the technical representation of ‘the economy’ as a 
constructed space for legitimation and control holds particularly true in the case 
of ASEAN, where the enforcement of economic sovereignty remains high on the 
agenda (Chapter 2). The justification for and implications of this analytical jump 
from the state to the region will be addressed in Chapter 4.  
This thesis’ conceptualisation of the politics of economic methodology 
builds on this core premise from Mitchell, and elaborates on the repercussions 
for reinforcing and challenging particular forms of economic expertise and 
authority (Chapter 4). The framework makes a case for understanding economic 
and political logics as mutually reinforcing; moreover, the logics at play in the 
process of mathematical modelling construct and maintain the illusion of 
distance between the technical and the political (Prince 2017). This interplay is 
captured in William Davies’ (2017) critique of economic rationality and 
neoliberal authority. As done in this thesis, he highlights the interdependencies 
between state authority and economic expertise and how they perpetuate 
coherence in the neoliberal state. Davies states: 
‘In order for objective representations to be generated, certain 
presuppositions and practical procedures must be adhered to that have a 
normatively binding force. The stronger the claim to value neutrality, the 
more rigidly these presuppositions and procedures must bind’ (Davies 
2017, 9).  
Moreover, it is precisely during moments of heightened uncertainty such 
as economic crises that this constructed coherence becomes more vital to the 
resolution of crises, as techniques of economic rationalisation provide ‘a single 
cognitive apparatus… a shared reality which various political, business, and 
expert actors can all agree on and inhabit’ (Davies 2017, 19). This point has 
important consequences for understanding how mathematical modelling 
operates as the shared language of regional and global surveillance, and how it 
fosters a false sense of confidence that we can monitor and control systemic risk 
despite its inherent complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities. Mathematical 
17 
 
formalism thus becomes ‘a flexible methodological glue’ (Morgan 2012, 399) that 
binds separate surveillance practices together whilst also creating space for the 
emergence of a surfeit of ‘new and artificial “realit[ies]” (Caballero 2010, 89). 
These models representing new and artificial realities are not just a product of 
ontological and technical constraints; they are also political statements on the 
boundaries of state jurisdiction and accountability. 
Hence, whilst this thesis’ interest in economic methodology shares 
similarities with Davies’ study, the focus on regional and global surveillance 
requires a deeper investigation of issues of accountability than done in his 
investigation of competition policy, as the politics of risk governance and 
representation comes to the fore. In this regard, Beck’s notion of organised 
irresponsibility is relevant: the proliferation of overlapping surveillance 
frameworks fosters organised irresponsibility in that even as actors or 
institutions acknowledge the emergence of potential and actual risks and 
recognise the need to contain them, they create and become entrapped in a 
complicated framework for providing evidence and assigning accountability. 
This can be used as a justification to understate the existence of certain risks, 
deny their causes, and spurn any ability to control them (Beck 1997, 2009).  
Studying surveillance and systemic risk as a manifestation of the politics of 
economic methodology is essential if we are to uncover these issues that have 
been traditionally overlooked by IPE literature. The analytical framework 
presented in Chapter 4 elaborates on particular methodological and political 
logics underpinning mathematical modelling, as done in regional and global 
surveillance. It will be used to illustrate how mathematical formalism creates a 
semblance of coherence in global economic governance that supports the 
expansion of both regional and global surveillance. The politics of economic 
methodology also sheds light on the appeal of surveillance as a technocratic 
regulatory project and a useful political resource.  Revisiting the supposed 
contradictions in post-crisis global economic governance that were raised in the 
introduction of this chapter, the politics of economic methodology can 
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simultaneously account for the growing demands for and limitations of technical 
rationalisation in global economic governance. It can also accommodate the 
complementary and competitive dynamics between AMRO and IMF surveillance.  
 These concerns and analytical parameters motivate the research 
questions and contributions of this thesis, which will be covered in the next 
section. 
   
1.3 The view from a different angle: research questions and thesis 
contributions 
Following the discussion above, this thesis seeks to address the following 
research question: 
How can the persistence and expansion of technical interventions in post-
crisis global economic governance be used as a political resource? 
This will be explored through the following supporting questions: 
(i) In what ways are mathematical surveillance models political 
representations of economic growth? 
(ii) To the extent that post-crisis surveillance reform focuses on 
systemic risk and macroprudential policy, how has this changed 
efforts to exert technical control over regional and global economic 
growth and stability? 
(iii) How does the recent proliferation of regional and global 
surveillance models define and displace accountability in global 
economic governance? 
In light of the considerations raised in the previous sections, it is worth 
reiterating how certain concepts are applied in this thesis within specific 
parameters. Firstly, whilst it is acknowledged that the surveillance toolkit is not 
limited to mathematical models, the use of ‘cutting-edge techniques’ (IEO 2017, 
29) in surveillance is given utmost importance. This drives this thesis’ focus on 
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the methodological and political rationale for the expansion of technical 
interventions in global economic governance. Hence, mathematical models used 
to support surveillance analysis—specifically those related to systemic risk and 
macroprudential policy—are the main objects of analysis in this thesis. Secondly, 
the various dimensions of accountability in global economic governance5 are 
also recognised, but the main basis for the assessment of accountability is the 
principle of external accountability. This thesis limits its analysis to how regional 
and global surveillance practices uphold this principle, specifically in the ways 
they use their respective surveillance models for policy justification and to 
substantiate assessments of the sources and transmission of risk. 
The main contribution of this thesis is the development of an analytical 
framework for the politics of economic methodology, as introduced in the 
previous section and expanded in Chapter 4. To date, there has yet to be an IPE-
based investigation that traces the logics behind the reasoning and 
representation of particular methodological practices in economics in the 
manner outlined in the previous section. In this regard, the approach developed 
here aims to serve as a catalyst for dialogue that encourages greater reflexivity 
amongst social scientists about their methodological choices. Greater 
methodological reflexivity is all the more urgent as scholars announce ‘the death 
of expertise’ (Nichols 2017) and politicians proclaim that ‘people in this country 
have had enough of experts’ (attributed to Michael Gove, cited in Mance 2016). 
This thesis is not meant to be an unequivocal critique against a particular type of 
expertise; rather, it hopes to shed light on the important ways methodological 
choices—which are rarely acknowledged, let alone openly discussed—can 
simultaneously strengthen perceptions of expert authority and provide a 
rationale for its limitations. In this regard, there are opportunities for the 
application of the analytical framework in other areas concerned with the 
politics of knowledge production. 
                                                        
5 For instance, see the articles in the 2004 special issue of Governance and Opposition. 
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This thesis also contributes to empirical discussions on two themes: 
surveillance in the context of systemic risk and macroprudential policy and East 
Asian regionalism in the context of post-crisis global economic governance.  On 
the first topic, the wider implications of the IMF’s 2012 Integrated Surveillance 
Decision have not been given due attention in IPE literature. Granted, the 
implementation of the resulting reforms is still ongoing; moreover, there has 
only been one comprehensive assessment—the 2014 Triennial Surveillance 
Review—available to researchers as the next review has been postponed to 2019 
with an interim review planned for this year (IMF 2018c). To the extent that the 
Integrated Surveillance Decision has been tackled in academic literature, 
scholars tend to give it a passing mention as a new development in the global 
architecture for financial regulation (Knight 2014; Lupo-Pasini 2017). Bessma 
Momani and Kevin A. English (2014) devote more attention to the Integrated 
Surveillance Decision and converge with this thesis to a limited extent as the 
authors highlight the repercussions in terms of collective action. As with this 
thesis, Momani and English view the Integrated Surveillance Decision as a 
reinterpretation of existing responsibilities; however, they do not provide an 
assessment as to its implications for systemic risk and macroprudential policy, 
nor comment on the prospects in terms of the rise of regional surveillance. Biagio 
Bossone and Roberta Marra (2013) also allude to similar themes as they argue 
that the Integrated Surveillance Decision provides the impetus for a ‘Good Global 
Citizen’ remit for the international community. However, the authors also do not 
draw any links with the Integrated Surveillance Decision’s impact on the politics 
of systemic risk and macroprudential policy analysis. Moreover, the discussion 
on the significance of methodological complexities, uncertainties, and 
ambiguities also offers another case that can complement broader post-crisis IPE 
and economic sociology literature on the uncertainties pervading global 
governance (Best 2014) and how such uncertainties can be used for strategic 
purposes (Davies and McGoey 2012).  
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As for the second topic on East Asian regionalism in the context of post-
crisis global economic governance, the literature is much more extensive. 
Relative to surveys of regionalism after the Asian financial crisis, various 
assessments are more circumspect about the overall impact in terms of regional 
cohesion. Observations thus far note varying degrees of regional assertion or a 
shift from regional to national and global measures (Chin 2010; Emmers and 
Ravenhill 2011; Katada 2011). William Grimes argued even before the global 
financial crisis that the progress in East Asian financial regionalism should be 
seen as an act of ‘regional nesting’ as these initiatives ultimately reinforce the 
established global financial architecture (Grimes 2006). His assessment of the 
prospects of regional liquidity arrangements are similarly sceptical (Grimes 
2011). This thesis is the first study to offer an extensive analysis of AMRO 
surveillance, which can add nuance to the existing debates in areas of trade and 
financial regionalism. Whilst this thesis shares the interest of existing literature 
in avoiding an assessment based on regional vs. global polarities, the debates 
have yet to consider how knowledge production and methodological practices 
come into play in institutional practices. Although there has been work on 
development paradigms (e.g., Beijing Consensus, which will be covered in 
Chapter 2), it has not been possible to situate these discussions within official 
rhetoric as such discourse is not formally embedded in institutional knowledge 
production and methodological practices.  
 
1.4 Methodology and data 
As an investigation of methodological practices, it would be remiss of this 
thesis to not disclose its position within the ‘philosophical wagers’ (Jackson 
2016, 54) that motivate methodological choices in the study of political science. 
Following Patrick Jackson’s work, a wager specifies the researcher, the world to 
be researched, and the nature of the relationship between them. His framework 
locates four such wagers—neopositivism, critical realism, analyticism, and 
reflexivity—depending on the relationship between the knower and the known 
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and between knowledge and observation. This thesis falls under the category of 
reflexivity, as it views ‘the economy’ (as represented in surveillance analyses) as 
‘endogenous to social practices of knowledge-production, including (but not 
limited to) scholarly practices’ (Jackson 2016, 39). In contrast to the other types, 
the approach adopted in this thesis aligns more closely with reflexivity given its 
interest in revealing how the process of knowledge production is embedded in 
the practice of research itself and the social and the political circumstances of the 
researcher. These circumstances act as ‘logics of distinction’ (e.g., ‘East’ vs. ‘West’ 
or regional vs. global in the case at hand); reflexivity holds that scientific 
knowledge reflects such logics of distinction and in turn ‘either reinforces or 
challenges these distinctions’ (Jackson 2016, 174). This is an important theme 
that is central to this thesis, one that is not shared with other categories in 
Jackson’s typology. It should be noted that the choice to align with reflexivity is 
not based on an evaluation of its relative strengths; rather, the choice is driven 
by the particular concerns of this thesis in knowledge production. Moreover, 
establishing this thesis as a reflexivist study helps situate the methodological 
choices made in the analysis and clarifies the implications of taking such an 
approach when evaluating the generalisability of the research findings.  
On methodological choices, reflexivity’s focus on examining knowledge as 
a product of the social and political circumstances of the researcher requires the 
thesis to shift its focus from the level of individual researchers working at the 
IMF and AMRO, to the historical and political circumstances of the two 
institutions and, in the case of AMRO, the region it represents. Reflexivity also 
posits that knowledge is transfactual in that valid knowledge-claims can be made 
by looking beyond established facts and experiences and examining the factors 
and processes that gave rise to such facts and experiences. Hence, in addition to 
considering the historical and political context surrounding IMF and AMRO 
operations, this thesis also accounts for the methodological presuppositions that 
IMF and AMRO staff members are assumed to carry as mainstream economists. 
As this thesis focuses on the methodological complexities, uncertainties, and 
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ambiguities plaguing systemic risk and macroprudential policy analysis, it also 
takes into account methodological ‘silences’ or non-disclosure of limitations of 
model-based surveillance analysis in light of methodological choices made.   
As for the implications of generating research findings from a reflexivist 
standpoint, the aforementioned views on the process of knowledge production 
create significant limits as far as causal or explanatory conjectures go. As a 
reflexivist study, this thesis does not aim to produce falsifiable hypotheses or 
representational claims based on ideal-types or case studies. Instead, it offers an 
interpretation of regional and global surveillance as both an object and 
determinant of methodological and political processes. As argued by Jackson, 
‘[f]or reflexivists, it is never appropriate to understand an empirical claim as 
simply a representation or depiction of a situation or a state of affairs; rather, 
every empirical claim is dialectically involved in a struggle with its object, and is 
as such necessarily perspectival’ (Jackson 2016, 191). Hence, this thesis offers an 
in-depth investigation of how these dynamics operate (specifically through the 
mechanisms outlined in Chapter 4) in the unique context of IMF and AMRO 
surveillance and the interplay between the two practices.  Nonetheless, studying 
the case of East Asia yields interesting insights for other regions, as will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this section.  
Another limitation of this thesis’ methodology involves a possible duality 
resulting from the involvement of two ‘researchers’ in the study: the thesis 
author, on the one hand, and IMF and AMRO economists, on the other. In relation 
to the two points made earlier on the researcher’s worldview (or the relationship 
between the knower and the known), the first point on ‘the economy’ refers to 
the author’s own views. The second point on the social and political 
circumstances of the researcher refers to IMF and AMRO economists. Due to time 
and resource constraints, it was not possible to conduct interviews with IMF and 
AMRO economists to ascertain their own worldviews and how this translates to 
their methodological choices, although Ben Clift’s recent study on the IMF 
suggests a degree of ‘cognitive dissonance’ (Clift 2018, 8) amongst the Fund’s 
24 
 
staff members. Establishing the importance of such cognitive dissonance in 
shaping methodological choices in IMF and AMRO research is a crucial point, 
although one that is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Case selection for this thesis is based on understanding AMRO surveillance 
as an influential case, one that can illustrate ‘why apparent deviations from the 
norm are not really deviant… once the circumstances of the special case or cases 
are fully understood’ (Gerring 2007, 108, emphasis in original). AMRO is only one 
of many regional arrangements that are part of an expanding global financial 
stability network. AMRO is the official surveillance unit of East Asia’s Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM). CMIM is a US$240 billion regional reserve-
pooling arrangement that can be used by ASEAN+3 members in need of liquidity 
support (ASEAN+3 2012). Similar initiatives can be found across different 
regions, such as the Arab Monetary Fund, BRICS Contingent Reserve 
Arrangement, Eurasian Fund for Stabilisation and Development, European 
Stability Mechanism, and the Latin American Reserve Fund (Fondo 
Latinoamericano de Reservas or FLAR). Such regional liquidity arrangements are 
seen as an important line of defence and mechanism for self-insurance in times 
of global financial instability. For instance, FLAR was established in 1978 
(originally as the Fondo Andino de Reservas or Andean Reserve Fund) in 
response to the region’s rising vulnerability to external financing and the 
absence of adequate and timely funding mechanisms that do not carry the 
damaging stigma attached to loan conditionalities (Ocampo and Titelman 2012). 
Chapter 2 will shed light on the parallels between the rationale for the 
creation of FLAR and CMIM. In another point of similarity with CMIM, FLAR 
expanded in the years after the global financial crisis, both in terms of 
membership (with the addition of Uruguay in 2008 and Paraguay in 2015) and 
subscribed capital (Ocampo and Titelman 2012, Cheng et al 2018). It has also 
strengthened its surveillance capabilities in recent years with the work of FLAR’s 
Division of Economic Studies (Grabel 2018). Whilst the resemblance in pre- and 
post-global financial crisis developments should not be dismissed, there are 
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important divergences given this thesis’ interest in tracing institutional 
processes of knowledge production. FLAR may have a longer history and an 
established reputation as a reliable creditor in the region (as opposed to CMIM, 
which has yet to be used by any of the ASEAN+3 member states), yet it takes a 
highly minimalist approach to surveillance. In contrast to AMRO, FLAR does not 
have an official framework for monitoring and consultation (Cheng et al 2018). 
Moreover, the Division of Economic Studies does not operate as a formal 
surveillance unit (Titelman et al 2014) and its monitoring is largely peer-based 
and country-specific (Grabel 2018). With respect to areas of shared concern such 
as regional stability and risks, FLAR takes part in informal consultations with the 
IMF (Cheng et al 2018). Chapter 6 will demonstrate how East Asian surveillance 
evolved from a previously similar approach to the current expansion of AMRO’s 
surveillance operations.  
As this thesis draws from John Gerring’s definition of what constitutes an 
influential case, the criterion for analysing case deviations in regional 
arrangements in this context must be first established. If we are mainly 
concerned with regional arrangements as a line of defence and mechanism for 
self-insurance, then the parallels between East Asia’s and Latin America’s 
respective experiences should be taken into consideration. Although her focus 
was not on FLAR but on the Union of South American Nations and the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (more commonly known as UNASUR and 
ALBA, respectively), Pia Riggirozzi (2010) notes that more recent regional 
initiatives in Latin America are not straightforward manifestations of defensive 
regionalism—an observation that also overlaps with the case of East Asia. 
However, this thesis is more interested in challenging conventional notions of 
regional vs. global processes as manifested through knowledge production. 
FLAR’s continued minimalist approach in surveillance may be interpreted as 
indifference or reluctance to contest the IMF’s status as the dominant technical 
authority in global economic governance. Following this line of thinking, AMRO’s 
expansion may be construed as a more aggressive attempt to challenge IMF 
26 
 
surveillance. Yet analysing the rise of AMRO surveillance as a manifestation of 
the politics of economic methodology belies this notion.  
It bears repeating that as a reflexivist study, it is not advisable to use the 
findings of this thesis to draw direct comparisons between the case of East Asia 
and that of other regions. Nonetheless, observers calling for the expansion of 
FLAR are watching the developments in CMIM and AMRO and looking into the 
possibility of having an institutionalised surveillance platform in Latin America 
(Titelman et al 2014). In this regard, the case of AMRO may yield useful insights 
for the development of future regional surveillance mechanisms.  
As for data selection, this thesis focuses on two sets of documents to 
demonstrate how analyses from spillover models are used in surveillance 
reports and policy documents, highlighting different implications for external 
accountability and policy justification. The first set includes the 2017 IMF 
Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and the Pacific (IMF 2017d) and the 2017 
ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook (AMRO 2017b). In this case, the emphasis 
is on spillovers across geographical categories (i.e., between domestic and global 
factors, or internal and external risk). The second case underscores sectoral 
spillovers (e.g., between the state and market, and real and financial sectors). The 
documents covered in this set are the 2017 IMF Article IV Consultation report for 
China (IMF 2017c) and the AMRO working paper High Corporate Debt in China: 
Macro and Sectoral Risk Assessments (Poonpatpibul et al. 2017). Whilst the focus 
is on the experience of China, the implied debates in these documents on the 
state/market and real/financial sectors divide is indicative of broader 
discussions on the experience of various East Asian states on the role of the state 
in steering funds into specific industries identified as critical to economic growth.  
As mentioned earlier, AMRO only started releasing its publications in 2017, 
hence the limited timeframe for the document analysis.  However, as this thesis 
seeks to contextualise these surveillance documents against a broader historical 
and political backdrop, the case studies are examined on the basis of the 
transformation of discourse on economic growth in East Asia from the early 
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1990s (prior to the Asian financial crisis) until 2018 (just over a decade after the 
global financial crisis first hit). Framing the analysis around these two crises 
allows this thesis to trace distinct shifts in the relationship between East Asia and 
the IMF (and the countries dominating the institution). The discourse on 
economic growth and the mathematical models used to underpin related 
surveillance analyses are analysed using official IMF and ASEAN documents 
(including working papers, speeches, and press releases) as well as various 
related academic and policy literature. As a key supporter of surveillance in East 
Asia, sources from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are also examined. ASEAN 
and ADB reports are used jointly to represent the case of East Asia, given the 
close links between the two institutions in terms of surveillance and technical 
analysis, as discussed further in Chapter 7.   
In light of this thesis’ heavy reliance on documentary analysis, a few 
qualifications need to be raised. The more important one relates to the role of 
IMF and AMRO economists in model development and surveillance analysis. As 
mentioned earlier, the lack of interview data means that this thesis shifts its gaze 
from the individual researcher to the institution. Hence, the analysis of IMF and 
AMRO staff members is limited to their role as bureaucratic economists who 
need to work within disciplinary and institutional constraints (Davies 2011). 
Contrary to other studies dealing with the politics of expertise, this thesis does 
not emphasise factors such as professional networks, hiring practices, and 
educational background. Where public information is available, comments are 
made on previous affiliations of key staff members (e.g., AMRO chief economist); 
however, such factors are not treated as important points of analysis in the 
context of the thesis. Greater emphasis on the dynamics at the institutional level 
is warranted given this thesis’ interest in the evolving relationship between East 
Asia and the IMF. 
Another issue relates to the document as an object of enquiry. In this 
regard, IMF, AMRO, and ADB publications are examined not just as a data source 
but as a site for conversation. Hence, these documents are analysed in relation to 
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their stated surveillance objectives and the underlying commitment to external 
accountability. IMF, AMRO, and ADB reports are viewed in terms of their 
assumed readers and the context in which the documents were produced 
(Atkinson and Coffey 2011, cited in Bryman 2016), including any connections to 
other documents which are directly or implicitly part of the broader 
conversation.     
Moreover, the documentary analysis carried out in this thesis also pays 
attention to the structure and organisation of the text (e.g., in terms of the 
elements included in summary highlights) and any omissions or gaps (Rapley 
2007), particularly those related to methodological limitations. For instance, 
even though IMF staff recognise any uncertainties or limitations related to their 
surveillance analysis in interviews (Clift 2018) or in technical working papers 
(as mentioned in Chapter 7), the omission of these details in the main 
surveillance reports is noteworthy as most readers of such reports will not 
consult related background papers. 
These methodological and data considerations determine the scope and 
limitations of this thesis as a reflexivist interpretation of regional and global 
surveillance. With these in mind, the next section will outline the main findings 
and key points that will unfold in the subsequent chapters.  
 
1.5 Main findings and chapter structure  
This thesis develops in two parts. The next three chapters lay out the 
contextual and conceptual foundations of the study. As a grounded analysis of 
regional surveillance requires a good understanding of the articulation of an 
‘East Asian model’ of economic growth, Chapter 2 outlines the transformation of 
the discourse on economic growth in the region from the early 1990s until 2018 
and how it relates to paradigms advocated by the West, primarily through 
western-dominated international financial institutions (IFIs). The discussion 
underscores the need to investigate East vs. West dichotomies, why these 
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constructed cleavages persist, and how East Asian countries use them to provide 
the economic and political rationale for their chosen path towards economic 
growth. These issues drive different conceptions of how sources of and risks to 
economic growth are defined and approached, which are reflected in the 
perception and construction of geographical (e.g., regional and global, internal 
and external) and sectoral (e.g., state and market, real and financial sectors) 
categories. This subsequently shapes the representation of ‘the economy’ in 
surveillance analysis, and in the mathematical models used to support it. 
Despite growing recognition of the dangers of overreliance on 
mathematical models, its influence in economic policy formulation still 
persists—this remains the case in financial and macroeconomic surveillance. 
Whilst regional surveillance offers East Asia the chance to present its own 
assessment of what constitutes ‘strong’ economic growth fundamentals, the 
region does so in terms considered appropriate by the gatekeepers of global 
economic governance. Chapter 3 examines the continued dominance of 
mathematical modelling in economics as a consequence of disciplinary politics, 
focusing on the developments (or lack thereof) in mathematical modelling in 
after the global financial crisis. The chapter also sheds light on the implications 
of the rising awareness of the limitations of mathematical models, as the 
acceptance of modelling’s deficiencies has served to fuel the expansion of 
technical rationalisation whilst absolving it of any shortcomings. This puzzle 
merits further investigation, and the development of alternative explanations for 
the continued dominance of mathematical modelling. 
Chapter 4 develops an analytical framework to address the aforementioned 
conundrum, as it makes a case for investigating mathematical modelling through 
the politics of economic methodology. The framework presents an approach for 
unpacking mathematical modelling and the economic and political logics driving 
modelling’s particular form of reasoning and representation. It argues that the 
mutually constitutive link between economic and political logics serves to create 
and reinforce the illusion of distance between the technical (or economic) and 
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political. This facilitates the simultaneous definition and displacement of 
accountability in global economic governance, as will be shown in the 
subsequent chapters on systemic risk and surveillance. Following this, the 
mathematical models used in surveillance are both technical representations of 
and political statements on economic growth and its sources and consequences.  
Systemic risk modelling then presents a new challenge, as research on 
systemic risk emphasises the difficulties of accurately tracing the transmission 
of risk due to interdependencies and feedback loops. Focusing on systemic risk’s 
inherent uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, Chapter 5 illustrates how the 
creation and expansion of efforts to exercise technocratic control over systemic 
risk upholds the illusion of distance between the technical and the political. It 
examines how definitions of systemic risk are both technical and political 
constructions as it involves identifying links to determine causality and 
accountability in managing economic stability within and across countries. As 
the nature of systemic risk blurs straightforward cause-and-effect links, the 
representation of systemic risk in mathematical models can exacerbate 
problems with how surveillance seeks to hold countries accountable to the 
international community for the external effects of their domestic policies.  
The last two chapters present a detailed analysis of how the 
aforementioned issues shape the implementation of surveillance and its post-
crisis preoccupation with macroprudential policy as the main tool for regulating 
systemic risk. Chapter 6 analyses the evolution of multilateral surveillance in the 
IMF and AMRO through the principle of external accountability. In the case of 
IMF surveillance, the principle is used to account for the persistence of 
surveillance despite gaps between its theoretical rationale and actual practice. In 
the case of AMRO surveillance, commitment to external accountability is viewed 
in terms of domestic legitimacy and international credibility. However, despite 
shared adherence to external accountability, the methodological complexities, 
uncertainties, and ambiguities plaguing macroprudential policy suggest that the 
validity of model-based surveillance analyses needs to be qualified. Nonetheless, 
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such concerns did not diminish the proliferation of spillover models in regional 
and global surveillance.  
Chapter 7 examines the specific case of spillover models used by the IMF, 
ADB, and AMRO, and how geographical and sectoral categories persist alongside 
acknowledgement of deepening and growing interdependencies. As raised in 
Chapter 2, discrete geographical and sectoral categories are fundamental to the 
modelling process. This is reflected in how various discursive strands on the 
causes of and solutions for economic growth and decline in East Asia are also 
underpinned by a discussion of whether the causes and solutions lie in the real 
or financial sector, or should be treated as internal or external. Lessons from the 
global financial crisis challenged orthodox understandings of these categories, 
but these cannot be properly translated in mathematical models because of 
ontological and technical constraints. The inherent limitations of such models 
have been recognised, but this realisation has only led to the proliferation of 
various spillover models rather than a more cautious and critical approach to 
their use. The emergence of different spillover models to support regional and 
global surveillance creates opportunities for political manoeuvring as each side 
is able to present different representations of the sources of systemic risk. 
However, any disagreements which may surface can be reduced to 
methodological issues. Hence, accountability is essentially displaced by the 











The Articulation of Economic Growth in East Asia:  
Reconsidering East vs. West Dichotomies 
 
 ‘If Asia resumes fast growth within the next two years and if in the meantime the 
United States goes into recession as the stock market and currency bubbles burst, 
we may again look to Asian models, as in the 1980s, for lessons on how to improve 
the parlous performance of American capitalism’  
(Wade and Veneroso 1998, 21)  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Financial and macroeconomic surveillance involves the construction of 
metrics and models that determine the components of ‘strong’ economic 
fundamentals and how this translates to growth. As this thesis seeks to explore 
how surveillance analyses are both technical representations of and political 
statements on economic growth, this chapter analyses the transformation of 
discourse on the ‘East Asian model’ of economic growth as a product of political 
contestations regarding geographical (East vs. West, internal vs. external) and 
sectoral (state vs. market, real vs. financial) categories. Investigating the political 
factors driving the construction and application of such categories is of particular 
importance in this thesis. As the technical exigencies of surveillance models 
effectively preclude consideration of the political factors behind purportedly 
apolitical categories, this chapter challenges the duality of the aforementioned 
geographical and sectoral labels in light of changes in East Asia’s historical and 
political circumstances over the last few decades. The use of these categories is 
also analysed in the context of policy justification, as assessments of economic 
growth and decline in East Asia tend to be framed in terms of dichotomies 
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between geographical and sectoral categories. Various accounts of the causes of 
economic growth (or solutions in the case of economic decline) normally 
privilege one category over another. This is reflected in how the dominant 
narrative during the Asian financial crisis attributed the collapse to allegedly 
‘internal’ factors such as the state and crony capitalism; the tone changed in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis as the downturn was attributed to 
‘external’ factors. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, regional and global surveillance are a 
form of territorial politics as they involve setting the scope for transboundary 
risk governance (Hameiri 2011). This can be observed in the use of geographical 
categories in narratives of financial crises. Spatial representations of financial 
crises are crucial for a deeper understanding of the channels and mechanisms 
through which individuals and institutions are connected in a financial system 
(French, Leyshon, and Thrift 2009). However, the use of geographical categories 
also carries strong political connotations. In the case of the 1997 crisis, 
references to ‘Asia’ or ‘East Asia’ suggested: 
‘not just a relatively short temporal frame to the events that transpired 
(and therefore preclude discussion of long-term contradictions in 
contemporary capitalist development), but also to delimit the spatial extent 
of the events and their cause. An “Asian” crisis implies not only that the 
problem lies within Asia and not in the wider global financial system, but 
also that “Asia” can be generalised and understood as a unitary entity’ (P. 
F. Kelly, Olds, and Yeung 2001, x).  
In the case of the 2007 crisis, the inclusion of the word ‘global’ has long 
been commonplace but this does not mean that it has gone uncontested. Kishore 
Mahbubani, designated ‘muse of the Asian Century’ (AsiaOne 2011), argues that 
the said downturn ‘should adopt its logical name: the Western financial crisis’ 
(Mahbubani 2011). Shaun Breslin (2011a) notes that the crisis revived 
discussions of a ‘clash of capitalisms’ pitting the East against the West. 
Mahbubani describes Asian capitalism as one that emphasises strong 
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government supervision of financial markets where ‘the “invisible hand” of free 
markets will be balanced by the “visible hand” of good governance’ (Mahbubani 
2009). Such debates are not new and similar themes appear in topics beyond 
financial crises. In the early 1990s, East Asian leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew 
(Singapore) and Mahathir bin Mohamed (Malaysia) played up the idea of ‘Asian 
values’, purportedly based on respect for authority, hard work, frugality, 
discipline, social harmony, and the primacy of the group over the individual 
(Langguth 2003; Miller 2004). The Asian values debate was primarily set up to 
counter the spread of ‘Western liberalism’, construed as excessive individualism 
and a predilection for open political conflict. These leaders argued that the Asian 
way facilitated political stability and economic development in the region, 
although others believe that the rhetoric was not driven by confidence in the 
region’s success but used to marginalise dissenting views that sought to 
challenge authoritarian rule (Rodan 1996). Whilst Mahbubani’s claims are not a 
defence of past authoritarian leadership in East Asia, his arguments are built on 
observations on the decline of the West and the rise of the East. A respected 
diplomat in Singapore, Mahbubani presents his views as ‘a gift to the West’ 
(Mahbubani 2018, cited in Nye 2018) as he highlights the dangers of Western 
hubris and the lessons Western leaders supposedly can learn from their Asian 
counterparts. Clearly, the political use of East vs. West discourse has survived the 
test of time.  
Beyond overt political incitements, various takes on so-called ‘Asian 
capitalism’ and ‘Asian values’ permeate both academic and policy discourse. 
Certain threads, such as those referred to above, tend to frame the discussion in 
terms of clearly defined ‘East vs. West’ dichotomies—the same can be observed 
in the discourse on the ‘East Asian model’ of economic growth. Framing economic 
growth models in such a way has important implications in the conduct of 
multilateral surveillance, particularly with respect to the principle of external 
accountability. This discourse is not simply an explanation of the causes of and 
solutions for economic growth and decline in East Asia; it is also a discussion on 
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whether the causes and solutions are internal (i.e., domestic or regional) or 
external. Whilst full implementation of the principle of external accountability 
has been difficult in practice, commitment to multilateral surveillance still drives 
countries to justify their policy choices to one another. Hence, multilateral 
surveillance operates based on a sense of ‘normative solidarity’ (Pauly 2008, 
207), one that can be challenged when subscribing to constructed notions of 
different Western or East Asian models of growth.     
The difficulty of formulating a coherent characterisation of the East Asian 
region is acknowledged; however, digging deeper into the persistence of East vs. 
West dichotomies requires that the point of reference—the articulation of the 
East Asian growth model as opposed to one advocated by the West—be 
established in the first place. The notion of regional space as used in this thesis is 
less about highlighting a shared identity, economic or otherwise. Rather, the 
focus is on the conception and perceived utility of the region as an economic 
space and community—an area seen as distinct from the wider global space but 
with fluid and intersecting boundaries and membership (Dent 2010). Building 
on the aforementioned implications of spatial representations on transboundary 
risk governance, the application of the term ‘region’ in this sense is also 
strategic:6 Using such geographical categories delimits acceptable accounts of 
economic processes and appropriate policy responses, whilst also validating the 
legitimacy of the authorities tasked to govern particular spaces.  
This chapter demonstrates how geographical divisions—and the sectoral 
categories that emanate from them—serve similar strategic purposes and relates 
this to the conduct of regional surveillance in East Asia. Instead of simply 
disregarding flawed East vs. West dichotomies, the subsequent discussion 
underscores the need to investigate why these cleavages persist and how East 
Asian countries use them to provide the economic and political rationale for their 
                                                        
6 Philip F. Kelly (2001) gives an insightful analysis of how metaphorical representations were 
used by Malaysian and Singaporean policymakers during the Asian financial crisis to defend 
policy choices and garner support for their respective governments.  
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chosen path towards economic growth. These issues drive different conceptions 
of how risks to economic growth are defined and approached. This subsequently 
shapes the representation of economic growth in the financial and 
macroeconomic models used in the surveillance process. Regional surveillance 
in East Asia is thus both a technical and political exercise, a tool that 
policymakers in the region can use to strengthen economic sovereignty as 
regional surveillance can be used to legitimate local authority to global 
audiences. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 outlines the 
evolution of the general discourse on economic growth in East Asia from the 
early 1990s until 2018 and how it relates to models advocated by the West, 
primarily through the IFIs it dominates. Moving beyond East vs. West frames, 
Section 2.3 examines how other geographical and sectoral categories have been 
reflected in technical discourse on economic growth in East Asia over the same 
time frame. Section 2.4 contextualises the discussion in the previous two sections 
as a reflection of how East Asian countries attempt to exercise economic 
sovereignty, and how this is subsequently reconciled given the region’s growing 
role in the global economy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, regional 
institutions such as ASEAN provide a venue for member countries to consolidate 
national authority through regional means; at the same time, ASEAN seeks to 
bolster regional authority by asserting its status as an important member of the 
global community. The fluid boundaries of what constitutes regional space in 
East Asia exacerbate tensions underlying East vs. West dichotomies, which also 
have important repercussions for external accountability. Commitment to the 
principle of external accountability requires countries to justify the external 
consequences of their respective internal policies, as stressed in Chapter 1. The 
continued use of rigid spatial boundaries amidst growing and deepening 
interdependencies is thus conceptually problematic yet strategically useful when 
used in surveillance analyses. As it presents its own assessment of East Asia’s 
economic performance, regional surveillance allows East Asian countries to 
37 
 
adhere to external accountability without compromising economic sovereignty; 
likewise, regional surveillance can be used to enhance international credibility 
whilst strengthening domestic legitimacy. 
 
2.2 Tracing the discourse on economic growth in East Asia  
In analysing how East Asia’s place in the global economy has evolved 
through the years, historical accounts of economic growth in the region tend to 
highlight processes of colonialism and development through modernisation and 
incorporation into Western markets (Arrighi, Hamashita, and Selden 2003; 
Berger 2009 cited in Elias and Rethel 2016).  For example, Sugihara (2003) 
contrasts the region’s ‘industrious revolution’ (characterised by the rise of 
labour-intensive technologies) with the West’s capital- and resource-intensive 
industrial revolution, with the former depicted largely as a result of East Asian 
economies’ response towards circumstances shaped by developments in the 
West. Whilst these factors affected East Asia’s growth in fundamental ways, this 
section focuses instead on the transformation of the discourse on economic 
growth in East Asia as a product of shifts in state strategy7 in a changing global 
(i.e., not merely Western) economy—one which they are (in varying degrees) 
actively part of and not merely passive players. In this discussion, economic 
growth discourse is analysed as a reflection of strategies enacted by a state 
viewed as ‘a territorially and functionally dispersed system’, one whose 
‘structural selectivity… [is] contingent upon the actions and strategic endeavours 
of a whole plethora of agents peculiar to specific places and times’ (MacLeod and 
Goodwin 1999, 516). Investigating economic growth discourse in these terms is 
necessary given this thesis’ interest in surveillance as a platform for policy 
justification. This section provides an overview of the shifts in the discourse on 
                                                        
7 This draws from an understanding of state strategy as a ‘pattern of intervention in the economy 
and society which “(a) favours the course of [a particular] accumulation strategy and the flow of 
material benefits to the requisite social base; and (b) constructs forms of representation that 
systematically favours the access of the key sectors and social groups to sites of political and 
economic power”’ (Jessop et. al. 1988, cited in MacLeod and Goodwin 1999, 516).  
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economic growth in East Asia from the early 1990s until 2018. This period 
bookends two events—the Asian and global financial crises—which represent 
crucial turning points in contemporary East Asia’s economic trajectory. 
2.2.1 East Asian Miracle 
In the years following the escalation of the Cold War, strong economic 
growth in various countries in East Asia was mainly attributed to the crucial role 
of the developmental state.8 Chalmers Johnson’s (1982) canonical book MITI and 
the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy spawned various studies on 
the remarkable success of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (for instance, see the 
volume edited by Woo-Cumings 1999).  The developmental state refers to 
countries pursuing aggressive industrial promotion through investment 
facilitation and resource mobilisation and reallocation. Selected industries are 
supported through extensive planning, intervention, and regulation, ‘creating 
rents by distorting markets’ (Wade 2004, xviii) to facilitate investment in sectors 
deemed crucial to the state’s long-term economic growth and maintain political 
support for such policies. Developmental states are also characterised by high 
household savings, high corporate debt-equity ratios, and close bank-firm-state 
collaboration (Wade and Veneroso 1998). Specific policies include technology 
transfers, export promotion, moderation of foreign competition in selected 
sectors, and control of domestic credit to ensure that finance can be directed to 
support industry objectives. Plan rationality and the central role of a relatively 
autonomous economic technocracy are crucial to policy making (Deans 1996). 
Smooth implementation also requires a tightly run state bureaucracy and 
consolidated state power to limit the space for opposing coalitions.  Corporatist 
political structures foster institutional stability and minimise conflicts between 
key interest groups, thus making it easier to maintain high levels of investment 
in the chosen industrial sectors.  
                                                        
8 The works of Meredith Woo-Cumings (2005) and John W. Dower (1990) stress the significance 
of national security and wartime mobilisation in Northeast Asia’s industrial development. 
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Whilst these broad characterisations were manifested in varying ways and 
degrees across East Asia (particularly Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and perhaps Singapore), the success of the developmental state in achieving 
relatively quick and equitable economic growth prompted talk of the ‘East Asian 
miracle’. Unpacking what actually constitutes the East Asian miracle is 
problematic given the differences in how it is portrayed. As opposed to the role 
attributed to the developmental state earlier, the World Bank’s 1991 World 
Development Report explains the economic success of East Asia as a result of 
‘market-friendly’ industrial policies (Singh 1995). Another World Bank 
publication, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, 
concludes that there are factors other than the specific industrial policies 
described above which ultimately led to accelerated growth in the region (World 
Bank 1993). The economic explanations behind these assertions will be tackled 
in greater detail in the following section.  
Before doing so, it is helpful to highlight how the aforementioned relevant 
discussions on East Asian economic growth in the 1990s generally highlight how 
governments got the macroeconomic fundamentals (however these may be 
defined) right. However, critics argue that the Asian financial crisis effectively 
delegitimised the idea of an ‘East Asian miracle’ and a successful Asian growth 
model. Rodney Bruce Hall (2003) examines the rhetoric employed by the US 
Treasury in their assessment of the causes of the crisis and the appropriate 
solutions. Similar to the arguments presented in the World Bank reports 
mentioned earlier, Larry Summers (then Deputy Treasury Secretary) depicted 
East Asia’s rapid economic growth prior to the crisis as a product not of ‘practices 
uniquely Asian’ but of ‘strong universal fundamentals’ (R. B. Hall 2003, 78). 
Summers built his attack on the developmental state by highlighting the ‘crony 
capitalism’ supposedly inherent in the system and how it ‘favoured centralised 
coordination of activity over decentralised market incentives…governments 
targeted particular industries, promoted selected exports, and protected 
domestic industry and [relied] on debt rather equity, relationship-driven finance 
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not capital markets, and informal rather than formal enforcement mechanisms’ 
(Summers 1998, cited in R. B. Hall 2003, 76). This is despite the IMF’s own 
acknowledgement that the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand were 
in relatively good shape prior to the crisis. Although it was previously noted that 
East Asia’s success was due to its increasingly free market system, there was a 
quick turnaround as these same analysts changed their positions and argued that 
it was homegrown causes (in the form of excessive government intervention in 
markets) which led to the crisis. A country’s economic success is portrayed to be 
a result of its growing integration into the global economy; on the other hand, its 
downturn is attributed to homegrown causes. Framing the blame in such a 
manner clears IFIs from any liability and legitimises the reform arrangements 
they advocate (Wade 2004). 
2.2.2 Washington and Post-Washington Consensus 
 The IMF was subsequently heavily criticised for pushing reforms aligned 
with the established Washington Consensus as these only worsened the effects 
of the crisis, particularly in Indonesia. Despite the fallout, the criticism did not 
lead to a revision in the IMF position—instead, what emerged was a ‘post-
Washington Consensus’ which continued to support the infallibility of free 
market policies, with the addition of governance and institutional development 
in the agenda. The subsequent shift in the East Asian discourse on economic 
growth and stability were largely influenced by the region’s disappointment with 
how the IMF responded to the crisis. As a result, the growth agenda placed 
greater weight on regional solutions and mechanisms for self-insurance. Among 
these efforts to strengthen East Asian financial regionalism are the failed Asian 
Monetary Fund, the Asian Bond Market Initiative9, and CMIM.  
                                                        
9 In an effort to address the double-mismatch problems encountered during the Asian financial 
crisis, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers launched the Asian Bond Market Initiative in August 2003. 
The primary objectives were to expand the bond issuer base, diversify currency issuance, and 
improve the market infrastructure in the region. 
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 As East Asia escaped the worst of the global financial crisis, certain 
regional figures used the occasion to vindicate the ‘East Asian model’. For 
example, Mahbubani argued that the crisis showed that the West should learn 
from Asia’s approach to capitalism (Mahbubani 2009). As the eurozone crisis 
escalated in 2011, he pushed his accusations further, going so far as to claim that 
‘Asia’s concern is that the world will soon come to grief if both the United States 
and Europe fail to make fundamental adjustments…their nations must now 
experience the pain of readjustment they once prescribed to others’ (Mahbubani 
2011). Referring to the need to reform global financial governance, Mahbubani 
goes on to say that ‘we need an end to the pretence that the United States and the 
European Union are the masters of the universe…both must learn to share 
power’. Whilst it can be argued that Mahbubani is also guilty of overlooking East 
Asia’s role in the global financial crisis as it fuelled the global imbalances that 
fostered the US subprime crisis, his views demonstrate the long-standing feelings 
of resentment towards the IMF’s role in the Asian financial crisis even after over 
a decade had passed. 
The global financial crisis also reignited the debate on the Washington 
Consensus as it facilitated a shift in economic power to rising economies, 
particularly China. As the crisis originated from the West, discussions raised the 
question of whether a post-neoliberal paradigm facilitated the relative strength 
and stability of economic development in these emerging economies. Studies find 
that the extent of divergence should not be exaggerated as their state-led growth 
models adopted selected components of the Washington Consensus template 
(Ban and Blyth 2013). There are also those who argue that observations pointing 
to the retreat of neoliberalism or the return of the developmental state in East 
Asian economies were overstated (Stubbs 2012; Pirie 2016).  Reference to a 
‘Beijing Consensus’ gained currency after the crisis as its supporters used the 
term to discredit the Washington Consensus and point to China’s economic 
success as evidence that it offers other countries a better alternative to the 
development policies advocated by the West and IFIs. 
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Hence, whilst China’s story takes centre stage in such discussions, the 
relevance of the Beijing Consensus applies to other countries in East Asia seeking 
to pursue locally-determined growth strategies that are not derived from 
Western templates. This is a significant development for the region, as 
challenging the Washington Consensus is construed as defiance of externally-
imposed growth doctrines and protection of the economic sovereignty cherished 
by East Asian countries, as discussed further in Section 2.4. 
2.2.3 Beijing Consensus and the China model 
The term ‘Beijing Consensus’ was first coined in 2004 by Joshua Cooper 
Ramo, an American who was affiliated with Tsingua University at that time. 
Ramo’s conceptualisation has been widely challenged on several grounds, 
including its inaccurate empirical basis and analytical incoherence (Kennedy 
2010). Moreover, some comparisons find that the reforms in China have actually 
largely conformed to the core principles of the Washington Consensus, and there 
is no agreement anyway on what actually constitutes the Beijing Consensus 
(Ferchen 2013). These disagreements are also seen in how Chinese intellectuals 
and policymakers perceive the Beijing Consensus. As far as the Beijing Consensus 
is used to criticise the Washington Consensus, there is some evidence of support 
from local analysts (Kennedy 2010). To the extent that it helped build China’s 
soft power on the global stage, party officials have also embraced the use of the 
term in debates. The notion of a ‘China model’ is similarly vague but it is more 
widely accepted by the Chinese government. However, officials have denied that 
it is being used to challenge the current global order. Rather, their view is that 
‘the China model means there is no one model for a country’ (Jiang 2010, 339). 
Despite the inconsistencies in the use of the terms, be it ‘Beijing Consensus’ 
or ‘China model’, the significance of the debate is still highly relevant. The main 
point underlying these discussions is not really the degree of convergence or 
divergence of Chinese policies compared to the tenets of the Washington 
Consensus but the context in which these comparisons are being made. During 
the 1990s and early 2000s, critics of the Washington Consensus associated it 
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with the imposition of US political and economic hegemony and portrayed the 
agenda as an ‘ideological Trojan Horse for US global hegemony’ (Ferchen 2013, 
403). The merits of the Beijing Consensus as an alternative model did not 
necessarily hinge on whether it was an accurate description of the political and 
economic realities in China; rather, it was its ‘open-ended oppositional nature’ 
that gave the term its appeal (Ferchen 2013, 398) as a point of comparison to 
Western economic doctrines. The growing interest in the Beijing Consensus 
coincided with the decreasing inclination of Chinese officials to listen to the West 
preach about ‘best practices’ in a range of policy issues from intellectual property 
rights to financial regulation.  
To the extent that the Beijing Consensus or the China model have a defining 
feature, it can be traced to its pragmatism in that China’s development story is 
not based on a specific plan or ideological position. It is argued that the Chinese 
experience should be viewed as an example of the merits of following a self-
determined path rather than an externally defined and imposed model. As 
pointed out by Breslin:  
‘Rather than thinking about what China is not and what China stands for, 
instead we need to think about what China is not and what China does not 
stand for…it is not the Western way of doing things; it is not following a 
model or prescription; it is not being told what to do by others; and it is not 
telling others what to do’ (Breslin 2011b, 1338, italics in original).  
Hence, the emergence of the Beijing Consensus and the China model in 
policy debates gives East Asian countries greater latitude to contest external 
policy prescriptions, thus supporting economic sovereignty. Whilst there may be 
no agreement as to whether an actual Beijing Consensus exists and whether it 
can or should be something other developing countries in the region should 
aspire to, its significance lies in its symbolic power as an alternative to the 
Western approach.  
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2.2.4 ‘Asian Century’ and the ASEAN Economic Community 
 The growing interest in the Beijing Consensus and the possibility of 
adopting a growth model different from those advocated by the West reflect only 
one side of the evolving discourse in East Asia after the global financial crisis. The 
other side adopts a more regional emphasis and concerns the realisation of the 
‘Asian Century’ and the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).  
Similar to the terms discussed above, the notion of the ‘Asian Century’ is 
another nebulous concept that is contentious yet appealing to many in the region 
for a variety of reasons.  In a number of studies, the West (and ‘the rest’) remains 
the point of comparison. One study evaluates the challenges of realising the Asian 
Century in terms of the region catching up with the advanced countries of the 
West (West 2018). Others focus on the implications of the rise of Asia for other 
countries, as done by Mahbubani (2018) and Michael Auslin (2017).  Under the 
leadership of former Prime Minister Julia Gillard, Australia was preoccupied with 
how the country can ensure that it benefits from the Asian Century and maintain 
a central presence in the developments in the region (Australian Government 
2012). 
In terms of charting a development strategy, the key document is the ADB 
study Asia 2050: Realising the Asian Century. The book presents a plausible future 
for the region wherein it will undergo ‘a historic transformation…[and] regain 
the dominant global economic position it held some 300 years ago’ (Kohli, 
Sharma, and Sood 2011, 1). It warns though that this success hinges on how a 
number of challenges are addressed, not just at the domestic level but at the 
regional and global levels as well. The prescribed agenda includes the need for 
greater regional cooperation to: ‘cement the region’s hard-won economic gains 
in the face of vulnerabilities to global shocks’ and to help Asian economies that 
are rebalancing growth towards “internal” (domestic and regional) demand to 
fully open their markets to neighbours in the region’ (Kohli, Sharma, and Sood 
2011, 4). The global strategy calls for a bigger role for Asia wherein it will: 
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 ‘gradually transform itself from a passive onlooker in the debate on global 
rule making and a reticent follower of the rules, to an active debater and 
constructive rule maker… as an emerging global leader, Asia should act as—
and be seen as—a responsible global citizen’ (Kohli, Sharma, and Sood 2011, 
5, italics added).  
Whilst rebalancing is an important theme, the study is careful about 
emphasising that Asia’s predicted rise will not come at the expense of the rest of 
the world. Rather, ‘[a]s Asia becomes the centre of the global economy, it will be 
in its own interest that the rest of the world also does well economically and 
politically…the Asian Century should not be Asia’s alone but the century of 
shared global prosperity’ (Kohli, Sharma, and Sood 2011, 5).  
Similar points are echoed in discussions regarding the AEC. However, 
whilst the AEC also speaks of deeper integration with the global economy, it is 
more concerned with the specification of a regional economic community and its 
place in the broader global economy. The AEC was borne out of a shared vision 
to transform ASEAN into: (i) a single market and production base; (ii) a highly 
competitive economic region; (iii) a region of equitable economic development; 
and (iv) a region fully integrated into the global economy (ASEAN 2008). 
Although the AEC was declared as ‘established’ at the end of 2015, work on 
forming a prosperous, competitive, and inclusive regional economic community 
will take time and will continue beyond 2015. As expected given ASEAN’s strong 
preference for non-interference and consensus decision-making, policy 
measures under the AEC ensure the accommodation of country-specific 
circumstances and make allowances for differences in the pace of 
implementation. Furthermore, ASEAN leaders also realise that the AEC will need 
to address emerging challenges resulting from current and anticipated changes 
in the regional and global economic landscape. One of these changes is 
recognition of a ‘new normal’ in the global order wherein the world’s major 
economies are experiencing a prolonged slowdown whilst rapid growth has 
shifted to emerging economies (RSIS and ISEAS 2013). In 2015, ASEAN launched 
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the AEC 2025 Blueprint which lists the creation of ‘a deeply integrated and highly 
cohesive ASEAN economy that would support sustained high economic growth 
and resilience even in the face of global economic shocks and volatilities’ (ASEAN 
2015, 2, italics added) as one of its goals.  
The resilience of the regional economy is a key theme in ASEAN’s agenda 
(ASEAN+3 2018; AMRO 2018b; ASEAN 2018). Parallel to concerns about global 
risks is a growing emphasis on ASEAN countries’ role in and contribution to the 
global economy. Moving from the original AEC Blueprint’s goal of full integration 
into the global economy, the AEC 2025 Consolidated Strategic Action Plan makes 
more ambitious strides towards a ‘Global ASEAN’ with the aim to ‘strengthen 
ASEAN’s position as an open and inclusive economic region, and lay the 
foundation for ASEAN to retain its centrality in global and regional engagement’ 
(ASEAN 2017, 46). Granted, there are parallels with other conceptualisations of 
economic resilience outside the region. Both the IMF (together with the Financial 
Stability Board [FSB] and Bank for International Settlements [BIS] [IMF, FSB, and 
BIS 2016]) and the European Commission (2017) cite the importance of shock 
absorption; however, the spatial implications in the case of Europe are worth 
mentioning. Whilst ASEAN underscores the need to withstand spillovers from 
external shocks, the European Commission is more concerned about preventing 
the spread of ‘strong spillover-effects across the euro area’ (European 
Commission 2017, 3) and specifying a framework for policy interventions in ‘key 
areas for resilience’ (European Commission 2017, 2) including the labour market 
and public finances. This contrasts with the conceptualisation of economic 
resilience in East Asia, which highlights deepening economic integration and 
openness and seeking ‘mutually beneficial economic agreements with external 
partners… to strengthen resilience against rising protectionism’ (ASEAN 2018). 
It also takes a relatively less prescriptive tone in contrast to the European 
Commission’s policy recommendations. The East Asian notion of economic 
resilience has deeply historical roots concerning nation-building and regime 
survival, which will be expanded upon in Section 2.4. 
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2.2.5 Challenging East vs. West dichotomies 
The preceding discussion demonstrates the persistence of dichotomous 
East vs. West categories in the discourse on economic growth in East Asia from 
the early 1990s until 2018. It is also noteworthy that more recent rhetoric 
employs the ‘global’ frame to highlight two different dimensions: the region’s 
exposure to global risks and its role in the global order. The use of these spatial 
categories in the depiction of economic growth can be roughly summarised as a 
narrative that vacillates through the peaks and troughs of East Asia’s growth 
trajectory. Advocates of the East Asian model highlight features supposedly 
unique to the region when the economies are performing well whilst supporters 
of the Western model insist that the region’s success is due to its adoption of 
policies that are conventionally associated with their own economies or with the 
IFIs they lead. As discussed above, this can be observed through the discourse on 
the East Asian miracle (prior to the Asian financial crisis), the Washington and 
Post-Washington Consensus (in the immediate aftermath), and the Beijing 
Consensus and the China model (during the global financial crisis). A decade after 
the global financial crisis first hit, we are witnessing the extension of the 
narrative to the realisation of the Asian Century and the ongoing process towards 
the realisation of the AEC. When invoking a regional frame in this context, the 
recent discourse has also shifted in that it now refers to the ‘region’ as a 
constructed space of resilience and market expansion, as well as a constructed 
space for joint action. The discourse also sees the ‘region’ as a platform for 
asserting a greater role in the global economy.   
As raised in the beginning of the section, the evolution of the discourse on 
economic growth in East Asia is crucial to understanding how countries in the 
region have justified their respective policy choices. Whilst the specific content 
of growth strategies vary, the invocation of East vs. West frames has remained 
through the years. Foregrounding such overt comparisons is analytically 
problematic.  For instance, Toby Carroll and Darryl S. L. Jarvis (2017) criticise the 
tendency of developmental state literature to reduce East Asia’s experience to a 
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list of institutional features and a particular policy agenda. In fact, Johnson 
himself warned against reading his analysis as a blueprint for developing 
countries (Johnson 1999, cited in Carroll and Jarvis 2017). Moreover, the 
characterisation of the developmental state as a uniquely East Asian 
phenomenon disregards the strong influence of Friedrich List’s work in 
economic thinking during the Meiji era (Deans 1996; Breslin 2011b), and 
overlooks parallels with the role of the strong state in the German ordoliberalism 
(Bonefeld 2012). The use of East vs. West dichotomies in economic growth 
discourse also raises the problem of self-orientalisation. Labels such as ‘Beijing 
Consensus’, ‘China model’, and ‘the Asian Century’ reinforce the Eurocentric 
notion of a global modernity. Against this backdrop, economic success allows 
East Asian countries to assert themselves as rising players; however, this is done 
within parameters determined by global capitalism. In effect, ‘the self-
assertiveness of orientals under these circumstances would seem to represent 
not an alternative to but a consolidation of Eurocentric hegemony’ (Dirlik 1996, 
116). 
Nonetheless, Arif Dirlik’s point also helps us understand the persistence of 
East vs. West frames when used in policy justification. As raised in the beginning 
of this chapter, defending policy choices by referring to East Asian models of 
economic growth allows its users to assert themselves to the global public. 
However, as the parameters of surveillance and external accountability are 
largely determined by global technocratic institutions such as the IMF, couching 
policy justification in more technical, apolitical language helps with gaining 
validation from the global technocratic audience.  
 
2.3 Deconstructing dichotomies in East Asian economic growth 
More technical discussions on economic growth in East Asia depart from 
the politically-loaded comparisons highlighted in Section 2.2. However, they are 
still generally inclined to perpetuate splits between other categories (e.g., state 
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vs. market, real vs. financial sectors, internal vs. external). A review of the 
economic literature applying these categories shows that whilst such 
distinctions persist, how they are used and framed as a cause of (or solution for) 
economic growth (decline) has changed over the years; furthermore, the shifts 
also coincide with the same critical junctures (i.e., the Asian and global financial 
crises) in East Asia’s growth trajectory. With a few exceptions, these narratives 
do not give due consideration to the overlaps and interactions between 
categories.  As will be demonstrated below, most accounts frame their analyses 
by emphasising the significance of one category over another, thus linking the 
causes of (or solutions for) economic growth (decline) to an allegedly distinct 
category.  This is a glaring omission given the nature of systemic risk, which will 
be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
This section will juxtapose an analysis of how other dichotomies—state vs. 
market, real vs. financial sectors, and internal vs. external risks—were used in 
technical discourse on economic growth in East Asia with the discourse covered 
in Section 2.2. Whilst these categories may be perceived as less politically-laden 
relative to East vs. West frames, the construction of these dichotomies serves to 
support important elements of discussions of East Asian vs. Western models of 
growth.  
2.3.1 East Asian Miracle 
In East Asia, the debate on the role of the state in relation to the market is 
central to discussions on the developmental state model. This is captured in the 
aforementioned World Bank reports published in the 1990s—the 1991 World 
Development Report (World Bank 1991) and The East Asian Miracle: Economic 
Growth and Public Policy released in 1993. The former argues that the 
developmental state model was a success precisely because the state pursued a 
‘market-friendly’ agenda and opened its economy to the global market. The 
World Bank’s position reflects neoclassical claims that privilege the role of the 
market in the growth of various East Asian economies. These claims trivialise the 
significance of the state by suggesting that it merely supported and followed the 
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market (instead of actively directing its operation), with some studies even 
insisting that these economies would have enjoyed faster growth had the state 
not intervened at all (see Singh 1998 for examples).  
The second World Bank publication is particularly noteworthy in light of 
the motivations behind the study. With its impressive economic growth and a 
successful track record of aid and investment in East Asia during the 1980s and 
1990s, Japan sought to contest the World Bank and its core principles regarding 
the role of the state in economic development. As the World Bank criticised its 
aid programmes, Japan wished to enhance its role as a leader in development 
thinking and convinced the Bank to undertake a study on how the region had 
prospered and what other countries can learn from the experience.10  As with the 
1991 World Development Report, the study concludes that growth in high-
performing East Asian economies was largely attributable to market-friendly 
policies. It acknowledges that certain interventions helped some Northeast Asian 
economies, albeit with the caveat that success depended on whether the 
interventions were ‘disciplined by competition, via either markets or contests’ 
(World Bank 1993, 11). Whilst some recognition is given to specific export-
oriented policies in Japan, the World Bank’s fundamental position on market-
friendly policies by and large remained unscathed. 
However, other analyses challenge the divide between the state and the 
market as depicted in the aforementioned accounts. The governed market theory 
challenges this state vs. market dichotomy as it recognises the importance of 
political arrangements; specifically, the theory argues that the relatively high 
investment levels in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is a result of government 
interventions (Wade 2004). This is not just limited to direct state intervention as 
the financial sector functioned as an important state mechanism for monitoring 
and fostering investments in the industrial sector. State-backed or –owned 
financial institutions played an important role in mobilising funds, both locally 
                                                        
10 Whilst ideational conviction was a key factor, Japanese motivations for pushing the study also 
included an interest in improving the country’s standing within the World Bank (Wade 1996). 
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and overseas. It was through the financial sector that governments could manage 
industry to ensure that firms were aligned with the country’s development 
strategy (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 1998; Wade 2004). Another way to contest 
the state vs. market dichotomy is through looking at ownership—in these terms, 
the cases of Japan and China demonstrate that the public and private overlap to 
a significant extent. Phil Deans cites the fusing of the public and the private as 
one of the key characteristics of the developmental state. The blurring of public 
and private ownership (e.g., through state-owned enterprises or SOEs) in this 
context is a deliberate part of the state’s strategy to expand control over the 
economy and realise its developmental goals (Deans 1996).  
Whilst critics of the developmental state dismiss such arrangements as 
crony capitalism,11 they overlook the benefits of cooperative and long-term links 
between the state, banks, and firms as it can direct a country’s high savings into 
efficient investments. In this regard, critics are inclined to stress distinct real and 
financial sectors, whilst the developmental state puts more emphasis on the 
linkages between the two. Such corporatist political arrangements helped 
sustain stability and predictability in the operation of firms with high debt-equity 
ratios (Wade and Venoroso 1998). Robert Wade concedes that this arrangement 
does not always work (for instance, in the case of economies with open capital 
markets) and can be prone to corruption (as witnessed in Indonesia); however, 
he maintains that close relations between the state, banks, and firms were 
instrumental to the high and sustained economic growth in a number of East 
Asian countries (Wade 2004).  
2.3.2 Asian financial crisis 
With the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, the state vs. market and real 
vs. financial sectors categories took on different forms, depending on how they 
were framed as causes of or solutions for the crisis. The role of the state vs. the 
                                                        
11  Paul D. Hutchcroft (1998) coined the term ‘booty capitalism’ to refer to the case of the 
Philippines to describe how embedded patron-client relationships in the country rendered state 
institutions (specifically the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) subordinate to oligarchic interests. 
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market continued to be a focal point for the West in their depiction of both the 
causes and the solution. In terms of the former, it was already mentioned in the 
previous section that the US Treasury blamed crony capitalism and the close 
links between the state, banks, and firms for the collapse in 1997. After the 
Washington Consensus-based reform agenda that was initially pushed by the 
IMF failed, the new solution touted as the Post-Washington Consensus 
approached the role of the state vs. the market in an ostensibly different way. 
The Post-Washington Consensus involved expanding the economic growth 
agenda to include wider goals of good governance and institution building. The 
premise is that state intervention is justified in light of the market imperfections 
(mainly defined as information asymmetries and transaction costs) that came 
into sharp relief during the Asian financial crisis. Yet as Ben Fine (2001) argues, 
the acknowledgement of market imperfections may seem novel but the Post-
Washington Consensus continues to portray the role of the state and the market 
as discrete in theory and in practice. This reinforces the state vs. market 
dichotomy as reflected in the aforementioned World Bank publications, without 
considering the relationship between the state and the market as a product of 
economic and political relations that shape, and are shaped, by underlying socio-
economic structures.  
The real vs. financial sectors discussion during the Asian financial crisis is 
embedded in diverging conceptions of what constitutes ‘macroeconomic 
fundamentals’ and how differences in these fundamentals could have led to the 
crisis. As previously mentioned, officials from the US Treasury and IFIs lauded 
East Asian economies for their ‘strong macroeconomic fundamentals’ before the 
crisis hit the region. In their view, strong fundamentals meant open markets, 
reduced deficits, and increasing privatisation, amongst other things (R. B. Hall 
2003). However, various analyses of the causes of the Asian financial crisis draw 
on different interpretations of what macroeconomic fundamentals cover and 
whether these were in themselves determinants of the crisis (Montes 1998; J. Y. 
Lim 1999).  
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2.3.3 Global financial crisis 
 With the discourse on economic growth in East Asia taking place in a very 
different context compared to the regional crisis nearly ten years before, the 
global financial crisis presented an opportunity to trace the shifts in the 
economic logic using the same categories of state vs. market and real vs. financial 
sectors. However, instead of looking at both causes and solutions as done for the 
Asian financial crisis, the discourse on economic growth in East Asia generally 
overlooks the former and focuses on the response instead.  
 Rather than simply reverting to the usual state vs. market debate, the 
relative success of many East Asian countries in spite of the downturn changed 
the tone of the discussion. The global financial crisis fuelled talk of the rise of the 
developmental state and the fall of the neoliberal state in the region. Granted, this 
discussion is not entirely new to the global financial crisis—critics of the East 
Asian model saw the Asian financial crisis as a vindication of their claims and 
hoped that it would herald the rise of the neoliberal state in the region. 12 It 
should be noted though that such discussions resulting from the Asian financial 
crisis were not imbued with a particular economic logic, despite being cloaked in 
a technical façade. In Mark Beeson and Iyanatul Islam’s (2005) assessment, they 
go so far as to claim that the dispute between the developmental vs. neoliberal 
state played out in the region regardless of any perceived empirical and 
theoretical credibility. They argue that: 
‘In the case of post-crisis East Asia, the notion that the political economies 
of the region need to be fundamentally reformed to re-ignite the economic 
                                                        
12  However, such predictions were premature. From the neoliberals’ perspective, the Asian 
financial crisis may have created an opportunity to extol the virtues of the neoliberal agenda but 
the process and outcomes are more ambiguous than the clear ascent of the neoliberal state they 
hoped for. A volume of case studies in the region edited by Richard Robison and Kevin Hewison 
(2006) shows the extent of the variation across the region. In Thailand, for example, the 
exacerbated economic slump led to an opposition towards the neoliberal reforms implemented 
after the crisis. On the other hand, the South Korean government used the neoliberal reforms to 
regain its lost legitimacy. Rather than simply going unchallenged, Hewison and Robison argue 
that East Asian economies strengthened, evaded, or even appropriated the neoliberal agenda in 
various ways to support or avoid policy and institutional reforms as governments saw fit to 
facilitate political stability and legitimacy.   
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miracle of the pre-crisis era does not stem from a politically neutral, 
dispassionate, and intellectually rigorous analysis of what went wrong in 
the recession-inducing 1997 financial crisis that engulfed the region. On the 
contrary, it represents an attempt to reinvent orthodoxy in the domain of 
economic ideas and ideology by a global policy community that is 
profoundly influenced by the United States, the key international financial 
institutions over which it exerts such authority and financial sectors 
associated with Wall Street’ (Beeson and Islam 2005, 198). 
The same applies to the second round of the developmental vs. neoliberal 
state debate during the global financial crisis. Richard Stubbs (2012) portrays 
this largely as a dispute wherein the developmental state side is embodied by 
China and the neoliberal model is embodied by the United States. Just as critics 
used the Asian financial crisis to legitimise the neoliberal growth model, so did 
detractors from the other camp use the global financial crisis to exonerate the 
developmental state model. In particular, Stubbs highlights how the Chinese 
economy was able to pull through the worst of the initial impact of the crisis 
thanks to a massive state-directed stimulus package.13  As the global financial 
crisis raised serious doubts regarding the United States’ standing as a model of 
economic growth, Stubbs described the effects of the crisis as a shift in ‘the mix 
of structures and policies in the major East Asian economies… away from the 
structures and policies promoted by the neoliberal coalitions and back towards 
those advocated by the developmental state coalitions’ (Stubbs 2012, 54). Whilst 
he concedes that neoliberal interests still have traction and prefaces his analysis 
by stating that the two camps are used in the analysis as ideal types, Stubbs does 
not acknowledge the overlaps and interplay between the developmental state 
and neoliberal categories.14  Recent shifts in state ownership in China and Japan 
                                                        
13 Whilst many governments in East Asia put together their own stimulus packages as the effects 
of the global financial crisis became clearer, these were dwarfed by China’s CNY4 trillion package 
(13% of China’s GDP in 2008) (Hur et al 2010). 
14 There are also some inconsistencies in Stubbs’ application of the terms ‘developmental’ and 




also demonstrate how these states have loosened control in some areas (e.g., 
privatisation of Japan Post) and tightened in others (e.g., consolidation of SOEs 
in energy and transport sectors in China), thus calling into question the analytical 
coherence of a developmental state (Carroll and Jarvis 2017). 
South Korea’s response to the global financial crisis also challenges Stubbs’ 
analaysis as ‘[a]ttempts to define Korea as either a “developmental” or 
“neoliberal” state inevitably obscure the importance of inconsistencies and 
sectoral variations within systems of economic governance’ (Pirie 2016, 672). 
Iain Pirie shows how the global financial crisis was depicted as an external threat 
to an otherwise fundamentally stable economy, validating the South Korean 
state’s retreat from neoliberalism but only to the extent that it benefited the 
chaebols (e.g., through tighter labour regulation) and supported national 
competitiveness.  In this instance, analytical focus moves to the divide between 
internal vs. external risks. Moreover, portraying the crisis as an external threat 
also allowed the South Korean government to avoid addressing structural issues 
such as overreliance on exports and high levels of household debt, which would 
require policies supporting domestic consumption and income redistribution.  
As for the discussion post-global financial crisis on real vs. financial sectors, 
there are both continuities and discontinuities in how it is approached compared 
to the Asian financial crisis. On the former, the alleged dichotomy between the 
real and financial sectors is still present in that policy experts still pit one sector 
against the other. Moreover, it is now used to distinguish a supposed ‘Asian 
mindset’ different from other economies, ‘a fundamental difference between the 
East and the West in their worldview’ (Sheng 2011, 74). Andrew Sheng, Chief 
                                                        
developmental state coalition compared to a neoliberal one, this is not applied in the same way 
in his analysis of the global financial crisis. For instance, it can be argued that the developmental 
state is not just characterised by blanket state intervention but by the specific mechanisms and 
objectives for state intervention. If this point is taken, Stubbs does not delve into how China’s 
stimulus programmes involving infrastructure projects and provision of certain health services 
should be construed as a manifestation of the developmental state in action.  
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Advisor to the China Banking Regulatory Commission, insists that the future of 
the Asian financial system 
 ‘requires a radical departure from the current mindset in the developed 
economies…thus far, Asia’s success in the real sector has been based on the 
fundamental premise that finance serves the real sector, not the other way 
around [and] Asia’s future approach to finance should be based on this 
same premise’ (Sheng 2011, 157).  
Even if this observation is accepted as true, this view is problematic in light 
of the considerable complexities and uncertainties in the links between the real 
and financial sectors that surfaced during the global financial crisis. As pointed 
out earlier with Pirie’s analysis of South Korea’s response to the global financial 
crisis, the negative impact of the crisis in the region—as marginal as it may have 
been in relative terms—shed light not just on the external threats but also on the 
structural weaknesses of the domestic economy. It exposed the need to rebalance 
from an export-oriented growth strategy to one that relies more on domestic 
consumption, as well as the deeper links between the real and financial sectors. 
The implications of this can be observed in Julian Gruin’s (2013) study on the 
role of the banking sector in China’s economic growth and the long-term viability 
of the Chinese government’s current strategy. Given the structure of China’s 
political economy, the consolidation of state authority over capital flows, and the 
dual role played by the financial sector as both an instrument for controlling 
industrial development and a tool for implementing macroeconomic policy, 
Gruin observes a symbiotic relationship between China’s real and financial 
sectors. Pirie’s and Gruin’s works reveal the problems associated with analyses 
perpetuating the misconception of an internal/external and real/financial sector 
divide, which continued even as the global financial crisis further underscored 
the dangers of doing so.  
Another point of discontinuity in the real vs. financial sector discussion 
stems from the nature of the impact of the global financial crisis in the region. 
For most East Asian economies, the global financial crisis was essentially a trade 
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crisis. In spite of growing interregional trade, the final destination for most 
exports from East Asia was still mainly Western markets. The drop in exports 
dampened business and consumer confidence, subsequently leading to a decline 
in private investment and consumption (Hur et al. 2010). Hence, in the years 
following the global financial crisis, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN 
and East Asia (ERIA) engaged economists from its research network to work on 
a number of topics deemed critical to the region’s economic growth in light of the 
fallout from the crisis.15 A look at some of the project reports gives a broad 
indication of East Asia’s heightened preoccupation with the transmission of 
shocks (particularly their origin, direction, and magnitude), a growing 
realisation of the uncertainties and complexities surrounding these shocks, and 
a sense of confidence that these can be managed. For instance, the ERIA project 
entitled Linkages between Real and Financial Aspects of Economic Integration in 
East Asia notes that the project rationale ‘has been structured around the idea 
that between the financial and real sectors of the economy there is a “black box” 
through which unanticipated shocks, or longer-term, unpredictable changes in 
either sector may be transmitted from one side to the other’ (Corbett and Findlay 
2010, 2–3). This statement implies that, despite acknowledgement of unknown 
links between the real and financial sectors in the region, they are still viewed as 
distinct categories. As for internal vs. external risks, another ERIA research 
project entitled Achieving Sustainable Growth in East Asia (Corbett and Xu 2010) 
finds that:  
‘The region is vulnerable to external shocks but the sources are specific and 
can be managed if well understood. The main source of business cycle 
fluctuations is still the United States; despite the growth of China its 
business cycles play a much smaller role’ (Corbett and Xu 2010, viii).  
                                                        
15 ERIA is an independent think tank which provides research and policy recommendations to 
the ASEAN Secretariat. It was established at the 3rd East Asia Summit in 2007 through an 
agreement among the 16 countries forming the summit, namely Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam (ERIA n.d.). 
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A more recent ERIA policy brief also tackles the issue of transmission 
channels of economic shocks in ASEAN from the rest of the world whilst 
acknowledging the need to address not just external integration (with the rest of 
the world) but also internal integration (within ASEAN and the greater Asian 
region) in the analysis of spillover effects (Majuca and Pagaduan 2015). The 
authors stress the extent of the variations in the impact of external shocks on 
regional economies and the need for macroeconomic policy coordination. In this 
analysis, regional integration is depicted mainly as a tool to build resilience 
against external shocks. The policy recommendations suggest that ‘common 
threats can be addressed through collective action, and spillovers and 
externalities can be internalised through macroeconomic policy coordination’ 
(Majuca and Pagaduan 2015, 1). 
2.3.4 Implications for policy justification 
Whilst some of the accounts covered in this section acknowledge the 
overlaps and interplay between state/market, real/financial sector, and 
internal/external categories, those which emphasised the dichotomies framed 
their explanations of economic growth and decline in East Asia with a tendency 
to favour one category over the other. The act of selecting which categories to 
incorporate or dismiss, emphasise or conceal is deliberate and political, in ways 
which will be explained in Chapter 4. In the context of this chapter’s focus on 
economic growth models in East Asia, the persistence of the aforementioned 
dichotomies and the choice to privilege one category over another influences 
how one identifies the variables, actors, and institutions that determine (and are 
held accountable for, in the case of actors and institutions) the changes in the 
economic performance of the countries in the region. These are choices made by 
economists in the modelling process, specifically IMF and AMRO economists 
working on surveillance analysis as will be illustrated in Chapter 7. 
 The various discursive strands on the causes of and solutions for economic 
growth and decline in East Asia are also underpinned by a discussion on whether 
the causes and solutions are or should be assigned to one particular category or 
59 
 
another. As can be observed in the studies cited above, the dominant narrative 
during the Asian financial crisis identified internal factors (e.g., the state and 
crony capitalism) as the main cause and the immediate solutions were largely 
determined and imposed externally by the IMF through a Washington/Post-
Washington Consesus-based reform agenda. When this failed during the global 
financial crisis, these external forces were seen as the main culprit for the 
protracted downturn. In response to this, the subsequent solutions (e.g., 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and the various ASEAN+3 initiatives 
mentioned in Section 2.2) were largely internal (as in domestic and regional) and 
focused on mechanisms for self-help and self-insurance. One such example is the 
development of regional surveillance, which will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 6. 
Analysing the repercussions through this perspective without taking into 
account how the state and other domestic elites supported, opposed, or co-opted 
what was labelled as the Western neoliberal agenda supports the constructed 
notion that neoliberalism has been basically imposed by the West on East Asia. 
As Raewyn Connell and Nour Dados point out, this can be problematic as: 
‘a narrative that makes neoliberalism a Northern [or Western in this 
context] invention imposed on the South [East Asia] can be useful to 
politicians who paint their domestic opponents as puppets of Washington… 
Resistance to neoliberalism is not a matter of throwing out an alien 
intrusion, but requires deeper local social politics… this is particularly 
unfortunate when thinking about neoliberalism in the global South, as it 
downplays the agency of Southern actors in the formation of the neoliberal 
order’ (Connell and Dados 2014, 134). 
Hence, discourse perpetuating such dichotomies can be deployed to serve 
a strategic purpose. Connell and Dados also argue that this problem is related to 
the tendency to approach the market as ‘the (imperfect) enactment of a pre-
formed ideological template’ (Connell and Dados 2014, 134) separating theory 
from reality. Whilst there is some truth in this claim, this thesis finds that it is not 
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simply a problem of separating theory from reality and practice but how theory 
is translated into practice via the design and use of economic growth models, 
specifically in the context of surveillance analysis.  
By and large, both regional and global surveillance analysis adheres to the 
split between state/market, real/financial sector, and internal/external 
categories. Chapter 7 will discuss this in greater detail and delve deeper into the 
construction and representation of these categories in IMF and AMRO 
surveillance. This has important repercussions when used to underpin policy 
justification. However, given the significance of developmental legitimacy in the 
region, policy justification should also be understood as a reflection of how East 
Asian countries exercise economic sovereignty. This issue is covered in the 
following section. 
 
2.4 Reconciling economic sovereignty with external accountability 
As one of the major casualties of the Asian financial crisis, South Korea held 
the unfortunate distinction of being the first developed country to be subjected 
to IMF conditionality after the mid-1970s. The economic rescue package of 
US$57 billion16 required a wide range of structural reforms. The South Korean 
government agreed to undertake measures such as tax and interest rate increase; 
trade, financial, and labour market liberalisation; and the closure of 
nonperforming private financial institutions (including chaebols). The IMF 
justified the need for such structural reforms as: 
‘…the policies and decisions that were normally within the purview of 
purely domestic governance were a major contributor to the subsequent 
economic woes. In effect, [the] sovereignty of a nation embodied within 
internal management and domestic policies was something that the IMF 
                                                        
16 This amount also includes bilateral loans and funds from the World Bank and the ADB. 
61 
 
had decided to modify at a fundamental level, if deemed necessary’ (Lee 
2003, 877). 
This account of how IMF intervention resulted in the ‘erosion of the 
borrowing countries’ economic and political sovereignty’ (Lee 2003, 904) 
appears straightforward. However, in the context of surveillance and the 
principle of external accountability in East Asia, the dynamics are different for 
two reasons: The first concerns the extent of member countries’ legal obligations 
with respect to compliance with surveillance recommendations (to be discussed 
further in Chapter 5). The second relates to the particularities of how countries 
in East Asia exercise economic sovereignty. This section tackles the issue of 
economic sovereignty in East Asia and how it links to external accountability. 
2.4.1 Historical context of economic sovereignty in East Asia  
Whilst the form and pace of economic development in East Asia have varied 
across countries, the region’s preoccupation with nation-building through 
economic growth has been an overarching theme. Differences in colonial legacies 
and state capacities shaped how East Asian countries have approached the goal 
of nation-building. In the case of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the imperatives 
of wartime mobilisation and national survival spurred rapid industrialisation 
(Woo-Cumings 2005). A confluence of internal and external factors facilitated the 
consolidation of state authority in these countries, and the influence of 
supporting bureaucratic structures that came with it. First, as these countries 
were dealing with the aftermath of various conflicts including World War II, the 
Korean War, and local guerrilla unrest, civil society was too weak and divided to 
develop into a strong opposition with interests the state could not afford to 
ignore. Second, the consolidation of state power was widely supported by the 
United States as Washington believed that this was necessary to contain the rise 
of communism. Massive amounts of FDI and military and economic aid poured 
into the United States’ allies in the region as a result. Third, leaders also used this 
to galvanise the public towards their cause under the banner of nationalism and 
the need to build a strong economy and cohesive society to counter the threat of 
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communism. The general population supported these objectives and backed 
governments that could provide stability and security (Stubbs 2012). Economic 
development in China has also been driven by national security concerns; the 
country’s growing links to the global market are justified ‘in the name of national 
sovereignty and self-development’ (Agnew 2010, 576). China’s particular 
experience is underpinned by a shared consciousness of a ‘century of 
humiliation’, depicted as a product of both internal corruption and external 
oppression (Callahan 2004). The construction of this historical consciousness in 
China through education and propaganda is instrumental to understanding how 
the Communist Party established its authority among its citizens (Z. Wang 2012).  
A similar dynamic can be observed in Southeast Asia as post-colonial 
nation-building underscored the importance of national resilience. As in other 
countries, economic growth was valued as a tool for securing national prosperity, 
thus reducing vulnerability to internal and external threats to regime legitimacy. 
Whilst minimising external threats were a concern, maintaining access to 
external markets and capital was also crucial to national prosperity (Nesadurai 
2004). However, in comparison to Northeast Asia, domestic cleavages—not just 
in terms of communist ideology but also in terms of ethnicity and religion—were 
much more prevalent in this part of the region. In most of Southeast Asia, the 
consolidation of state authority was a highly fractured and contingent process 
that relied on the influence of local elite coalitions and embedded patron-client 
relations. This limited state coherence and capacity, which also deepened 
Southeast Asian governments’ reliance on external support to legitimise the 
authority of new political elites (Beeson 2003).  
Hence, nation-building and state legitimacy in East Asia were—and 
continue to be—contingent on mutually constitutive links between internal and 
external factors. States sought to legitimise their rule through economic success, 
which was in turn dependent on international recognition and access to external 
markets (Deans 1996). The exercise of economic sovereignty in this context also 
means that East Asian governments seek to align themselves with international 
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norms as states both contribute to and leverage the global economy. In instances 
wherein states take part in international cooperation, it is done in the interest of 
national stability. East Asian countries view participation in the global economy 
as one that presents both opportunities and vulnerabilities, requiring both ‘state 
orchestration and global negotiations’ (D’Costa 2012, 33). This is akin to Singh’s 
argument that whilst it may be true that East Asia’s economic growth in the 
1990s coincided with the opening of its markets, its integration with the global 
economy is best described as ‘strategic’ and not ‘close’, and that ‘[East Asian 
countries] integrated up to a point where it was useful for them to do so for 
promoting national economic growth’ (Singh 1995, 14). Whilst there are 
variations in state capacity across the region and through the years, this reading 
suggests that East Asia’s strategic integration with the global economy was done 
with the aim of strengthening economic sovereignty.   
2.4.2 Shifting boundaries of economic sovereignty  
How then can the centrality of economic sovereignty be reconciled with 
rising regionalism? These two forces are not necessarily incompatible17 given 
the peculiarities of regionalism in East Asia. After the Cold War, East Asian 
countries viewed regionalism as an ‘intermediate zone between the 
deterritorialising impulses of capitalism and the territorial limits of nationalism’ 
(Duara 2010, 974). One of the earlier attempts at fostering regionalism can be 
traced to the 1955 Bandung Conference.18 Whilst the gathering failed to produce 
any significant results as far as ‘region-building’ goes, the Bandung Conference is 
credited for laying the groundwork for the central element of the ‘ASEAN way’ as 
                                                        
17 At the same time, the interaction between nationalism and regionalism is not necessarily free 
of tensions. As Mark Selden (2012) points out, ongoing territorial disputes, the rise of China (and 
the competition and co-dependence resulting from it), the continuing conflict between North and 
South Korea, and the uncertainty over the presence and influence of the United States in the 
region increase complications as these factors create both incentives and barriers in the process 
of East Asian regionalism. 
18  The Bandung Conference assembled 29 countries from Asia and Africa to discuss shared 
development political concerns. The Asian countries in attendance were Cambodia, China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and 
Vietnam (Camroux 2007). 
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it contributed to the region’s definition of the norms of non-interference, non-
alignment, and consensus decision-making (Camroux 2007). In fact, the rationale 
for ASEAN was driven by the members’ ‘need to consolidate their authority as 
states’ (Bessho 1999, cited in Beeson 2003, 365); ASEAN’s core function ‘is to 
support Southeast Asian nation-building’ (Palmujoki 2001, cited in Sutherland 
2009, 332). Paradoxically, the appeal of ASEAN lies in its weakness: The 
sovereignty concerns that led to the creation of ASEAN and its continued 
relevance have also been the main reason for East Asian countries’ hesitation to 
build strong regional institutions that could potentially erode state authority. 
Hence, the emphasis on respecting state sovereignty allowed East Asian 
countries to reconcile regional cooperation with nation-building. In the case of 
Vietnam, membership in ASEAN was portrayed by the Vietnamese Communist 
Party as part of its nation-building project. As the government was keen to 
present Vietnam as a credible member of the regional community and an 
important partner for trade and investment, ASEAN membership held the key to 
both domestic legitimacy and international recognition (Sutherland 2009).     
Beyond ASEAN, East Asia’s participation in open regionalism should also 
be understood as a domestic political project (Jayasuriya 2003). As evidenced by 
the competing concepts of East Asia on the one hand and Asia-Pacific on the 
other, the boundaries and membership of regional institutions in East Asia 
continue to be in a state of flux. In the early 1990s, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum was the most prominent regional platform. However, 
disagreements regarding the pace and process of sectoral liberalisation and 
disappointment with APEC’s failure to deal effectively with the Asian financial 
crisis caused serious damage to the organisation’s reputation and credibility in 
East Asia. The crisis in the region led to a more defined sense of identity in East 
Asia by strengthening not only perceptions of increased economic 
interdependence between Southeast and Northeast Asian states but also 
perceptions of a ‘common Other’ because of the response of the United States and 
the IMF. However, it should be noted that the rise of ASEAN and ASEAN+3 ran 
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parallel to the rise of other regional platforms with wider membership such as 
the East Asian Summit (which also counts the United States as a member) and 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (although its future is increasingly uncertain under 
the Trump administration). At the same time, despite the proliferation of 
regional arrangements in recent years (e.g., the endorsement of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership with ASEAN+3 as well as Australia, India, 
and New Zealand), bilateralism has also grown as East Asian governments 
remain pragmatic and continue entering arrangements which they feel is the 
most effective channel to pursue their domestic interests. This is particularly 
important in instances where governments are faced with failed regional 
negotiations and slow implementation (Ravenhill 2002). Hence, the extent of 
East Asian countries’ participation in and commitment to both regional and 
global platforms hinges on its alignment with national interests and 
development priorities. Regionalism and multilateralism serve not to constrain 
state domain but are extensions of it (Camroux 2012).  
This is consistent with the notion of ASEAN resilience. As raised earlier in 
this chapter, the conceptualisation of economic resilience in East Asia takes a 
particular form that diverges from the IMF and European counterpart. Regional 
resilience began appearing in ASEAN discourse as far back as the first summit in 
1976, where member states agreed to ‘eliminate threats posed by subversion to 
its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience’. In the current 
context, Hoang Thi Ha notes that ‘subversion is no longer the overriding concern 
but national resilience, especially in terms of economic performance, remains 
central to ASEAN’s strategic autonomy today’ (Ha 2018, italics added). Regional 
resilience is embedded in ASEAN unity and centrality, as its member countries 
resolve to ‘remain united vis-à-vis external divisive forces’ and use the institution 
as the platform ‘to effectively engage key partners, in order to respond 
collectively and constructively to global developments and issues of common 
concern’ (ASEAN 2018).   
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2.4.3 Economic sovereignty and external accountability 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 explained the persistence of and problems with the use 
of discrete geographical and sectoral categories in economic growth discourse in 
East Asia. The discussion above illustrated the intricacies of economic 
sovereignty in East Asia and how it is exercised across national, regional, and 
global platforms. Whilst there are variations across East Asia, the primacy of 
nation-building through economic growth is a common thread. The region’s 
experience with economic sovereignty also shows how East vs. West and internal 
vs. external dichotomies are flawed. Before we turn to the rise of regional 
surveillance in East Asia in Chapter 5, it is useful to illustrate how certain regional 
initiatives under the rubric of ASEAN+3 support the parallel goals of domestic 
legitimacy and international credibility.  
One of the key lessons that emerged after the Asian financial crisis is the 
need to develop local capital markets. Earlier in this chapter, it was pointed out 
how the emphasis on finding local/regional solutions was a product of East Asia’s 
disenchantment with how the West responded to the 1997 crisis. Development 
of bond markets aligns with the policy stance of the IMF, but local officials readily 
welcomed this new direction for different reasons. As far as international 
policymakers were concerned, the rationale for bond market development lies 
in perceptions of its vital role in fostering national and global financial stability. 
As for regional officials, the main drivers for bond market development were the 
opportunities it presented for risk diversification and retention of regional 
savings for infrastructure development. Local capital development gave 
policymakers ‘space to reassert their control of the liberalisation and institution-
building process’ (Rethel 2010, 500). Despite such assertions of local control, the 
Asian Bond Fund Initiative (ABFI) remained nested in Western structures. The 
ABFI could have been a rising player in global capital markets but officials in East 
Asia pushed for an Asian-Bond-Eurobond link and the establishment of a Euro 
Bond Market in Asia to help gain external buy-in for the development of an Asian 
Bond Market (Sohn 2007), and consequently, also garner market support. 
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Likewise, although CMIM was ostensibly created so the region will not need to 
rely to the IMF in the event of another liquidity crisis, East Asia’s policymakers 
opted to include an IMF link. Disbursement guidelines indicate that the funds 
allocated through CMIM (except for the first 20% of the allotment) will be linked 
to a programme with the IMF. Granted, ratio of the link has been reduced since 
the swap arrangement first came into effect in 2010 with the prospect of eventual 
elimination, yet the decision to take an incremental approach was done to 
assuage credibility concerns and to avoid strong opposition from the IMF and the 
United States (Grimes 2011).  
In the same vein, the cases of the ABFI and CMIM have similarities with how 
AMRO surveillance operates. Economic sovereignty calls for careful management 
of the demands of domestic legitimacy and international credibility—as a 
platform for policy justification, participation in surveillance activities acts as a 
channel for strengthening both, especially with the rise of regional surveillance. 
Similarly, by offering East Asian countries its own platform for alternative 
assessments of economic performance, regional surveillance allows continued 
commitment to the principle of external accountability without compromising 
economic sovereignty. 
This is particularly relevant given the underlying commitment to external 
accountability. Whilst the principle itself is not an explicit component of regional 
surveillance, ASEAN is increasingly vocal about the importance of the region’s 
role in the global community. In 2012, the region’s leaders adopted the Bali 
Concord III Plan of Action 2013-2017 to signify their commitment to ‘enhance 
ASEAN’s role in contributing towards finding solutions to global challenges and 
to further promote ASEAN a reliable regional player in the global community of 
nations’ (ASEAN 2011). With this in mind, it becomes clearer how regional 
surveillance should be viewed as an important tool for consolidating domestic 
legitimacy and international credibility. It would be damaging for regional 
surveillance to be perceived as a direct challenge to global surveillance; at the 
same time, it needs to cohere with conceptions of what constitutes the 
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‘appropriate economic growth model’ for the specific context and interests of the 
different ASEAN+3 member countries who are part of the surveillance process.  
Hence, employing the categories analysed in this chapter serve a strategic 
purpose when invoked in policy justification. Using East vs. West frames in 
references to economic growth models may be perceived as too politically loaded 
and inappropriate when the overarching goal of surveillance is global stability. 
Mathematical models, on the other hand, carry the badge of technical neutrality 
that is widely valued in the domain of global economic governance. Yet, as shown 
in Section 2.3, the use of purportedly neutral categories such as state/market, 
real/financial, and internal/external can also be traced to themes reflected in 
East Asian vs. Western models of economic growth. These have important 
implications given how surveillance models are used to present technical 
justifications for diverging claims on the sources of and risks to economic 
growth. The politics inherent in surveillance models deserve due attention, 
especially when both regional and global institutions are committed to 
upholding the principle of external accountability, yet have different motivations 
for doing so as shown in Chapter 6.  
  
2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter analysed how the use of selected geographical (East vs. West, 
internal vs. external) and sectoral (state vs. market, real vs. financial market) 
categories pervade discourse on economic growth in East Asia from early 1990s 
till the present. The discussion also revealed the problematic construction of 
such dichotomies, and suggested that these flawed dichotomies persist as they 
can be used for policy justification. The application and emphasis of certain 
categories over another shape how academics and policymakers specify the 
variables, actors, and institutions that determine the economic growth (or 
collapse) of countries in the region.  
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This in turn influences the practice of surveillance and how it represents 
the sources of and risks to economic growth.  With the emergence and expansion 
of regional surveillance in East Asia, the region’s policymakers have access to an 
alternative platform for policy justification, thus allowing them to showcase their 
commitment to the principle of external accountability. However, the salience of 
international credibility and domestic legitimacy in East Asia means that regional 
surveillance cannot present itself as a direct contender to IMF surveillance; at the 
same time, the imperatives of nation-building need to be prioritised in regional 
surveillance as well. East Asian countries are increasingly keen to assert 
themselves as rising players in the global economy. These aspirations mean that 
the region has become more conscious about how it portrays itself as a 
responsible member of the global community. As the narrative of East Asia’s 
growing prominence in the global economy continues to be framed as a process 
of internal resilience amidst external incursions, regional surveillance offers East 
Asia the chance to present its own assessment of what constitutes ‘strong’ 
economic fundamentals; however, it will do so in terms considered appropriate 
by the gatekeepers of global economic governance. 
East Asia’s conception of strong economic fundamentals may not always 
conflict with the dominant framework espoused by IFIs. Nonetheless, in the 
event that this is the case, tensions that may surface in attempts to reconcile 
internal pressures with the external accountability can be minimised and 
deflected if policy justification is underpinned by model-driven surveillance 
analysis. The use of mathematical models lends surveillance analysis the 
apolitical tenor and technical authority expected from any credible assessment 
of economic policy, hence making surveillance models a useful political resource.  
The next chapter elaborates on this point, as it discusses the continued 
dominance of mathematical modelling after the global financial crisis and 
reviews explanations for modelling’s endurance despite widespread recognition 





The Persistence of Modelling:  
Proof of Expertise, Pretext for Its Limitations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous analysis of crisis narratives that emerged out of the Asian and 
global financial crises illustrate how spatial (East vs. West, internal vs. external) 
and sectoral (state vs. market, real vs. financial) categories were misleadingly 
constructed as analytically discrete units. Moreover, emphasising one category 
over another frames assessments of economic policy in East Asia in such a way 
that the sources of and risks to economic growth were attributed to certain 
sectors or actors and institutions associated with a particular geographical area. 
As argued in Chapter 2, such assessments can be construed as politically 
contentious. In the context of regional and global surveillance, politically laden 
assessments of economic policies are especially problematic when the primary 
objective of the conduct of surveillance is maintaining global financial and 
macroeconomic stability. Consequently, the integrity and authority of 
surveillance analysis are rooted in its veneer of technical neutrality.  
In the next two chapters, we explore the claims of technical neutrality that 
characterise economic policies derived from mathematical models.  As will be 
shown in the coming discussion, this is a theme that has been covered in 
philosophy of science, economic sociology, and IPE literature. Whilst these works 
have produced valuable insights, this thesis extends existing analyses by 
investigating how claims of technical neutrality in mathematical formalism are 
embedded in mutually constitutive links between methodological and political 
logics of reasoning and representation.   
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The present chapter opens the discussion with a survey of the continued 
dominance of mathematical modelling after the global financial crisis. The global 
financial crisis has triggered a wave of changes and self-reflection amongst 
economists regarding macroeconomic theory and modelling; however, it is 
premature to claim that we are witnessing a ‘fundamental ontological and 
epistemological shift’ (Best 2016, 48). In their analysis of selected conferences 
and publications between 2007 and 2012, Vinca Bigo and Ioana Negru 
investigate the extent to which economists questioned their discipline’s 
dominant methodological orientation. Whilst there is genuine concern about the 
state of mainstream methodology, most participants and authors continued to 
emphasise the need to work within the framework of mathematical formalism. 
Most of the solutions presented involved developing or improving models; with 
the exception of a few dissenters, no one considered a future for macroeconomics 
wherein the emphasis on mathematical modelling would decline. The authors 
observe that ‘economists continue to take existing methodology as an 
unquestionable (sacrosanct) given’ (Bigo and Negru 2014, 342). Post-crisis 
debates favoured strategies that did not stray from the usual path of the core 
methodological framework.  
Granted, expectations of radical change should be managed, especially 
immediately after the crisis. Within the IMF, there is now a more diverse 
engagement with various theoretical traditions and methodological approaches 
in staff research and policy outputs. Yet the extent of pluralism is still largely 
limited as Fund economists continue to work within the broad scope of New 
Consensus Macroeconomics; modelling and other forms of quantitative analyses 
are still prioritised within the IMF. Staff members reflected on and dealt with the 
post-crisis academic debates with a pragmatic mind set, one limited by the 
necessity of policy-oriented research as well as institutional and operational 
constraints (Clift 2018). Reform initiatives need to be ready for swift 
implementation; economic theory and models should provide policymakers with 
easily digestible and actionable guidance (Palumbo 2017). Crises may prompt 
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ontological and epistemological deliberations but they do not guarantee the 
complete overhaul of an entrenched theoretical and methodological approach. In 
times of crises, policy influence always lies with those who work within the 
dominant paradigm, even though it may be the same paradigm that led to the 
crisis itself (Bryan et al. 2012). In this regard, it is likely that policymakers cannot 
afford to make such drastic changes in times of crisis as this could be conceived 
as an admission of loss of authority and control precisely at a time when this is 
needed the most. 
Nonetheless, the flawed yet persistent dominance of mathematical 
formalism merits a deeper investigation, more so as it continues to underpin 
global economic governance without any signs of wavering. Chapter 3 offers an 
alternative explanation for mathematical modelling’s unrelenting clout as this 
chapter builds a case for the capacity of models to serve as a political resource. 
In contrast to existing accounts, the explanation presented here highlights the 
ways in which methodological choices made in mathematical formalism can 
strengthen perceptions of technical expertise whilst offering a justification for its 
limitations. Section 3.2 reviews developments in mathematical modelling after 
the global financial crisis. It focuses on two specific models that are widely used 
in surveillance analysis, namely Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
and vector autoregression (VAR) models. Section 3.3 analyses the persistence of 
mathematical modelling in terms of disciplinary boundaries and the politics of 
expertise. Such explanations are informative as they shed light on how 
perceptions of authority are bestowed on some forms of expertise and not 
others. However, perspectives from these areas of study give more weight to the 
institutional sources of disciplinary authority; the implications of 
methodological choices for knowledge production and expert authority are 
largely overlooked. Section 3.4 addresses this gap as it draws on debates 
between orthodox and heterodox economics. Insights from these discussions, 
especially those pertaining to the incorporation of knowledge limitations in 
mathematical models, are used to demonstrate how mathematical models can be 
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a useful political resource. Models can be used to justify the growing demands 
for and limitations of technical interventions in global economic governance; at 
the same time, models can also bolster expert authority and provide a defence 
for any shortcomings. It is argued that this can explain the continued dominance 
and expansion of mathematical modelling after the global financial crisis, in a 
way that reveals both the coherence and contradictions inherent in the practice 
of mathematical formalism. 
 
3.2 Mathematical modelling after the global financial crisis  
Post-crisis regulatory reform treated the 2007 downturn as a ‘socio-
technical failure’ that can be remedied with sophisticated technical interventions 
run by technocratic experts (Engelen et al. 2012, 361). Rebuilding the financial 
system after the collapse was largely seen as a matter of identifying the 
appropriate socio-technical fix for ‘calculative failures’ in an otherwise 
functioning global economy (Engelen et al. 2012, 360).  A similar premise 
underlies the direction of changes in mathematical modelling after the global 
financial crisis. As mentioned above, the surge in calls for improving models has 
led to wider recognition of its flaws, yet a more fundamental questioning of its 
continued dominance—one that foregrounds the importance of methodological 
choices in the construction of knowledge and technical expertise—remains to be 
seen.  
This section will provide an overview of the post-crisis commentary on 
economic methodology. As the debate on the failures of economics after the crisis 
is well-trodden territory (see for example, Lavoie 2016; Colander et al. 2009), 
the discussion here will centre on the comments on macroeconomic modelling, 
a core component of surveillance analysis. This can be observed in various 
spillover models developed by IMF, ADB, and AMRO economists, which will be 
analysed in greater detail in Chapter 7. Even with this narrow focus, it is difficult 
to get a clear consensus on the state of macroeconomic modelling. What are the 
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appropriate criteria for a fair assessment? Should the critique be based on the 
validity of the model’s assumptions or the effectiveness of its policy 
recommendations? Should we focus on the model’s explanatory or predictive 
power? A decade after the crisis has passed, there is no shortage of suggested 
solutions but the search for answers continues. As Olivier Blanchard, Emeritus 
Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and IMF Chief Economist 
from 2008 to 2015, pointed out in an off-hand remark during his speech at the 
2017 NBER Macroeconomics Annual Conference:  
‘This may be a hopeless and misguided search. Maybe even the simplest 
characterisation of fluctuations requires many more distortions. Maybe 
different distortions are important at different times. Maybe there is no 
simple model… I keep faith that there is’ (Blanchard 2017, 3).  
This section offers no guidance either; instead it will shed light on the 
persistence of this faith in mathematical modelling that Blanchard shares with 
many others, despite recognition of its significant limitations. The focus will be 
on two models, i.e., DSGE and VAR, that are widely used in both IMF and AMRO 
surveillance. These models—and their inability to account for non-linearities 
and financial frictions—are of particular interest given post-crisis surveillance’s 
emphasis on systemic risk and macroprudential policy. This section will also 
outline some of the new models that were developed after the global financial 
crisis to incorporate certain aspects of complexities and uncertainties in the 
financial and macroeconomic system. The expansion of models to incorporate 
complexities and uncertainties demonstrate the continued predilection for 
technical rationalisation in economic policies.  
DSGE models19 bore the brunt of the criticism after the crisis, being an easy 
target given their popularity in many central banks and policy institutions (such 
                                                        
19 The genesis of DSGE models can be traced to Real Business Cycles models and New Keynesian 
theoretical approaches. John Quiggin (2012) provides a succinct account of the historical 
evolution of DSGE models, dating back to the first general equilibrium theory developed by Leon 
Walras in the 1870s. 
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as the IMF) across the globe. The main features of the core model include three 
interrelated blocks: a demand block, a supply block, and a set of monetary policy 
equations, all built on microeconomic foundations derived from assumptions on 
the behaviour of households, firms, and the government. Following his critique 
that the impact of changes in macroeconomic policy cannot be predicted solely 
on the basis of historical data, Robert E. Lucas asserted that consistent empirical 
links can only be derived from microeconomic foundations, specifically rational 
expectations, utility maximisation, and market equilibrium (Quiggin 2012). 
DSGE models are set up such that the agents base their choices on their 
expectations about future outcomes, and the interaction between agents’ 
behaviour and policy actions lead to market equilibrium after every period. The 
structure also allows for exogenous events (e.g., productivity shocks) that 
disrupt the equilibrium conditions and create economic fluctuations. The 
specification of these shocks helps the user trace how the effects of exogenous 
effects are transmitted through the economy. The appeal of DSGE models lies in 
their versatility, as their structure makes them scalable and easy to adjust and 
expand depending on the policy question the modeller seeks to address 
(Sbordone et al. 2010). Given its support for the use of monetary policy and the 
view that market volatility and crises were unlikely, DSGE models were popular 
during the Great Moderation. It took the global financial crisis to turn the tide. 
Critics of DSGE identify several shortcomings in their assessments. One of 
the oft-cited issues is its misplaced reliance on microeconomic foundations. In 
his congressional testimony on DSGE models and its use of the representative-
agent paradigm, Robert Solow claims that ‘DSGE models do not pass the smell 
test’: 
‘They [DSGE models] take it for granted that the whole economy can be 
thought about as if it were a single, consistent person or dynasty carrying 
out a rationally designed, long-term plan, occasionally disturbed by 
unexpected shocks, but adapting to them in a rational, consistent way… The 
protagonists of this idea make a claim to respectability by asserting that it 
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is founded on what we know about microeconomic behaviour, but I think 
that this claim is generally phony. The advocates no doubt believe what 
they say, but they seem to have stopped sniffing or to have lost their sense 
of smell altogether…’ (Solow 2010, 2). 
The list of DSGE’s flawed assumptions is long, including the theories it 
applies on consumption and investment. The model is also mistaken in its 
approach towards aggregation and its treatment of shocks as exogenous. 
Moreover, undue dependence on DSGE conditions its users to view the world as 
if it follows the depiction in the model. This encourages the belief that the 
economy does operate along an equilibrium; this leads to ineffective and possibly 
detrimental policy recommendations (Caballero 2010; Stiglitz 2017). Another 
glaring gap in standard DSGE models is its exclusion of the financial sector. For 
instance, the use of DSGE models assumed that any interaction between the real 
and financial sectors can be reduced in the following manner: 
‘… in DSGEs, the monetary side of the economy is fully determined by the 
real sphere. Agents make decision [sic] about producing, consuming, and 
investing based on the available resources, preferences, and prices. Money 
is treated as an add-on to the real economy, a mere unit of account that 
allows for comparing the values of goods and services, facilitating 
individual optimal choice. Given the outcome of the optimisation process, 
the financial sector is modelled as passively producing the means to 
execute the necessary transactions in labour, goods, and services’ 
(Bezemer 2011, cited in Christophers 2017, 266). 
Whilst this crucial shortcoming has been acknowledged, the remedies thus 
far have been limited to the addition of financial frictions to the same core model. 
Inclusion of the financial sector is now more common in DSGE models, including 
those used in various central banks across the globe. Before the global financial 
crisis hit, most central bank DSGE models did not account for credit channels, 
financial frictions, and macrofinancial interactions and shocks. To a certain 
degree, this can be attributed to data limitations (e.g., frequency mismatch of 
77 
 
data used for financial and macroeconomic analysis); institutional arrangements 
(specifically the separation of financial stability and monetary policy analyses in 
central banks) also played a role. More importantly, the absence of financial 
frictions minimised modelling complications and kept DSGE models manageable 
for policy use. A survey of central bank working papers published between 2008 
and 2010 found a growing group of central banks developing DSGE models with 
financial frictions, including the US Federal Reserve, the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, and the European Central Bank which have incorporated such features 
in their core forecasting models. Despite these notable changes, the 
incorporation of financial frictions should not be overstated as the additional 
features are largely limited to the introduction of a financial accelerator or a 
collateral constraint (Roger and Vlcek 2012). As concerns that a more 
comprehensive inclusion of financial frictions will result in an unwieldly model 
prevail, the financial sector continues to be analysed as if it were a distinct realm 
separate from the real economy (The Economist 2013; Christophers 2017).  
Similar views were echoed in academic and non-academic platforms alike, 
so much so that attacking DSGE models was seen as ‘a media bandwagon’ 
(Cooper 2011, 378). Nonetheless, DSGE models still had staunch defenders from 
within the discipline. For instance, Blanchard has been steadfast in his position 
that ‘current DSGE models are flawed but they contain the right foundations and 
must be improved rather than discarded’ (Blanchard 2018, 43). As different 
models are appropriate for different purposes, he proposes the use of five kinds 
of general equilibrium models, starting with a common core model and 
developing others for policy, toy, forecasting, and foundational theory. Sceptics 
argue that such model expansions are usually carried out in a very arbitrary 
manner, such that the coherence and elegance that DSGE advocates hold dear are 
diminished (Stiglitz 2017). However, Blanchard believes that continued 
adherence to microeconomic foundations facilitates ‘formal dialogue’ (Blanchard 
2018, 49), and that whilst ‘[o]ne wishes that there were a short cut and a different 
starting point… I do not think either exists’ (Blanchard 2018, 49). Other 
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economists share similar views as they hold the position that ‘more persuasive 
microfoundations’ hold the key to rebuilding stronger DSGE models, although 
there are differences in opinion on what exactly this would entail (Vines and 
Wills 2018, 23).  
Akin to the DSGE model, VAR models—whilst technically a statistical model 
and not a macroeconomic one—were also widely used prior to the crisis (e.g., by 
ADB staff) for forecasts and received some criticism afterwards as well. In its 
basic form, VAR involves simultaneous regressions of several time series 
variables using its own lagged values and those of all the other variables in the 
system. The model emerged as a response to some of the same issues raised 
against DSGE, specifically the validity of the modelling assumptions as dictated 
by economic theory and the discretionary normalisation of equations in the 
model. Without the restrictive assumptions of conventional causal models, VAR 
is useful for an engineering approach to policy analysis in that the data 
determines the appropriate theory to be applied (Howitt et al. 2008). Its 
proponents highlight the advantages of favouring an atheoretical, reduced-form 
approach where the only assumption necessary is the causal ordering of the 
variables included in the model (Holden 1995).  
As VAR’s atheoretical approach significantly narrows the scope for attack, 
it was covered less in post-crisis commentary relative to DSGE. Nonetheless, it 
was also criticised for its inaccurate forecasts as both DSGE and VAR employed 
linear functional forms and did not account for financial frictions prior to the 
crisis (Hendry and Muellbauer 2018). Its heavy reliance on historical data also 
reduces its credibility in terms of generating future policies, making it unreliable 
as a policy model (Lindé 2018). Furthermore, even those who appreciate VAR for 
its atheoretical framework concede that purely statistical models are inadequate 
by themselves as theory is still needed for the interpretation of the data (Howitt 
et al. 2008).  
As a response to post-crisis critiques that such models failed to take 
account of the various dimensions of complexity and uncertainty in the economy, 
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various economists also pushed for the use and development of new approaches. 
A research group of economists and computer scientists from different European 
institutions developed an agent-based model of the EU economy to investigate 
the effects of quantitative easing and deregulation of the labour market. Agent-
based models include an evolutionary structure to allow the depiction of 
transactions between agents over time. This is particularly helpful in long-term 
studies of boom-and-bust cycles (The Economist 2013). Agent-based modelling 
(drawing from Post-Keynesian traditions) can also incorporate bounded 
rationality, heterogenous agents, and financial frictions (Caverzasi and Russo 
2018). Economists have also turned their attention to the natural sciences as 
financial network models are inspired by work on ecosystems, food webs, and 
infectious diseases contagion (May, Levin, and Sugihara 2008; A. G. Haldane and 
May 2011). Research using non-linear models and complexity theory are also 
gaining attention. New institutionalists (inspired by Post-Marshallian 
economics) designed a macroeconomic model based on a complex systems 
approach. Whilst their work started before the onset of the global financial crisis, 
its relevance increased in the years after the crisis with the model’s use of non-
linear dynamics and multiple equilibria (Cooper 2011).   
Just as the increasing realisation of complexities in the economy has led to 
its inclusion in models (in some pre-determined form or another), the rising 
acknowledgement of uncertainty has had the same result. There are promising 
initiatives on the fringes of mainstream economics, one being Sheila Dow’s call 
to endogenise uncertainty in modelling. In contrast to mainstream accounts 
which depict uncertainty as a constraint to market equilibrium and rational 
choice, Dow promotes an approach that goes beyond the individual agent and 
stresses the need for markets that ‘accept their own limitations and proceed 
more cautiously as a result’ (Dow 2013, 9). Another approach is being developed 
under the Institute for New Economic Thinking’s ‘Imperfect Knowledge 
Economics’ project. As a response to the limitations of the rational expectations 
hypothesis, the project puts forward the contingent expectations hypothesis 
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which models rational forecasting in markets open to unanticipated structural 
change, without resorting to the assumption that market actors are necessarily 
irrational. By doing so, contingent expectations hypothesis offers an alternative 
choice to conventional macroeconomic models where ‘we can place at the centre 
of macroeconomic research partly open models that recognise that determinate 
structures are inherently out of reach for economic analysis, but that nonetheless 
provide a way to build macroeconomic theory that is compatible with rational 
decision-making and thus can explain regularities in time-series data’ (Frydman 
and Goldberg 2013, 32). 
Within mainstream economics, efforts to account for uncertainty in 
markets are usually done through co-opting uncertainty via mathematical 
formalism. That the nature of uncertainty essentially means that it escapes 
accurate quantification does not appear to be a concern amongst these 
economists. One such example is the creation of an index of economic policy 
uncertainty using newspaper coverage frequency of selected keywords in US 
media. The methodology looked at the combination of different terms including 
‘economic’ (or ‘economy’) and ‘uncertain’ (or ‘uncertainty’), together with 
‘deficit’, ‘regulation’, ‘legislation’, ‘White House’, ‘Federal Reserve’ or ‘Congress’ 
(S. R. Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2016). In another study, Chiara Scotti designed a 
surprise index that measures actors’ confidence about the economy based on 
macroeconomic news surprises. ‘Surprises’ in this study are determined by the 
difference between the actual releases of macroeconomic variables and the 
corresponding figures predicted by Bloomberg. These indicators are 
incorporated in models that still follow standard assumptions of rationality 
(Scotti 2013).   
Observations noting the ‘systemic failure of the economics profession’ (D. 
Colander et al. 2009) after the global financial crisis may have prompted greater 
self-reflection amongst economists. However, the tenacity of mathematical 
modelling was not damaged at all; in fact, its application has widened and its 
influence endures. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, pragmatic 
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concerns and policy imperatives contributed to the resilience of models in 
economic policy. Crises alone may not generate a cognitive shift as disciplinary 
and institutional constraints may impede a more fundamental overhaul of the 
dominant methodological approaches in economic analysis. The next section 
examines these constraints as consequences of disciplinary boundaries and the 
politics of expertise. 
 
3.3 Mathematical modelling, disciplinary boundaries, and the politics of 
expertise  
The prominence and prestige accorded to mathematical modelling in the 
economics profession has a long, if uneven, history. Early forms of economic 
models appeared as far back as the 18th century with François Quesnay’s Tableau 
Economique (Morgan 2012), but it was in the 1870s with the first round of the 
Marginalist Revolution that economists became enamoured with the application 
of a single mathematical concept (i.e., equilibrium) in their discipline (Bell 1980; 
Mirowski 1991). The emergence of a shared language and the subsequent 
‘mathematicisation of economic discourse’ (Mirowski 1991, 155) facilitated the 
rise of mathematical economics, but it was only in the years following the Great 
Depression that the second round of the revolution occurred. From the 1930s to 
the 1960s, modelling became institutionally embedded as ‘a technique of 
government’ and ‘tool for the exercise of public expertise’ (Fourcade 2009, 2). 
Physicists started to join the ranks of economists and spearheaded the 
development of mathematical models in academic and government institutions. 
This development was central to the expansion of an influential programme that 
reached its peak in the militarised research agenda of the United States after 
World War II (Mirowski 2002).   
This section delves into the disciplinary boundaries and politics of 
expertise that underpin mathematical modelling’s favoured standing in 
economics. Given this thesis’ interest in models as a political resource, the 
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discussion will emphasise the perceptions of authority that are linked to the 
development and use of mathematical models. Whilst disciplinary and 
institutional structures may remain relatively entrenched, the dynamic nature of 
expert authority will also be covered given the fluid hierarchies within a 
community of experts. This point is particularly pertinent to the case of regional 
surveillance, as East Asia strives to establish its credibility and authority in the 
realm of global economic governance after the 2007 crisis. 
As in other fields, the boundaries of the community of economists are 
shaped by particular disciplinary practices that seek to delineate what is deemed 
as legitimate knowledge. Practices, such as the endorsement of preferred 
accounts of a discipline’s history in major textbooks or citation and publication 
in top-ranked journals, determine the standards for acceptable knowledge 
production and the scope for engagement (or exclusion) with other related 
disciplines (Clift and Rosamond 2009; Clift, Kristensen, and Rosamond 2018). 
The boundaries of community and conversation are particularly rigid in the case 
of mainstream economics as the discipline puts a high premium on intellectual 
cohesiveness, which helps to explain the incentives of the continued use of 
mathematical models. In disciplinary terms, Marion Fourcade, Etienne Ollion, 
and Yann Algan offer a biting commentary as they note that:   
‘… modern-day economists attribute their intellectual standing and 
autonomy to their reliance on precisely specified and parsimonious models 
and measures. They see the field’s high technical costs of entry and its 
members’ endeavours to capture complex social processes through 
equations or clear-cut causality as evidence of the discipline’s superior 
scientific commitments, vindicating the distance from and the lack of 
engagement with the more discursive social sciences’ (Fourcade, Ollion, 
and Algan 2015, 92). 
To be fair, there has been considerable reflection amongst mainstream 
economists about the limitations of their analytical inclinations to privilege 
individual preferences over social processes, and methodological precision over 
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real-world accuracy. Whilst we have witnessed isolated examples of this 
development after the global financial crisis (as pointed out earlier in this 
chapter), knowledge production is a contingent process, especially when it feeds 
into policy decisions. Stephen Turner refers to this as ‘the problem of the 
aggregation of knowledge’ (Turner 2015, 46) as he argues: 
‘If knowledge is distributed, it needs to be assembled in order to be 
employed for decision-making. To be assembled, there must be a process… 
there must be elements of organisation. The organisation of knowledge is 
the organisation of other people’s knowledge, and the structure of this 
knowledge involves trust, methods of certification and recognition filters 
that help to legitimate intellectual authority…’ (Turner 2015, 5). 
Given its role in policymaking, the authority of economics thus hinges not 
just on disciplinary peculiarities but on broader organisational forces as well. 
State institutions are constructed based on economic practices but are also sites 
for their concurrent legitimation (Fourcade 2009). Favoured forms of economic 
knowledge and expertise are thus equated to political authority, and vice versa.20 
The next chapter will build on these observations and will elaborate on the 
specificities of these links as embedded methodological choices.  
In the context of regional and global surveillance, the political authority tied 
to technical expertise is especially germane given the principle of external 
accountability. Whilst local contexts have consequential impact on processes of 
disciplinary socialisation and knowledge production (Fourcade 2009), 
economics is generally viewed as an international discipline with established 
scientific standards. As regional and global surveillance offer multiple 
assessments of the external impact of a country’s internal policies, the perceived 
link between intellectual cohesiveness and the practice of mathematical 
modelling is instrumental to the creation and preservation of IMF’s and AMRO’s 
                                                        
20 Although political theory would insist on making clear distinctions between knowledge and 
truth, and authority and expertise (Turner 2015), it is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage 
in an otherwise relevant debate.  
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authority in global economic governance. Mathematical models can be presented 
as a ‘universalistic paradigm’ (Fourcade 2009, 3) that can facilitate a constructive 
conversation between regional and global institutions as both work towards the 
attainment of global financial and macroeconomic stability.  
However, adherence to mathematical modelling should be not be seen as a 
methodological straitjacket that AMRO economists have to wear against their 
will. Rather, mathematical models are deployed as tools for navigating the 
hierarchies within the community of economic experts.  Janet Newman’s 
(Newman 2017) analysis of the political ambiguities in communities of experts 
is helpful in this regard. Her work shows how the reconfiguration of state power 
under New Labour created spaces for emerging sources of expert authority such 
as non-government organisations (NGOs) and community workers. As these 
groups were empowered by the shifts in the authority of conventional experts 
(including those in government and academic positions), they challenged 
neoliberal structures by using the same forms of expertise and knowledge 
practices associated with the actors and institutions they sought to contest.     
There are parallels between Newman’s study and the rise of regional 
surveillance, as the global financial crisis exposed the cracks in the IMF’s 
credibility as intellectual compass.  The financial crises in Asia and Latin America 
during the 1990s led to the thinking that the primary source of risk and 
instability can be traced back to emerging markets and developing economies 
and their flawed policy choices and institutional deficiencies. IFIs and the states 
leading them encouraged crisis-afflicted economies to adopt a market-oriented 
regulatory approach aligned with the US and the UK model, with minimal input 
from emerging markets and developing economies. 
With the major financial centres located in New York and London, the 
United States and the United Kingdom were the de facto intellectual leaders and 
were the key drivers of the global financial regulatory and surveillance agenda. 
The global financial crisis challenged the legitimacy of the United States and the 
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United Kingdom (and the global institutions they headed) as unopposed 
intellectual leaders in international finance.  
One way this shift can be observed is by looking at the changes in the 
perceptions and reception of the IMF as a trusted adviser and watchdog in East 
Asia. To be fair, the IMF’s image did improve after the global financial crisis but 
this was largely attributed to the Fund’s more open and flexible approach to 
conditionality in its lending programs. However, assessment of the IMF’s 
response to the crisis revealed the persistence of problems such as a lack of 
relevance and value-added in the Fund’s advice and a perceived lack of 
evenhandedness in the treatment of member countries. According to interviews 
carried out by the IEO, groupthink and intellectual capture continues to 
undermine the credibility of IMF surveillance (IEO 2013). 
The changing domestic context and shifts in interstate power also 
contributed to changes in traditional sources of intellectual hegemony in global 
finance. After the crisis, there was a shift towards a more centralised 
international financial system governed by the G-20, with the help of the IMF and 
the FSB. However, as the G-20 leaders became more proactive in setting the 
financial reform agenda, the technocrats in these epistemic communities became 
constrained by the priorities of the G-20 and the G-20 leaders in turn had to deal 
with growing domestic political pressures (Helleiner and Pagliari 2011). This is 
certainly not the first time domestic political pressures shaped financial reform. 
The 1988 Basel Accord was reached largely due to the efforts of US and UK 
government officials as they responded to demands from the financial sector. 
The negotiations and ensuing agreements were reached to improve the 
competitiveness of US and UK banks by ensuring an even playing field (Kapstein, 
1994). However, this time around, governments face pressure not only from 
market forces but from the general public as well. The complexities and 
technicalities of financial governance meant that the domain remained elusive to 
most of the public; however, the global financial crisis changed this as it 
highlighted the dangers of poor surveillance and its impact on the general public.  
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Whilst these developments widened room for regional authorities to come 
up with their own approach to surveillance, policymakers in East Asia are 
hesitant to take a revisionist stand as such a move may damage international 
credibility and domestic legitimacy. As argued in Chapter 2 and discussed further 
in Chapter 6, these concerns motivate AMRO surveillance. Regional surveillance 
consequently serves as a platform for policy justification but expressed in 
technical terms that comply with accepted international standards of economic 
expertise. The use of mathematical models allows East Asia to participate in the 
conversation on global economic governance; having AMRO as an alternative to 
IMF surveillance lets East Asia join the conversation but in terms they consider 
appropriate given the region’s own concerns about regional resilience and 
stability.  As long as they stay within the confines of mathematical formalism, 
AMRO economists can draw from their own understanding of the Asian and 
global financial crises to inform their surveillance analyses. The resulting 
account is thus a product of political and relational knowledge (Newman 2017) 
in that AMRO’s standing as an emerging expert authority in global economic 
governance is derived from a degree of alignment with the dominant structures 
they aim to challenge; at the same time, knowledge production in AMRO is 
motivated by the evolution of East Asia’s ambiguous relations with the IMF.  
As demonstrated above, the persistence of mathematical modelling after 
the global financial crisis can be explained in terms of the institutional sources of 
disciplinary authority. However, the discussion thus far treats mathematical 
models as empty vessels for knowledge production. To better appreciate the 
endurance of mathematical modelling, specifically the embedded practices that 
facilitate both its coherence and shortcomings, the methodological implications 




3.4 Alternative explanations for the persistence of mathematical 
modelling 
In seeking to investigate the other ways in which mathematical models can 
be a useful political resource in global economic governance, this section 
develops an alternative explanation for the persistence of mathematical models 
that is rooted in the politics inherent in methodological choices. Before laying out 
the analytical framework of the politics of economic methodology in Chapter 4, 
this section will outline the debates on the predilection for mathematical 
formalism in economics. The works of two key figures representing opposing 
ends in the methodological/political spectrum—Tony Lawson and Ben Fine—
are reviewed here to illustrate how critical analyses of mathematical formalism 
overlook the ways in which the methodological and political are mutually 
reinforcing. Whilst framing the discussion in this manner risks the exclusion of 
other important contributions to the topic (e.g., Backhouse 2010 amongst 
others), this compromise helps focus the attention on the tendency to treat the 
methodological and political as related but separate processes, which is this 
section’s primary objective.  
As opposed to the emphasis in the previous section on disciplinary politics, 
this discussion accounts for how modelling, as a particular kind of 
methodological practice, drives the process of knowledge production and how 
this process determines which entities and factors underlying the economy are 
included or excluded in the investigation. Hence, by examining mathematical 
modelling as a methodological practice, we can also understand how knowledge 
limitations are disregarded or accommodated and co-opted. This is crucial in the 
context of post-crisis modelling: Disciplinary imperatives tend to highlight the 
importance of modelling in the construction of expert authority but neglect to 
consider how the growing realisation of the limitations of mathematical models 
effectively fuelled its expansion. This section ends with an analysis of knowledge 
limitations (in the form of complexity and uncertainty) against this backdrop.  
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3.4.1 Orthodox vs. heterodox economics 
It bears stating at the onset that orthodox economics is by no means 
homogenous in terms of theoretical approaches and its use of empirical evidence 
(e.g., game theory and behavioural economics) (Dow 2008). As raised at the 
beginning of the chapter, a certain degree of theoretical and empirical 
heterogeneity can also be seen amongst the mainstream economists who work 
in the IMF (Clift 2018). In this thesis, orthodox economics is primarily 
characterised by the cohesion of its methodological approach, specifically in its 
adherence to mathematical formalism.21 In debates on mathematical formalism, 
one of the common distinctions made is between orthodox economists who 
believe that the economy operates as a closed system and heterodox economists 
who see it as an open system. Whilst these categories are ideal types, this 
distinction serves as the main basis for this chapter’s examination of the 
orthodox vs. heterodox debate to underscore the fundamental methodological 
choices that emanate from this divide.  
A closed system is one characterised by social atomism: interactions take 
place amongst independent and fixed individuals and structures (of beliefs, 
preferences, and resource allocations, amongst others). Economists then explain 
aggregate outcomes based on the behaviour of individuals or by searching for 
regularities in aggregate behaviour. This reduction of aggregate behaviour to 
methodological individualism is an important consequence of thinking of the 
economy as a closed system. On the other hand, an economy assuming an open 
system considers a more complex and dynamic interaction of individuals and 
structures which are neither pre-determined nor explainable or reducible in 
terms of the other (Lawson 1997).  
Lawson narrows down the divide between the orthodox and heterodox 
group to the former’s ‘insistence that methods of mathematical modelling always 
be employed’ (Lawson 2015b, 152). It should be noted that he does not 
                                                        
21 It should be noted that, aside from modelling, discussions on mathematical formalism may also 
refer to axiomisation and mathematisation (Dow 1998).  
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completely disregard the value of mathematical models: Lawson specifies that it 
is the orthodox school’s dogmatic application and failure to dig deeper and 
question fundamental assumptions behind social ontology and economic 
methodology that is at the root of problems in economics. Lawson argues that ‘if 
for many the belief that mathematical formalism is essential is just too ingrained 
to be easily shaken off, the thought that formalism could actually be deleterious 
is beyond comprehension’ (Lawson 2003, 249). He insists that the debate 
between orthodox and heterodox economics is not primarily due to opposing 
policy and substantive claims; Lawson believes that ideologies about how the 
economy works should not be blamed for ‘what went wrong with economics’.22 
The shortcomings of mainstream economists is not their ignorance—wilful or 
otherwise—of the real nature of the market. Nor is it a deliberate strategy to 
maintain the status quo. Rather, Lawson’s main concern is that mainstream 
economics’ obstinate commitment to mathematical formalism makes model-
based economic policy impervious to criticism (Lawson 2015b).  
On the other end of the spectrum of the orthodox vs. heterodox debate are 
those who understand the divide as one that is essentially driven by conflicting 
ideologies and values. Fine disputes Lawson’s critique of orthodox economics as 
he claims that it cannot be reduced to issues of ontology and methodology. He 
does not define the orthodox problem of unrelenting commitment to 
mathematical formalism in such terms; rather, Fine emphasises that the key 
issue is ‘the use of utility and production functions, with accompanying 
assumptions to allow the theory to proceed regardless of any other 
considerations—methodology, realism, other theories, empirical evidence, and 
mathematics—to the contrary’ (Fine 2006, 2).  
Fine uses the term technical apparatus and architecture (TA2) to elaborate 
on this point. The orthodox technical apparatus is based on the mainstream 
                                                        
22 He does not completely disregard ideology and political factors in his assessment (Lawson 
2015b). In fact, Lawson attributes the historical rise of mathematical formalism, particularly after 
World War II with the influence of the Cold War and McCarthyism on academic economics, to 
cultural factors and the prevailing political climate (Lawson 2003).  
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economists’ reliance on explaining the behaviour of optimising individuals based 
on utility and production functions; policy solutions were framed in these 
arbitrary terms. He argues that accounting for the development of 
microeconomics through this framework should not be seen merely as ‘an 
original sin, reflective in the implosive disregard for other factors and methods, 
but the transformation of that sin into virtue as far as the mainstream is 
concerned’ (Fine 2016, 7). Fine observes the same issue in the development of 
general equilibrium theory, which he considers as the basis of the orthodox 
technical architecture. General equilibrium theory is faulted, not primarily due 
to what is commonly seen as its flawed approach and assumptions about the real 
nature of the economy, but because all these reservations are overlooked. 
General equilibrium theory is effectively rendered sacrosanct as it is ‘open to be 
adopted or not at the discretion of the discipline according to purpose and 
convenience’ (Fine 2016, 8). 
 Following this thought, Fine offers a different reason for the persistent 
dominance of orthodox economics. As mentioned earlier, Lawson argues that 
orthodox commitment to mathematical formalism is fundamentally a question of 
social ontology and economic methodology. On the contrary, Fine sees the 
expansion of the indiscriminate application of TA2 as a form of ‘economic 
imperialism’. The claim here is that orthodox economics is now more widespread 
than ever as its analytical approach is considered appropriate for a growing 
range of fields previously seen as non-economic (e.g., the incompatible 
application of methodological individualism to accommodate the use of variables 
such as race and gender). Whilst there is some acceptance that the core 
principles of orthodox economics are incapable of explaining how the real 
economy works, the response is not to question TA2 but to bring in other non-
economic variables into the TA2 framework (Fine 2016). Again, application is 
done arbitrarily depending on purpose and convenience—Fine points out that 
‘the specification of orthodoxy is not a fixed ontology nor a fixed technical 
apparatus but a shifting historical logic that wields the two’ (Fine 2006, 3). Under 
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expanding economic imperialism, orthodox engagement may be wider but it is 
still done on narrow terms.  
These diverging accounts on the continued emphasis on mathematical 
formalism indicate a clear distinction between methodological and political 
factors. Lawson’s critique of mathematical formalism is primarily based on 
mainstream economists’ ontological position regarding the nature of the 
economy. In comparison, Fine’s assessment is not based on mainstream 
economics’ flawed assumptions about the nature of the economy; instead, he lays 
the blame on mainstream economics’ propensity to sideline such flawed 
assumptions to accommodate particular interests and objectives. This thesis 
proposes a different approach and seeks to demonstrate that these two views 
should be read as parallel and inseparable processes; Chapter 4 expands on this 
point as it analyses the mutually constitutive links between methodological and 
political logics in mathematical formalism.  
Before we turn to this, it is helpful to clarify how mathematical modelling 
holds incentives, not just because of disciplinary and institutional constraints as 
raised earlier in the chapter, but for both methodological and political purposes 
as well. Consensus around the use of mathematical models in economic 
policymaking means that model-based arguments can be assessed based on the 
same criteria. This facilitated the spread of technocratic expertise in US 
government offices, as model-driven policies were perceived as balanced and 
objective (Morgan and Rutherford 1998, cited in Dow 2008). As mentioned 
earlier in the chapter, these are concerns that shape emerging countries’ 
perception of IMF surveillance, hence underscoring the importance of model-
based surveillance analysis in the rise of regional surveillance in East Asia.  
Mathematical modelling is also valued for its clarity and precision; 
however, in the context of a complex open system such as the global economy, it 
can be argued that ‘it is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong’ 
(attributed to Wildon Carr, cited in Chick 1998, 1862). David Colander makes a 
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similar claim as he argues that the use of formal methods in applied economics 
creates results that are ‘needlessly precise’. He goes on to claim that: 
‘The reason is analogous to the law of significant digits – the result of an 
analysis can only be as exact as the least precise part of the analysis. Since 
the sociological and political dimensions are extraordinarily imprecise, 
making applied economic theory precise adds nothing to the precision of 
the final conclusion’ (D. C. Colander 2001, 22). 
The trade-off between precision and accuracy is a critical point in 
surveillance analysis, especially in the context of systemic risk and 
macroprudential policy. As will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, methodological 
complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities plague the analysis of systemic risk 
and macroprudential policy. Yet the preference for technical interventions in 
global economic governance suggests that some semblance of precision is valued 
over elusive accuracy. This can be observed in the capacity of models to 
incorporate knowledge limitations, a crucial point that is largely overlooked in 
other works explaining the resilience of mathematical modelling in economic 
policy.   
3.4.2 Knowledge and its limitations  
Early efforts to establish regional surveillance in East Asia were driven by 
a search for ‘relevant truths’. One study suggests that regional surveillance could 
address the demand for more suitable models ‘more directly related to the 
particular nature of the [recent] crisis in East Asia’ (Manzano 2001, 10). 
Policymakers in East Asia had reservations about the regional surveillance 
carried out by multilateral institution, as the ASEAN+3 finance ministers and 
central bank governors demanded more assessments grounded in the national 
context and local economic and political conditions (Nesadurai 2009). This 
continued over the years leading to the global financial crisis. The IEO 
commissioned a review of the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook reports between 
2003 and 2009. In his assessment of the reports prepared by the Asia-Pacific 
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Department, Peter Montiel finds that the policy recommendations were largely 
‘based on a global perspective, rather than a single-country or regional 
perspective that authorities in the region are more likely to adopt’ (Montiel 2011, 
6–7). Policy advice in the reports ‘clearly intended to support the Fund’s 
particular perspective on the “global imbalances” issue’ (Montiel 2011, 7). Whilst 
these concerns are valid, such observations are predicated on the belief that 
simply switching to more ‘regionally-relevant’ models will address the problem. 
However, the process of mathematical modelling is not just a question of how 
relevant knowledge is incorporated; it also hinges on how the model accounts 
for (or minimises) the problem of knowledge limitations.  
 The conception and use of knowledge and its limitations in economics are 
often conflated with the notion of information, which economists have fetishised 
to the point that it ‘has inadvertently debased their treatment of knowledge’ 
(Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2017a, 6).  Managing the economy has been treated as 
a matter of collecting and processing the right kind of information, as well as 
coordinating its use. Here, the economic agent is seen as a passive actor in the 
production and processing of knowledge. The problem of establishing man’s 
rationality was circumvented by relegating rationality to a set of axioms of 
rational choice; instead, economists focus on the necessary mechanisms to 
facilitate rational choice such that ‘the object of study needed to be the choice, 
not the chooser’ (Heyck 2012, cited Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2017b, 21). 
Knowledge did not reside in the economic agent; ‘truth’ was processed and 
validated by the market as constructed by the economist in the theories and 
models they built. In this context, the status of the economist as expert operates 
under the assumption that she holds enough knowledge to understand how to 
engineer the system of actors, institutions, mechanisms, and markets that 
comprise the economy. Hence, the following discussion will focus on how 




Economists acknowledge the difficulties of achieving a complete 
understanding of the economic system; however, they differ on whether these 
are considered as constraints that can be remedied by reducing uncertainty to 
measures of probability, or including uncertainty as a shock, volatility, or 
inadequate information. The works of Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes 
are frequently cited as standard economic approaches to uncertainty, wherein 
the former equates uncertainty to unquantifiable risk whilst the latter is more 
concerned with uncertainty as an intrinsic part of the economic system (Dow 
2013). In many cases, attempts to account for uncertainty in economics were 
made to maintain coherence with the rational choice framework. Irrationality 
was seen as ‘a threat to economic theory’ (Amariglio 1990, 29) and 
acknowledging fundamental uncertainty would be incompatible with rational 
choice.  
A rare voice in the discipline, George Shackle does not see uncertainty as a 
limitation to economic theory and eschews mathematical formalism in the 
analysis of uncertainty. He notes that ‘economics has virtually turned 
imprecision itself into a science: economics, the science of quantification of the 
unquantifiable, and the aggregation of the incompatible’ (Shackle 1972, cited in 
Amariglio 1990, 37). Shackle calls for the economics discipline to embrace the 
totality of uncertainty instead of disregarding it, arguing that the inclusion of 
uncertainty in its imprecise form will actually lead to more accurate and rigorous 
economic models. However, such a drastic shift for mainstream economics will 
prove to be difficult, especially for those involved in policy-oriented research as 
previously discussed. Even advocates acknowledge that similar approaches to 
uncertainty may not appeal to those who follow mainstream methodology and 
will require the economics discipline to adopt a more pluralist perspective (Dow 
2013). Most debates in mainstream economics on the limitations of knowledge 
are framed in terms of specific problems (e.g., adverse selection, moral hazard) 
and the required points of intervention (Madra and Adaman 2014). This is also 
reflected in the new post-crisis models that were discussed in Section 3.2, as they 
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attempt to quantify various aspects of complexity and uncertainty such that it 
can be incorporated in models.   
The dominant perception of knowledge limitations as an incentive problem 
within a rational choice framework allows for its continued analysis through 
mathematical models. However, this approach only accounts for the knowledge 
limitations of economic agents and not the knowledge limitations of the 
economist who creates these models. Friedrich Hayek alludes to this in his 
argument about the pretence of knowledge. For Hayek, the notion that an 
individual or a centralised institution could ever gain complete knowledge or 
arrive at an accurate estimate of probability is ‘epistemological nonsense’ 
(Cooper 2011, 375). This is attributed to the dispersion of information (in a 
world composed of ‘phenomena of unorganised complexity’ (Hayek 1945, cited 
in Fourcade 2018, 3) and the misconception that knowledge can only be derived 
through measurement. Whilst this was used to support Hayek’s questionable 
faith in price mechanisms and spontaneous market coordination, his preference 
for ‘true but imperfect knowledge, even if it leaves much undetermined and 
unpredictable, to a pretence of exact knowledge that is likely to be false’ (Hayek 
1974, cited in Cooper 2011, 375) has garnered some support. Mainstream 
economics’ inclination to prioritise analytical precision and mathematical 
formalism over a more realistic depiction of the messy economic system has 
been blamed for the construction of ‘a new and artificial “reality”’ (Caballero 
2010, 89). Whilst Caballero’s point is valid, surveillance analysis needs to be 
assessed as a special case. As mentioned earlier, perceptions of objectivity and 
evenhandedness are associated with the intellectual cohesion and precision 
offered by model-based surveillance analysis. The credibility and authority of 
IMF surveillance rests on this foundation; the use of mathematical models 
presents AMRO surveillance with the tools to challenge IMF’s credibility and 
authority in a level playing field.   
However, the preference for precision over accuracy creates a paradox for 
model-based policy justification: Mathematical formalism is touted as the main 
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source of credibility for policy justification in global economic governance, but 
this means that technical sophistication is valued over realistic representation. 
This creates an environment wherein mainstream economists can foreground 
their knowledge and the sophistication of their models in the name of expertise 
and mathematical rigour; at the same time, they can defend their theories’ and 
models’ creation of artificial realities in the name of mathematical formalism.  In 
the context of regional and global surveillance, the construction of ‘artificial’ East 
Asian vs. Western economic growth models is permissible due to the pressures 
of complying with the rules of mathematical formalism. Hence, the use of 
mathematical models serves to both strengthen and compromise the integrity of 
model-based policy justification.  
When knowledge limitations such as complexities and uncertainties are 
acknowledged in model-based policy justification, mathematical models can be 
used to lend credibility to policy analysis whilst defending their narrow 
applicability. As the principle of external accountability requires countries to 
explain the external implications of domestic policy choices, this makes 
mathematical models a valuable political resource in global economic 
governance. Model-based surveillance allows for a technical dialogue between 
regional and global platforms that can be construed as objective and 
evenhanded; at the same time, any disagreements can be reduced as a matter of 
prioritising precision over accuracy.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
Whereas the previous chapter offered an explanation for the continued 
(albeit inaccurate) use of distinct spatial and sectoral categories in the discourse 
on economic growth in East Asia, Chapter 3 presented an alternative account for 
the continued (albeit problematic) use of mathematical models in economic 
policy after the global financial crisis. Contrary to other explanations that 
highlight the importance of disciplinary and institutional constraints, this 
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chapter attributed the unwavering influence of mathematical models to its 
capacity to serve as a political resource. More precisely, it illustrated how 
mathematical models can simultaneously bolster expert authority and provide a 
defence for any limitations, specifically in terms of the trade-off between 
precision and accuracy in the analysis of economic policy. 
The 2007 crisis may have sparked a widespread questioning of 
macroeconomic models yet this has failed to make a dent on its status as the 
dominant methodological approach in mainstream economics. If anything, the 
compulsion to work within the framework of mathematical formalism has both 
deepened and widened. New approaches developed in response to the crisis 
have managed to incorporate various dimensions of complexities and 
uncertainties in the financial and macroeconomic system into increasingly 
sophisticated models. The politics of expertise and disciplinary boundaries 
associate the endurance of mathematical modelling with the institutional 
sources of disciplinary authority, such as publication in esteemed journals or the 
legitimation of technical expertise through state support. However, such 
explanations treat mathematical models as impenetrable black boxes and 
overlook the implications of methodological choices in the production of 
knowledge and construction of expert authority.  
This chapter argued that a deeper understanding of the persistence of 
mathematical modelling requires moving beyond disciplinary and institutional 
factors and taking a closer look at the methodological process itself. To the extent 
that precision in modelling requires the depiction of spatial and sectoral 
categories as analytically discrete despite evidence to the contrary (as shown in 
Chapter 2), the process of privileging precision over accuracy thus involves 
choices that are not just methodological but political as well. Compliance with 
the rules of mathematical formalism requires making such choices in the face of 
ontological and technical constraints. This point will be expanded in the next 
chapter as it develops the analytical framework for this thesis’ study of the 




The Politics of Economic Methodology:  
Defining and Displacing Accountability  
through Mathematical Models  
 
4.1 Introduction   
To paraphrase Colin Crouch (2011), the strange non-death of mathematical 
models calls for a deeper interrogation of its enduring dominance within 
orthodox economics. The growing chorus of criticism after the global financial 
crisis has failed to weaken confidence in mathematical formalism (as noted in 
Chapter 3) and this conviction in models can be observed in the conduct of 
surveillance as well. IMF and AMRO surveillance toolkits draw from a wide range 
of quantitative and qualitative approaches, yet mathematical models are usually 
foregrounded in surveillance analysis as their use boosts credence in these 
organisations’ technical and ‘apolitical’ authority. As the continued commitment 
to the principle of external accountability obliges countries to justify the external 
impacts resulting from their respective internal policies, model-based 
surveillance analysis and the claims to technical and apolitical authority that 
accompany it are used as the basis for policy justification in global economic 
governance.  
The previous chapter re-assessed the rendition of mathematical modelling 
as a purely technical exercise as it demonstrated how models can be a useful 
political resource, in a manner that other studies tackling the political 
implications of the use of metrics and models in economic policy (Braun 2014; 
Broome and Quirk 2015; Henriksen 2013; Mügge 2016; Watson 2014) have 
largely overlooked. Whilst acceptance of modelling’s shortcomings continues to 
facilitate the post-crisis expansion of technical interventions in global economic 
governance, acknowledgement of modelling’s limitations provides a ready 
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excuse for economists to escape blame for any inaccuracies in their analysis. 
Building on the argument developed in Chapter 3, this chapter further explores 
the link between the technical and the political. It does this by developing an 
analytical framework for unpacking the politics of economic methodology in the 
case of mathematical modelling. This involves specifying the economic and 
political logics driving the particular form of reasoning in mathematical 
formalism and its subsequent representation as models. By tracing the interplay 
between economic and political logics, the chapter examines how the illusion of 
distance between the technical and political is constructed and maintained 
(Prince 2017) through methodological practices embedded in mathematical 
formalism.  
Given this thesis’ interest in representation through mathematical models, 
it is necessary to break down the logic and tensions underpinning the process of 
how mainstream economists reconcile the choices they make in the models they 
build. In light of the focus on surveillance and the principle of external 
accountability, this chapter is mainly concerned with policy justification through 
the form of reasoning and representation inherent in mathematical models.  It is 
argued that the use of mathematical modelling to underpin policy justification 
should not be seen merely as claims of technical rationality but as a political 
assertion of authority and control. As such, mathematical models can also be 
used as a tool to define and displace accountability in global economic 
governance. 
Following Mitchell’s (1998) argument that ‘the economy’ is the re-
imagination of the nation-state, the analytical framework begins with the basic 
premise that mathematical modelling imposes ontological and technical 
constraints that determine the representation of ‘the economy’. Section 4.2 
elaborates on this as it illustrates the interplay between five economic and 
political logics that drive mathematical modelling (Figure 1). Section 4.3 analyses 
how this interplay allows for the simultaneous definition and displacement of 
accountability in global economic governance and proposes five ways through 
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which this can be observed. The chapter concludes with an overview of how the 
components of the framework will be used in the rest of the thesis. 
Figure 1 – Logics driving mathematical modelling 
 
4.2 Reasoning and representation through mathematical models 
‘[T]he master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. He must be 
mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher—in some degree. He must 
understand symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the particular 
in terms of the general and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of 
thought. He must study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of 
the future. No part of man’s nature or his institutions must lie entirely outside 
his regard. He must be purposeful and disinterested in a simultaneous mood; 
as aloof and incorruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near to earth as a 
politician’ (quotation from the obituary of Alfred Marshall, Keynes 1924). 
Methodological (universal economic logic)
• Modelling involves setting ontological and 
technical constraints which determine the 
representation of 'the economy'.
• These constraints detemine a model's 
domain of applicability.
• Modelling is the accepted form of 
reasoning and representation in 
discussions on economic policy.
• Modelling is the basis for the technical 
credibility of the economist and her 
reputation for neutrality.
• The economist's status as expert is 
contingent on adherence to tenets of 
mathematical formalism (membership in 
community of experts).
Political (multiple logics)
• Modelling involves setting boundaries on 
what 'the economy' is. 'The economy' is a 
re-imagination of the nation-state.
• These boundaries determine what the 
state has jurisdiction over.
• Modelling is the accepted tool 
governments use to specify terms in 
which economic knowledge is translated 
into economic policy.
• Modelling is the basis for policy 
legitimacy and its packaging as technical 
and apolitical.
• Expertise is not a disembodied rationality 
but one embedded in political and 
relational knowledge (shifting hierarchies 
in community of experts).
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John Maynard Keynes’ criteria for ‘the master-economist’ is a tall order; 
thus, the everyday economist navigates these conflicting demands by making 
compromises based on their ontological suppositions. This section examines the 
process and politics of economic reasoning and representation through 
mathematical models. Whilst references to reasoning in this context allude to the 
process in which economists navigate the ontological and technical constraints 
imposed by adherence to mathematical formalism, representation concerns the 
depiction of ‘the economy’ in models.  
Following Figure 1, the argument will unfold in the following sequence: 
First, modelling involves setting ontological and technical constraints that 
determine the representation of ‘the economy’; these constraints also determine 
the boundaries of ‘the economy’ as a re-imagination of the nation-state. Second, 
ontological and technical constraints define the limitations of the model’s 
applicability; consequently, the model is also a representation of what the state 
has control over. Third, modelling is the accepted form of reasoning and 
representation of economy policy; however, the state sets the terms for 
representation as it leads efforts to define and measure ‘the economy’. Fourth, 
the technical authority and neutrality of the economist is based on modelling; 
conversely, the credibility of economic policy is based on this technical authority 
and neutrality. Fifth, expertise is determined by compliance to the rules of 
mathematical formalism; however, expertise is not solely determined by a 
universal logic but is embedded in political and relational knowledge as well. 
These links demonstrate how the interplay between economic and political 
logics serves to create and reinforce the illusion of distance between the 
technical and political through mathematical modelling.   
This section will expand on these five points in turn, starting with the 
methodological side before dealing with the political. The link between the two 
is examined through two points, namely: (i) the obfuscation of relational issues 
of authority in models due to the depiction of the economy as a closed system; 
102 
 
and (ii) the implications of incorporating knowledge limitations in models within 
the constraints of mathematical formalism.  
4.2.1 Methodological (universal economic logic) 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the enduring commitment to surveillance 
across countries is built on a sense of normative solidarity, albeit one that 
diverges from the conventional notion of ‘an underlying and broadly shared 
sense of the rightness of [the IMF’s] prescriptions’ (Pauly 2008, 190). Instead, 
this thesis’ view on normative solidarity emphasises the salience of the principle 
of external accountability, which requires that countries be held accountable to 
other members of the international community in light of the external spillovers 
of their internal policy decisions (Pauly 1997). Against this backdrop, the 
credibility and neutrality of policy justification hinge on perceptions of 
objectivity and even-handedness. This is bolstered by the intellectual cohesion 
and precision inherent in model-based surveillance analysis.   
Following this, the representation of economic policy in the form of 
mathematical models is one way of giving a semblance of normative solidarity in 
surveillance analysis as mathematical formalism calls for adherence to a 
universal economic logic. Economic logic is underpinned by ontological 
commitments which are: 
‘rarely, if ever, challenged by those scholars who work inside the 
intellectual tradition… these central elements are taken as pre-
suppositions, as relatively absolute absolutes, and as such, they become the 
constraints… within which the scientific discourse is conducted’ (Buchanan 
1991, cited in Mäki 2001, 5).  
When used in economic policy, these ontological principles—including 
rational choice, individual autonomy, and free market coordination—effectively 
define the portrayal of ‘the economy’ in macroeconomic models. Referring back 
to Figure 1, modelling involves setting ontological and technical constraints 
which determine the representation of ‘the economy’. Adherence to 
103 
 
mathematical formalism requires mainstream economists to work within certain 
presuppositions about how ‘the economy’ operates (ontological constraints) and 
ensure that this can be translated into a working model (technical constraints). 
As noted in Chapter 3, there is a degree of plurality among orthodox 
economists as they may differ in their choice of theory or evidence. Nonetheless, 
they are united in their predilection for mathematical formalism. It should also 
be noted that a distinction needs to be made between the ontologies of an 
orthodox economist and the theory she uses—they do not always necessarily 
coincide. In such cases, the economist may opt to adopt an instrumentalist 
approach towards theory wherein theory does not need to give an accurate 
depiction of the real world; rather, it is ‘a useful tool for whatever purposes there 
may be’ (Mäki 2001a, 10). This point is crucial to understanding any divergences 
between the models used in regional surveillance compared to those used in 
global surveillance. As discussed in Chapter 2 and elaborated further in Chapter 
6, the purpose of AMRO surveillance is geared towards issues of local/regional 
economic growth and resilience; surveillance at the global level is more 
concerned with wider financial and macroeconomic stability.  
In addition to taking into account policy objectives, economists draw from 
some or a combination of empirical, social, and ontological criteria in their 
theoretical choices. However, the standard criterion for theories as realistic 
depictions of the real world should be reconsidered as all theories contain 
unrealistic elements. Instead, Mäki argues that theoretical soundness should be 
subject to the following test: 
‘The problem of theory choice is also a problem of choosing between good 
and bad unrealistic elements… Putting the thought in terms of truth, we 
may say the following. Falsehood is not sufficient for making a theory bad. 
Truth is not sufficient for making a theory good. Yet, truth and falsehood 
should matter. For them to matter, we have to be able to distinguish 
between harmful and harmless falsehoods on the one hand, and between 
significant and insignificant truths on the other’ (Mäki 2001b, 384).      
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This combination of empirical, social, and ontological criteria underlie the 
deliberation between harmful/harmless falsehoods and significant/insignificant 
truths. Consequently, such constraints determine a model’s domain of 
applicability.  
The invocation of the aforementioned ontological principles by orthodox 
economists also delimit what is considered appropriate in terms of economic 
reasoning. A model depicts an economist’s understanding of the economic world, 
and her reasoning with that model is constrained by rules of content and format 
that are suitable for that specific model. In other words, these rules ‘determine 
and limit how each particular model can be used, and so, constitute the kinds of 
reasoning that are possible with that particular model’ (Morgan 2012, 27). 
Hence, any critical discussion regarding the validity of a model and its findings 
will only be taken into consideration if it abides by these same rules. Adherence 
to particular ontological presuppositions effectively determines who are 
recognised as ‘genuine participants’ (Mäki 2001a, 5) in the conversation in 
orthodox economics. Questioning the persistence of mathematical formalism in 
economics is also a challenge given the intrinsic nature of scientific reasoning. 
Once a form of reasoning becomes widely accepted in any discipline, it becomes: 
‘… a timeless canon of objectivity, a standard or model of what it is to be 
reasonable about this or that subject matter. We do not check to see 
whether mathematical proof or laboratory investigation or statistical 
‘studies’ are the right way to reason: they have become (after fierce 
struggles) what it is to reason rightly, or to be reasonable in this or that 
domain’ (Hacking 1992a, cited in Morgan 2012, 10).  
Together with the points raised earlier about how the ontological 
principles of mathematical formalism determine the representation of ‘the 
economy’ in macroeconomic models, this thesis’ analytical framework is also 
based on the notion that modelling is the accepted form of reasoning and 
representation in discussions on economic policy. 
105 
 
The acceptance of modelling as the valid form of reasoning in orthodox 
economics means that it is also an important criterion for membership in the 
community of economic experts. Whilst different models may be seen as isolated 
projects, they are joined together by a shared practice and skillset. Adherence to 
mathematical modelling becomes ‘a community commitment’, ‘a flexible 
methodological glue’ (Morgan 2012, 399). Emerging issues and debates have to 
be investigated as a modelling project for it to be given serious consideration by 
other members of the community of mainstream economists; modelling is thus 
‘not just a matter of professional habit but…a signal of professional quality’ 
(Morgan 2012, 399).  
Modelling therefore also sets the boundaries for conversation in terms of 
who the economist’s audience is. Arjo Klamer (2007) debunks the perception 
that economists are out to impress their academic or institutional colleagues in 
general. Instead, the group whose opinion matters the most are those who also 
share a specific area of expertise. Any discussion or critique that lies outside 
these narrow boundaries are deemed irrelevant. In the same way that adherence 
to mathematical formalism’s mode of reasoning becomes the basis for the 
boundaries of dialogue, new entrants to the practice of surveillance are 
constrained by the accepted rules of content and format for the analysis of 
economic policy. As raised in Chapter 3, mathematical modelling in economics is 
highly valued in both academic and policymaking circles due to impressions of 
objectivity, scientific expertise, and intellectual cohesiveness that are attributed 
to model-based policy analysis. As such, modelling is the basis for the 
technical credibility of the economist and her reputation for neutrality. 
Once accepted as a ‘genuine participant’ of the conversation, the economist’s 
status as expert is contingent on adherence to tenets of mathematical 
formalism. This point is especially important in the context of surveillance in 
East Asia. Whilst the region seeks to assert its own voice in global economic 




4.2.2 Unpacking the political in the methodological  
The discussion thus far outlines how the methodological logics listed in 
Figure 1 drive the modelling process in economic analysis. It draws from 
perspectives from the philosophy of science to highlight how ontological and 
technical constraints are a product of abiding by a universal economic logic. This 
account is based on the portrayal of the economic world as a closed system; 
model building is thus an exercise of ‘isolation, of inclusion and exclusion, of 
focusing on key elements and neutralising the rest, of simplification and 
idealisation’ (Mäki 2002, 11). If it requires the inclusion of unlikely assumptions, 
a critique of the modelling process from the philosophy of economics perspective 
would claim that that such false assumptions are permissible if it results in the 
development of a simple model which can serve as a ‘source of relevantly truthful 
information about the complex reality’ (Mäki 2002, 11). This is related to the 
point made earlier about theoretical choice, wherein ontological and technical 
constraints interact and adjust depending on what the economist considers to be 
harmful/harmless falsehoods or significant/insignificant truths. Mary S. Morgan 
also acknowledges that model building is not a linear process23 but one that 
‘involves the scientist’s intuitive, imaginative, and creative qualities’ (Morgan 
2012, 25).  
Yet invoking creativity and scientific reasoning gives the false impression 
that what is ‘relevantly truthful’ and what is considered harmful/harmless or 
significant/insignificant, is purely a matter of making methodological choices to 
comply with ontological and technical constraints. The discussion in Chapter 2 
on the variations in the discourse on economic growth in East Asia disputes this 
as it clearly indicates that the choices between which categories to highlight or 
downplay—whether East vs. West, internal vs. external, state vs. market, or real 
vs. financial sectors—are driven by a host of historical and political factors that 
cannot be reduced to methodological issues. For instance, the analysis of one of 
                                                        
23 This is illustrated in how Thomas Sargent tweaked his interpretation of rational expectations 
as he struggled to develop a VAR model to accommodate his assumptions (Sent 2001). 
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AMRO’s spillover models in Chapter 7 will illustrate how the decision to 
foreground external over internal risks is a product of ASEAN’s concerns 
regarding regional resilience, and the shifts in East Asia’s economic growth 
trajectory between the Asian and global financial crises. 
Chapter 7 will delve into these points in greater detail as it shows how the 
proliferation of different models to support regional and global surveillance can 
be seen as a result of divergences in how economists for these two camps 
negotiate ontological and technical constraints. In this case, any conflicts can be 
interpreted as methodological disagreements resulting from differences in how 
the economist deals with ontological and technical constraints. Others claim that 
the economist can be agnostic about such matters and may even deny that 
models are representative of reality as they use them to portray ‘parallel or 
imagined model worlds’ (Morgan 2012, 30). Whilst it can be argued that 
ultimately, calculated political intentions do not always drive the overarching 
objectives of mathematical modelling (Lawson 2015b), the process of 
negotiating the ontological and technical constraints discussed earlier involves 
making deliberate choices.  
With regard to the dominance of mathematical modelling and the focus of 
this thesis on reasoning and representation in policy justification, the 
methodological is political in two important ways. Firstly, when these choices are 
reflected in the closed system of a mathematical model, it minimises embedded 
relational issues of authority but economists can justify this dismissal purely as 
a methodological choice. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a closed system 
assumes social atomism in that interactions take place among independent and 
fixed individuals and structures. Following this, representing ‘the economy’ as a 
closed system ‘entails that any references to social relationality and so to 
(relational) issues of power… are effectively masked over or hidden, or at best 
trivialised’ (Lawson 2015b, 161).  
The analytical framework developed in this chapter approaches these 
issues using Newman’s conceptualisation of political and relational knowledge 
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(Newman 2017). As argued in Chapter 3, AMRO’s efforts to assert itself as an 
expert authority in global economic governance is influenced by its ambiguous 
relations with the IMF. On the one hand, AMRO’s operations are still shaped by 
the IMF stigma left behind after the 1997 Asian financial crisis; on the other, 
AMRO still relies on the credibility derived from maintaining links with the IMF 
(to be explained further in Chapter 7). In the context of modelling, AMRO uses 
the language of mathematical formalism to manage these two dynamics in a way 
similar to the NGOs and community workers in Newman’s study. AMRO 
economists work through mathematical models to offer an alternative to IMF 
surveillance analysis, thereby contesting the IMF’s dominant authority using the 
same forms of expertise and knowledge associated with the Fund.  
Secondly, navigating ontological and technical constraints means that the 
validity of economic models is necessarily reduced to its ability to generate 
‘relative truths’. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the limitations of knowledge 
imply that truth is not only relative but also incomplete. Even with the most 
comprehensive and sophisticated models, model-based policy justification will 
always contain relative and incomplete truths. However, the implications of 
these limitations are overshadowed with the pretence of mathematical rigour; 
precision is prioritised over accuracy.  
Accepting that truth is relative is important in the case of regional vs. global 
surveillance. When the demands and restrictions of conforming to an accepted 
form of scientific reasoning mean that choices need to be made between 
harmful/harmless falsehoods or significant/insignificant truths, this means that 
methodological choices are also political as what is harmful or significant varies 
across different groups of actors. In the context of this thesis, what is harmful or 
insignificant to regional economic growth is not necessarily the same as what is 
harmful or insignificant to global stability—this will be demonstrated through 
the comparative analysis of IMF and AMRO spillover models in Chapter 7. Even 
if the intent is not explicit, such decisions are made consciously and involve a call 
by the economist on what should be considered harmful or significant.  
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Similarly, acknowledging that truth is incomplete is germane to this thesis’ 
focus. As raised in Chapter 3, the co-option of knowledge limitations (particularly 
in the form of complexities and uncertainties) in mathematical models increased 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis due to growing awareness of 
systemic risk. The complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities of systemic risk 
are examined in Chapter 5; similar methodological issues prevalent in 
macroprudential policies are covered in Chapter 6. Both systemic risk and 
macroprudential policies are central to post-crisis surveillance at the regional 
and global levels. However, whilst the credibility of regional surveillance is 
contingent on its adherence to global standards of technical expertise, these 
same standards do not allow for a realistic representation of the many 
complexities and uncertainties of the global economy.  
The relativity and incompleteness of truth have two further repercussions 
that cannot be explained on the basis of economic logic alone. One relates to how 
the boundaries of the economy and its components are defined. The other relates 
to the knowledge economists are presumed to have and how this determines 
who is considered an expert and who gets to be part of the community and the 
conversation. The next discussion will shed light on how these two aspects relate 
to political matters of control and authority, which cannot be subsumed under a 
singular economic logic.   
4.2.3 Political (multiple logics) 
As indicated in the beginning of the chapter, the analytical framework 
begins with the core premise that modelling involves setting boundaries on 
what ‘the economy’ is. Conversely, ‘the economy’ is a re-imagination of the 
nation-state. Modelling thus involves defining what lies within the economic 
realm. Historically, orthodox, pre-Keynesian representations of the economic 
sphere were defined by the market; here relations were determined by measures 
of utility, costs, and prices. Keynes’ The General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money gave rise to a different construction of the economy which 
corresponded to geographical boundaries, specifically the nation-state. This 
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involved aggregation of consumption, employment, investment, and production, 
which included estimations of wages, interest rates, and other variables. The 
economy as a re-imagination of the nation-state was a result of pragmatic issues 
of measurement and technical construction; however, this is only one part of the 
story. As this approach gained ground in the 1950s, Mitchell points out that the 
representation of the nation-state as ‘the economy’ allowed for a new narrative 
for the nation-state (including post-colonial states) to use to assert itself among 
its citizens and in the changing global order (Mitchell 1998). Furthermore, it 
provided the justification for ‘a novel conception of politics as growth’ (Mitchell 
1998, 89). As the state was involved in the construction and collection of new 
methods and statistics to quantify consumption, employment, investment, 
production, and other related variables, it was able to represent the economy as 
a bounded object under government control, managed within specific territorial 
limits. The notion of economic growth shifted from one centred on material and 
spatial expansion to ‘the internal intensification of the totality of relations 
defining the economy as an object’ (Mitchell 1998, 90). As the nation-state was 
re-imagined as the economy, the relations defining the former and the latter 
cannot be easily be separated. However, the state portrays itself as external to 
the economy as the latter becomes the object of the former’s efforts to define, 
represent, and regulate the whole range of economic relations. Mitchell argues 
that such a portrayal is problematic as ‘the border is just a mode of intervening 
in and representing certain larger economic relations… neither the economy nor 
the state forms a self-contained, free-standing sphere’ (Mitchell 1998, 92). 
However, such issues are minimised in mathematical models as modelling 
involves setting boundaries that determine what the state has jurisdiction 
over. 
Whilst Mitchell’s compelling analysis used the Egyptian village of B’erat as 
case study, his insights can easily be applied to the context of surveillance in East 
Asia. This is not to suggest that this thesis treats the region as simply an 
agglomeration of member states in its representation as an economic space. As 
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Breslin and Higgott point out, ‘care should be taken to avoid strict national or 
sovereign parameters in identifying regionalisation’ (Breslin and Higgott 2000, 
345). There are several examples of regional initiatives in East Asia to support 
this, including APEC (seen as a regional project largely driven by private sector 
elites) and various sub-regional projects such as the Brunei Darussalam-
Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asian Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA).24 Rather, 
the particular practice of nation-building through region-building in ASEAN 
provides the context for this thesis’ application of Mitchell’s work. As mentioned 
earlier, the creation of ASEAN is rooted in its members’ ‘need to consolidate their 
authority as states’ (Bessho 1999, cited in Beeson 2003, 365). Chapter 2 
underscored the importance of nation-building and developmental legitimacy in 
the region. States and domestic elites use economic success to consolidate 
authority and legitimise power, thus making regional space (as constructed 
through ASEAN initiatives) an important sphere for state legitimation and 
control. As ASEAN+3 member states seek to represent itself through the 
economy and actively participate in the construction of metrics and models that 
allows its depiction as a territorially-bound object under government control, 
AMRO surveillance thus becomes a platform for the dissemination such a 
representation. More importantly, dissemination through regional surveillance 
means the audience is not just the local public but global observers as well.  
National income accounting is one such project: it facilitated the 
representation of the economy as a self-contained sphere and gave the state 
discretion to determine what should and should not be counted within the 
boundaries of national economic activity and growth. Whilst national accounts 
generally include the financial sector, this is not the case in mainstream 
macroeconomic models which, until recently, have tended to ignore finance. 
Chapter 6 will delve deeper into this in its discussion of macroprudential policy. 
                                                        
24  BIMP-EAGA consists of the entire sultanate of Brunei Darussalam; Kalimantan, Sulawesi, 
Maluku, and West Papua (Indonesia); Sabah, Sarawak, and Labuan (Malaysia); and Mindanao and 
Palawan (Philippines). Whilst ADB is an important partner in this initiative, there are plans for it 
to be led by the private sector (ADB 2018). 
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However, even with these developments, the (real) economy and financial sector 
are still generally depicted as separate entities. For instance, Chapter 3 
underscored how DSGE models typically do not account for the financial sector. 
The disregard for finance by macroeconomics, and the disregard for 
macroeconomics by finance, has led to what Christophers calls multiple 
ontologies in economics that can ‘direct and constrain vision in crucial ways, to 
influence what can and cannot be seen’ (Christophers 2017, 267). This has 
significant implications considering the close links between the real and financial 
sectors in East Asia and post-crisis revelations of the complex interdependencies, 
not just between the two sectors but also across borders. Against this backdrop, 
the depiction of distinct real and financial sectors operating within clearly 
defined territorial boundaries influences what can and cannot be seen, hence 
also shaping what is (or is not) perceived to be within government control. 
Whilst this may be the case, the widespread institutionalisation of 
mainstream economic expertise in policymaking (Fourcade 2009) means that 
the state represents and regulates the economic space as it is depicted in a model, 
making it fit the unifying logic of mathematical formalism like a square peg in a 
round hole. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the status and authority of 
mainstream economists draw from these two sources: its expertise and scientific 
objectivity (as reflected in its adherence to mathematical formalism), and its role 
as expert within government institutions. Likewise, the state frames the 
legitimacy of its policies on the basis of economic expertise and impartiality 
(Fourcade 2018). The state specifies the terms in which economic expertise is 
used in public policy; the economist determines the valid representation of these 
policies in the models she creates (Henriksen 2013). Following the logics listed 
in Figure 1, modelling is the accepted tool governments use to specify terms 
in which economic knowledge is translated into economic policy; at the 
same time, modelling is the basis for policy legitimacy and its packaging as 
technical and apolitical.  
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The final point in Figure 1 concerns the economist as a member of a 
community of experts as it states that expertise is not a disembodied 
rationality but one embedded in political and relational knowledge. As with 
any other scientific community, there are also hierarchies of expertise operating 
within the economics discipline. Membership by virtue of modelling may gain 
you entry into the community but some members are more equal than others. 
Earlier in this section, it was explained how this analytical framework’s take on 
political and relational knowledge (based on Newman 2017) interprets AMRO’s 
use of mathematical models as an exercise wherein AMRO challenges the IMF’s 
dominance in global economic governance by using the same forms of expertise 
and knowledge associated with the Fund.  This occurs against the backdrop of 
shifting hierarchies in the community of economic experts. The different 
trajectories of economic expertise across the globe and the existence of internal 
conflicts within mainstream economics are not discounted (Fourcade 2009, 
2018). However, the spread and standardisation of post-war modern modelling 
expertise25 fuelled the dominant (if inaccurate) perception of a particular brand 
of economics as the universal form of expertise (Fourcade 2009). Those who 
wish to join the conversation may offer a novel contribution but it is likely to be 
assessed against this accepted ‘international’ standard.  One example of how this 
has played out in East Asia is the debate concerning the World Bank report The 
East Asia Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (World Bank 1993). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, Japan sought to challenge the development principles 
espoused by the World Bank but the report ultimately framed Japan’s incredible 
economic success in its own terms of market-friendly policies. The intellectual 
authority of the IMF has waxed and waned through the Asian and global financial 
crises, creating space for the emergence of regional surveillance as a new voice 
contributing to discussions on global economic governance. However, their 
                                                        
25 Aside from developments in the United States, model-based policymaking was also on the rise 
in the Netherlands (Maas and Waters 2014).  
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status as participants in the surveillance conversation will be assessed based on 
standards for global technical expertise. 
Mainstream economists appear united in their form of reasoning and in the 
practice of their technocratic expertise; this shared logic determines their 
acceptance into the community and the conversation. Within this community, the 
relativity and incompleteness of truth are effectively reduced to modelling 
problems or disagreements. Once again, the accepted form of reasoning and 
representation renders such issues in terms of methodological concerns. 
However, taking this at face value diminishes the importance of the shifting 
hierarchies built within the community of economic experts. 
4.2.4 Interplay between methodological and political logics 
To recap, the methodological is political with respect to mathematical 
modelling as: (i) the representation of the economy in models as a closed system 
obscures relational issues of authority; and (ii) the negotiation of the ontological 
and technical constraints means that claims drawn from this form of reasoning 
and representation are necessarily relative and incomplete truths.  Awareness 
and acceptance of truth as relative and incomplete is not a problem in itself; the 
concern lies in the portrayal of mathematical modelling as an exercise whose 
limits are solely determined by adherence to a universal economic logic. The 
relativity and incompleteness of truth and the economic representations that 
result from it involve negotiation of ontological and technical constraints as 
determined by a universal economic logic; however, these are also constraints 
that are determined by the state and the economic experts it employs.  
As we read Mitchell’s and Christophers’ works together with the experience 
of various countries in East Asia, the representation of national economies and 
its different components in mathematical models should not be reduced to a 
manifestation of a single scientific logic, nor can this be dismissed. Bringing in 
the nation-state as the level for aggregation instead of the market challenges the 
common perception of economic science as a universalistic paradigm. The switch 
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from market to state requires an accompanying shift in representing the 
economy as a fixed model to a representation of space where multiple discourses 
are capable of co-existing whilst also challenging and redefining other logics 
(Daly 1991). We can observe these dynamics in the context of regional and global 
surveillance, such that the emergence of overlapping frameworks result in 
multiple representations of regional and global economies and multiple 
assessments of economic policies that may converge in some aspects and diverge 
in others. However, these intricacies are minimised in mathematical models.    
The tendency of regional and global surveillance to favour model-based 
analysis gives the false impression that the representation of the economy in 
such a manner is inevitable, and that contesting such representations can only 
be done using the same logic. Shedding light on the multiplicity of logics—
particularly in terms of the defining the economy and determining membership 
and status in the community of economic experts—shows how the political 
creates self-reinforcing feedback effects into the methodological, and vice versa. 
Hence, what is methodological and political cannot be analysed in isolation from 
the other.   
Following Figure 1, this section outlined five economic and political logics 
that underpin mathematical modelling in surveillance. It demonstrated how the 
interplay between these two sets of logics construct and maintain the illusion of 
distance between the technical and political through methodological practices. 
In Chapter 1, a case was made for examining economic methodology as a practice 
that determines how we produce knowledge and how these choices the objects 
and mechanisms we examine (Jackson 2016). As this thesis studies mathematical 
models as a tool for policy justification, such methodological choices have 
significant repercussions in the context of the principle of external accountability 
as they determine what should be considered as valid claims and assessments of 
a country’s economic policies. The next section expands on the points covered in 
the analytical framework by examining how the interplay between economic and 




4.3  Disentangling accountability in mathematical models  
The difficulties of assigning accountability in global economic governance 
are manifold; however, it is beyond the scope of this study to break down the 
theoretical and practical issues concerning the distribution of agency and 
responsibility in the assemblage of global governance (see, for example, 
Anderson et al. 2012).  As mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis draws from David 
Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi’s approach towards accountability in global 
governance, which emphasises the need for international organisations ‘to 
justify their actions vis-à-vis affected parties, that is, stakeholders’ (Held and 
Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 127). Accountability is usually defined in terms of formal 
or legal institutional mechanisms, including measures such as voting, 
appointment, sanctions, and legal responsibility. In the case of surveillance, 
commitment to the principle of external accountability provides the central 
plank for establishing accountability as countries are called to justify the external 
impact of their internal policy decisions, all in the name of global stability. 
However, this is not a straightforward exercise when surveillance is conducted 
‘for the benefit both of the international community as a whole and of individual 
member states’ (Crow, Arriazu, and Thygesen 1999, 17). Establishing 
accountability thus becomes even more problematic with the post-crisis 
surveillance focus on systemic risk and spillovers as tracing the source and 
recipients of risk becomes difficult. Chapter 5 will show how the nature of 
systemic risk means that determining what exactly is ‘for the benefit both of the 
international community as a whole and of individual member states’ can be a 
contentious process. Hence, this chapter views the post-crisis commitment to the 
principle of external accountability as a matter of disentangling accountability: 
with overlapping regional and global frameworks, surveillance becomes a tool 
for defining and displacing accountability in global economic governance. 
This reading of surveillance and external accountability informs this 
section’s analysis of accountability in mathematical models. It begins with an 
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assessment of the difficulties faced when disentangling accountability in 
economic policy through two approaches. The first focuses on reputational 
concerns (to highlight the various layers of actors and relationships that 
underpin surveillance) whilst the second examines the different pressures faced 
by the academic economist in contrast to the bureaucratic economist (to 
highlight the role of disciplinary and institutional constraints). In the case of 
model-based surveillance analysis, mathematical models offer a site for 
investigating the multifaceted dynamics of accountability that has yet to be 
explored. Drawing from the previous section’s analysis of the interplay of 
methodological and political logics, the section ends with a discussion of the 
mechanisms through which the definition and displacement of accountability 
can occur in mathematical models.  
4.3.1 Approaches towards disentangling accountability 
The first approach relates to reputational concerns. The conceptualisation 
of accountability as ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum in which the 
actor is obliged to explain and justify his conduct’ (Bovens 2007, cited in Busuioc 
and Lodge 2016, 92) is helpful in studying the case of surveillance. Madalina 
Busuioc and Martin Lodge (2016) build on the concept of accountability as a 
relationship as they use a reputational perspective to analyse how institutions 
manage different expectations between different actors. When actors are broken 
down in terms of account-givers and account-holders, accountability 
relationships can be viewed as a process of reputational co-production. 
Reputational concerns determine the strategies account-givers use to manage 
their accountability relationship with account-holders; at the same time the 
reputation of account-holders is determined by their effectiveness in making 
account-givers answerable for their actions. From the perspective of 
reputational strategies, the preference of AMRO and IMF surveillance for using 
mathematical models is warranted as it allows both parties to showcase their 
respective technical authority; at the same time, the use of mathematical models 
provides an neutral platform for reputational co-production. 
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Whilst such a framework is instructive, the case of regional and global 
surveillance creates a number of complications. When we talk about the 
responsibility for global economic governance and financial stability and the 
dense network of actors involved, establishing who the account-givers and –
holders are and defining the nature of their accountability relationship becomes 
complicated. The bureaucratic economists in charge of surveillance are held 
accountable not just by the international organisations they are affiliated with—
they are also indirectly accountable to the member states (some with 
overlapping membership). Furthermore, the function of surveillance means that 
the bureaucratic economists involved do not only monitor member countries’ 
economic performance, they are also tasked to provide policy analysis and 
recommendations, which may (or may not) feed into member countries’ 
economic performance. From the side of member countries, they report to these 
bureaucratic economists to a certain extent but the member countries can also 
hold the bureaucratic economists accountable for any shortcomings in their 
monitoring and analysis. Finally, as economists, they are also answerable to 
other members of the disciplinary community. 
The second approach concerns the responsibilities faced by bureaucratic 
economists. The concurrent ‘scientification of politics and the politicisation of 
science’ (Weingart 1999, 151) contests the assumption of a linear relationship 
between politics and science, which involves the following sequence: politics 
identifies the problem; science provides expertise; politics determines the policy 
decision. As demonstrated above, this sequence does not neatly apply in the case 
of surveillance. Whilst Peter Weingart argues that ‘[t]he initial concerns about 
the accountability of experts disappear because access to scientific advice has 
become democratised and the resulting relationship between science and 
policymaking appears as recursive and reciprocal rather than linear’, this level 
of transparency does not work in mathematical modelling in economic policy. 
Another problem can be observed in the specific situation of the bureaucratic 
economist. Davies’ study on anti-trust regulation illustrates the pressures faced 
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by bureaucratic economists who are required to honour ‘their commitment to 
scientific analysis [and] their commitment towards their governmental patrons’ 
(Davies 2011, 304). Both academic and bureaucratic economists advise 
policymakers on the basis of their scientific authority, but the former are not 
subject to the political and institutional responsibilities imposed on the latter. 
Whilst disciplinary constraints are already difficult to dispute, academic 
economists may do so without worrying about its administrative implications. 
Bureaucratic economists have to work within both disciplinary and official 
constraints, ‘living “for” economics and “for” the state simultaneously’ (Davies 
2011, 320). Where disciplinary pressures end and administrative ones begin are 
already hard to identify; couching the advice of bureaucratic economists in 
mathematical models makes it even more challenging to separate these 
demands, as suggested in the discussion of the mutually constitutive links 
between economic and political logics. 
Mathematical models may not come across as obvious sites for 
disentangling accountability in global economic governance. Nonetheless, the 
significance of models in surveillance analysis should not be dismissed.  For 
instance, Haruhiko Kuroda and Masahiro Kawai, prominent figures in the ADB 
and the Japanese Ministry of Finance, argue that ‘to be effective, the surveillance 
process needs to put more emphasis on technical discussions and create an 
environment for serious policy discussions… The surveillance process must 
encourage frank discussions on the technical substance without being abrasive 
and confrontational’ (Kuroda and Kawai 2002, 25). From this position, a model-
based approach to surveillance is crucial in taking an objective stance on 
‘politically sensitive yet critical issues’ (Takagi 2010, 11). As repeatedly 
emphasised in this chapter, the credibility of policy justification lies in its 
apolitical representation and technical sophistication. Hence, the mathematical 
models used in surveillance analysis offer an unlikely yet valuable resource for 
investigating the specific manifestations of the principle of external 
accountability. By viewing surveillance as an exercise of the politics of economic 
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methodology and applying the analytical framework developed in this chapter, 
mathematical models allow us to examine two processes: (i) the reasoning 
undergone by bureaucratic economists as they build models (specifically how 
she reconciles trade-offs between precision and accuracy and the accountability 
issues that result from such methodological choices); and (ii) the representation 
of state boundaries in mathematical models (specifically the implications for 
state jurisdiction and accountability).  These will be analysed in greater detail in 
Chapter 7’s discussion on IMF and AMRO spillover models. 
In the previous section, we developed an analytical framework to clarify 
how the interplay between the economic and political logics of mathematical 
modelling construct and maintain the illusion of distance between the technical 
and the political. The following discussion builds on this by outlining how the 
construction and maintenance of this fictional gap simultaneously define and 
displace accountability. This is done through five specific ways that apply to the 
context of bureaucratic economists working on surveillance, such as those 
affiliated with the IMF and AMRO.  
4.3.2 Mechanisms for definition and displacement of accountability in 
mathematical models  
To start with, modelling constraints and boundaries define 
accountability in economic governance. Through its consistent application of 
economic reasoning and representation, mathematical models define 
accountability by giving its users and the general public the impression that it is 
able to establish clear causality within specific parameters. As mentioned earlier, 
the ontological and technical constraints imposed by the use of models are so 
entrenched that limitations are rarely explicitly disclosed. The process of 
modelling also requires the depiction of variables as distinct categories, either 
exogenous or endogenous. Hence, representations of economic activity suggest 
that the relationship of these variables to economic output can be explained in a 
straightforward manner.  
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Accountability is displaced in mathematical models as ontological and 
technical constraints limit the model’s domain of applicability. Verifying the 
validity of models can only be done within this domain and cannot be judged on 
any other basis. Julian Reiss underscores this problem in his statement that 
‘models often have local applicability, even in their intended domain… 
unfortunately, it is not quite clear what a model’s “intended domain” is or what 
“applicability” means’ (Reiss 2013, 124). As the underlying assumptions that 
determine this narrow domain are not openly discussed, it is difficult to find 
grounds for disputing a model’s validity if these are the only recognised criteria 
for assessment. In the event that they are disclosed, the economist can justify her 
model’s shortcomings based on the ontological and technical compromises she 
needed to make to be consistent with the accepted suppositions of mathematical 
formalism.  
As mentioned earlier, the ontological and technical constraints imposed on 
the modelling process also have repercussions in terms of the representation of 
the state. The crucial role played by states and bureaucratic economists in 
setting the boundaries of ‘the economy’ involves defining what is within and 
beyond the purview of government control. Consequently, mathematical models 
are an implicit statement about the jurisdiction of state and non-state actors in 
terms of managing the economy (Mitchell 1998, 2005). Following the 
aforementioned notion of ‘politics as growth’, the definition of the economy 
through mathematical models allows different states to define the economy to 
serve different political purposes (e.g., assigning and rejecting accountability as 
the state sees fit). The technical nature of this representation can be used to 
dilute suspicion of influence from any political agenda. The state can reinforce 
the perception of technical expertise to support the veneer of the apolitical 
allocation of responsibility and blame. Hence, compliance with the rules of 
mathematical formalism muddles accountability in that model-based 
economic policies are only valid in the model’s limited domain of 
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applicability, and depend on the state’s politically contestable 
representation of the economy. 
With respect to the state as an international apparatus that governs a 
geographically-bounded territory, mathematical formalism can also serve to 
displace accountability in a different way. Whilst the territorial borders of the 
state and the economy coincide in mathematical models, the actual movement 
of economic activity cannot be accurately traced in terms of defined state 
territories. Due to feedback effects and interdependencies across the global 
economy, it is difficult to make definite claims about the geographical sources of 
growth and risk. A fuller discussion of spillovers and systemic risk in Chapter 5 
will illustrate this point.  
As for the role of the bureaucratic economist, it was pointed out earlier that 
disciplinary and administrative pressures dictate the work and methods of 
bureaucratic economists. Adherence to mathematical modelling boosts the 
bureaucratic economists’ reputation as an apolitical technical authority. Political 
neutrality insulates the bureaucratic economist from political accountability, 
whilst scientific expertise means that the bureaucratic economist is largely 
answerable only to an audience who also follow the same form of reasoning and 
representation. Valid critique can only come from within this community so any 
external debates which do not conform to the same mathematical formalism can 
be dismissed.  
However, in the case of mathematical modelling in economic policy, the 
invocation of technical expertise to justify the constraints faced in the 
representation of ‘the economy’ means that adherence to mathematical 
formalism can be used to justify the choice to favour precision over accuracy in 
the modelling process. In other words, rigour in the form of reasoning is valued 
over rigour in the form of representation. Moreover, whilst reasoning may follow 
a singular economic logic, this is not the case in terms of representation as it is 
shaped by multiple political logics. This leads to two implications for the 
displacement of accountability: The accepted form of reasoning determines 
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who can hold the bureaucratic economist accountable (in this case, the 
target audience are fellow economists); the accepted form of 
representation and its translation into economic policy may vary 
depending on the audience (which differs in the context of regional 
compared to global surveillance). Furthermore, both economic and political 
logics highlight the technicality and neutrality of modelling but do so for 
different audiences.  
Accountability can also be displaced because of shifting hierarchies of 
expertise. Whilst an overarching form of reasoning in mathematical formalism 
may unify the community of economic experts, changes in hierarchies of 
expertise can create spaces for subtle forms of dissent within the ranks.  
Bureaucratic economists can use this opportunity to present different model 
representations of the economy as their respective institutions see fit. However, 
any political undertones can be minimised as debates still need to be carried out 
using the same dominant form of reasoning and representation. As mentioned 
earlier, the shift between the Asian and global financial crises created the room 
for AMRO to assert itself as an expert authority in global economic governance; 
nonetheless, this is done to fit internationally-accepted standards for technical 
expertise that have been established by the IMF. Hence, even when using the 
same form of reasoning and representation, economic expertise is 
underpinned by political and relational knowledge. However, any political 
or relational tensions can be reduced to methodological disagreements.  
To sum up and relate the discussion on accountability directly to the five 
links highlighted in this chapter’s analytical framework, I propose five ways in 
which mathematical models define and displace accountability: 
(i) Modelling constraints and boundaries define accountability in 
economic governance. 




(ii) Model-based economic policies are only valid in the model’s limited 
domain of applicability, and depends on the state’s politically 
contestable representation of the economy; 
(iii) The accepted form of reasoning determines who can hold the 
bureaucratic economist accountable (in this case, the target 
audience is fellow economists); the accepted form of representation 
and its translation into economic policy may vary depending on the 
audience (which differs in the context of regional compared to 
global surveillance); 
(iv) Both economic and political logics highlight the technicality and 
neutrality of modelling, but do so for different audiences; 
(v) Even when using the same form of reasoning and representation, 
economic expertise is underpinned by political and relational 
knowledge. However, any political or relational tensions can be 
reduced to methodological disagreements. 
 As can be gleaned from the references made thus far to the case of East 
Asia, these points carry significant weight in understanding the discourse on 
economic growth in the region and the role of regional surveillance in global 
economic governance. From the perspective of model-based policy justification, 
regional surveillance allows policymakers in East Asia to define and represent 
the sources of and risks to economic growth in their own terms, but in 
accordance with the parameters set for technical credibility that have been set 
and accepted as the international standard. At the same time, any discrepancies 
or weaknesses that may surface in the analysis can be justified as a matter of 
methodological differences, or as an unavoidable consequence of complying with 




4.4 Conclusion  
The puzzle of the parallel rise of two phenomena—the growing realisation 
of the dangers of overreliance on mathematical models and the persistent 
tendency towards mathematical formalism—underscores the importance of 
analysing these issues in the context of the politics of economic methodology. 
Lawson argues that most of those who criticise orthodox economics on the basis 
of opposing substantive claims (usually regarding modelling premises) miss a 
crucial point:  
‘The inevitable consequence is that discussions of the state of the modern 
discipline remain largely superficial, criticism is mostly misdirected and 
overly tame, and supposed/proposed alternative approaches or 
projects…end up, in the main, being essentially more of the same’ (Lawson 
2015a, 2). 
Judging from the direction post-crisis mathematical modelling is currently 
taking (as shown in Chapter 3), this observation seems to still hold true. The 
previous chapter presented a different angle on the existing critique of orthodox 
economics by making a case for investigating the politics of mathematical 
modelling. In contrast to previous studies analysing the political consequences 
of the use of metrics and models in economic policy and other approaches that 
take the economic and political logics as separate, this chapter presented an 
analytical framework that demonstrates how these two are mutually 
constitutive. The discussion engaged with insights from philosophy of science, 
economic sociology, and IPE literature to illustrate how the interplay between  a 
set of five specific logics results in the creation and preservation of a false 
dichotomy between the technical and the political. In the context of model-based 
surveillance analysis, the process of mathematical modelling facilitates the 




Chapter 2 demonstrated how the discourse on economic growth models in 
East Asia has undergone significant changes in the last few decades yet the 
framing of the sources of and risks to economic growth continue to be 
represented in terms of relationships between ostensibly discrete categories, 
such as state/market, real/financial sectors, and internal/external. There are 
variations in how these relationships are understood in East Asia when 
compared to the more dominant accounts offered by IFIs such as the IMF, as 
discussed in Chapter 2 and examined further in Chapter 7. When these 
differences are represented in the form of mathematical models, a cursory look 
gives the impression that surveillance analysis is a strictly technical undertaking; 
however, a closer examination reveals a political exercise as well. Mathematical 
modelling entails a specific process of reasoning and representation which 
imposes constraints on how the economist chooses between which categories to 
include or exclude, highlight or downplay. As these choices shape how one 
defines the variables that determine changes in the economic performance of the 
countries being monitored, the mathematical models used in surveillance are 
both technical representations of and political statements on economic growth 
and its sources and consequences.  
The remaining chapters in this thesis will expand on the themes developed 
in the analytical framework. They will focus on various aspects of systemic risk 
and its analysis in regional and global surveillance to illustrate how 
mathematical models can serve as a political resource, particularly in the ways it 
can support goals of securing domestic legitimacy and international credibility.  
Chapter 5 examines systemic risk models as a special case of post-crisis 
modelling. In this context, the high degree of methodological complexities, 
uncertainties, and ambiguities involved in the modelling process widens the 
space for displacing accountability. In Chapter 6, we investigate the rise of 
regional surveillance as an illustration of how East Asia is navigating the shifting 
hierarchies in the community of global economic technocrats. Moreover, the 
expansion of regional and global surveillance (in the sense that they now employ 
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a macroprudential frame in their analysis) creates challenges in setting shared 
parameters for interpreting state boundaries and jurisdictions. Finally, Chapter 
7 scrutinises selected IMF and AMRO spillover models to trace how their 
respective economists negotiate ontological and technical constraints. The 
discussion sheds light on the politics inherent in the process, and illustrates how 
the IMF’s and AMRO’s model-based surveillance analysis defines and displaces 




















Modelling Systemic Risk  
(or How to Measure the Immeasurable) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As it did in the case of mathematical modelling, the global financial crisis 
also prompted a rethinking of the monitoring and supervision of systemic 
linkages. This resulted in a deluge of institutional and regulatory reforms, with 
different measures all broadly contributing to the infrastructure deemed 
necessary to guard against the build-up of systemic risk and secure global 
financial stability. In the years immediately following the crisis, the G-20 
spearheaded various reform initiatives and tasked international bodies such as 
the IMF and the FSB to take the lead with implementation (G-20 2009). As the 
immediate response to the crisis was understandably reactive, reform measures 
concentrated on the dangers of excessive risk taking and leverage by financial 
institutions. In response, the G-20 leaders committed to building a stronger, 
more globally consistent supervisory and regulatory framework for the financial 
sector. Five key principles were identified to guide reform efforts: (i) strengthen 
transparency and accountability; (ii) enhance sound regulation; (iv) promote 
integrity in financial markets; (v) reinforce international cooperation; and (vi) 
reform the financial architecture (G-20 2008). Specific items in the action plan 
include those relating to capital and liquidity standards; regulation of credit 
rating agencies, hedge funds, and OTC derivatives; and monitoring of 
systemically important financial institutions.  
Whilst it can be argued that there was wide consensus on the importance 
of these reform proposals, there were concerns that the plans were mostly 
applicable in advanced countries and held little relevance to the particular 
circumstances of emerging economies in East Asia. As the concerns of region put 
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heavier emphasis on economic growth and stability, the lessons that 
policymakers in East Asia drew from the impact of the 2007 crisis related to the 
need to diversify and rebalance sources of economic growth and the need to 
strengthen tools to ensure financial and macroeconomic stability (Arner and 
Park 2010).    
The discussion in Chapter 2 on the discourse on economic growth in East 
Asia is just one reflection of how various countries subscribe to different 
conceptions of what constitutes economic growth and risk. However, the 
centrality of interdependencies and feedback effects in global systemic risk call 
these differences into question. More recently, IMF Managing Director Christine 
Lagarde called for a ‘new multilateralism’, a movement towards ‘a new global 
partnership for growth’ that is underpinned by ‘mutual responsibilities’ shared 
by emerging and advanced countries alike (Lagarde 2016). The 2007crisis led to 
a deeper appreciation of the extent of systemic risk in the global financial and 
macroeconomic system, and these developments have created new pressures on 
surveillance and the tools and mechanisms used in the process to apply the 
principle of external accountability. As the infrastructure for global economic 
governance relies heavily on the creation and expansion of technocratic 
measures for controlling systemic risk (Erturk et al. 2011), systemic risk models 
form an important part of this infrastructure as a core component of surveillance 
analysis.  
However, Chapter 3 showed us that the crisis further entrenched the 
dominance of mathematical modelling, thereby perpetuating problems with how 
surveillance seeks to hold countries accountable for their contribution to this 
‘new global partnership for growth’. This is a result of the continued emphasis 
on the universal economic logic entrenched in mathematical models, even as the 
multiplicity of logics amplify with the growing complexities and uncertainties in 
global economic governance. The methodological complexities and uncertainties 
referred to in Chapters 3 and 4 also apply in the case of systemic risk; however, 
the challenges faced by systemic risk modelling are not just a matter of 
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complexity and uncertainty. Given the transboundary nature of systemic risk and 
the emergence of overlapping regional and global surveillance frameworks, the 
ambiguity inherent in systemic risk needs to be unpacked as well. 
Chapter 5 begins the second part of this thesis as it explores the use of 
mathematical models in specific policy areas, namely systemic risk and 
surveillance. This chapter builds on the themes raised in the previous chapter as 
it examines how systemic risk modelling also falls into the same process of 
creating and maintaining a false dichotomy between the technical and the 
political. Section 5.2 covers the definitions (or lack thereof) and dimensions of 
systemic risk. These dimensions—namely complexity, uncertainty, and 
ambiguity—carry important implications in the technical representation of 
systemic risk. Section 5.3 analyses these three dimensions in terms of its 
strategic uses for political manoeuvring. Section 5.4 focuses on the 
transboundary nature of systemic risk and its implications for external 
accountability. Key points from Chapter 4 are applied to systemic risk to 
illustrate how the complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity inherent in systemic 
risk facilitate the displacement of accountability in global economic governance.   
 
5.2 Defining systemic risk 
General application of the term ‘systemic risk’ underscores the degree to 
which it is entrenched in a wide network of social processes and is a product of 
processes of modernisation and globalisation. This can be seen in a wide range 
of areas including pandemics, pollution, and even supply chains (Goldin and 
Mariathasan 2014). Whereas simple or idiosyncratic risk is one in which the 
cause is clear and the potential negative repercussions are easily recognisable 
because it is not affected by feedback loops (for instance, potential or ongoing 
events have no bearing), examining systemic risk requires focusing on 
interdependencies. This includes links between individuals, institutions, sectors, 
or areas which may otherwise seem unrelated (Renn, Klinke, and Asselt 2011).  
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Following this, it is understandable how arriving at a single, precise 
definition of systemic risk in the financial and macroeconomic context has 
proven to be difficult. It is more common to avoid defining systemic risk per se 
and focus on its effects instead. Technical definitions are further complicated by 
the complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities inherent in systemic risk. This 
section examines how definitions of systemic risk are both technical and political 
constructions.  
5.2.1 Definitions and dimensions of systemic risk 
Scholars may have lamented the absence of the term ‘systemic risk’ in 
academic literature when the global financial crisis first hit but that is certainly 
no longer the case today (D. Colander et al. 2009). An earlier attempt to define 
systemic risk depicts it as ‘breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed to 
breakdowns in individual parts or components, and are evidenced by co-
movements amongst most or all of the parts’ (Kaufman and Scott 2003, cited in 
Goldin and Vogel 2010, 5). This conceptualisation looks at systemic risk as a 
shock as its main components are identified in these terms:  
(i) ‘“macroshock” triggered when relatively modest tipping points or 
regime shifts hit their threshold and produce large, cascading failures 
on most or all of the system;  
(ii) shock diffusion through the network via contagion (transmission, 
feedback, and amplification of risk); and  
(iii) “common shock”, which is not the result of direct causation, but is 
evidenced by indirect impacts of systemic risk’ (Goldin and Vogel 
2010). 
After 2007, systemic risk was no longer regarded in such terms as the crisis 
revealed its insidious nature. The crisis also fuelled the rising prominence of the 
concept of systemic risk in both academic and policy agendas. Whilst this may be 
viewed as a welcome step, it is also important to be wary of the profusion of 
publications, conferences, and the like dedicated to the subject. Underneath all 
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the calls for a broader view of financial and macroeconomic risk is a lingering 
vagueness about what it is we should be looking for. The IMF itself admits: 
“’Systemic risk’ is a term that is widely used, but it is difficult to define and 
quantify. Indeed it is often viewed as a phenomenon that is there “when we 
see it”… Similarly, a systemic episode may simply be seen as an extremely 
acute case of financial instability, even though the degree and severity of 
financial stress has proven difficult, if not impossible, to measure’ (IMF 
2009, 113). 
Claudio Borio, head of the Monetary and Economic Department of BIS, has 
stated that ‘Given our current knowledge, it is not realistic to expect a single 
measure of systemic risk to cater to all purposes; in fact it is actually dangerous 
to do so’ (Borio 2010, 7). A study released by the US Department of Treasury’s 
Office of Financial Research reviews 31 different approaches to measuring 
systemic risk and concludes that there will never be one single accurate indicator 
(Bisias et al. 2012). However, institutional definitions are still needed for 
operational reasons. For example, a joint report by the IMF, BIS, and FSB describe 
systemic risk as the ‘disruption to the flow of finance services that is (i) caused 
by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system; and (ii) has the potential 
to have serious negative consequences for the real economy’ (IMF, BIS, and FSB 
2009, 2). Others define systemic risk in terms of the similarly nebulous notion of 
financial (in)stability, as done by the IMF in the quote cited above. Likewise, a 
separate report by the BIS Committee of the Global Financial System remarks 
that there is no widespread agreement on what financial stability should look 
like. The committee points out that ‘the notion of financial stability is often 
discussed in terms of the concept of systemic risk and its sources, for which again 
there is no consensus definition’ (Committee on the Global Financial System 
2010, 21).  
Such circuitous definitions are further complicated by the high degree of 
complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity in systemic risk, or what Ortwin Renn, 
Andreas Klinke, and Marjolein van Asselt (2011) call the dimensions of systemic 
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risk. Complexity here is understood as the challenge of specifying and calculating 
causal links between various actors (both actual and potential) and specific 
outcomes. In the case of simple risks, the events between a cause and an effect 
can be explained by a clear and exact functional relationship; estimating 
probabilities can be done effectively with statistical models. However, the 
complexity inherent in systemic risk means that simple models cannot 
adequately capture factors such as feedback loops, amplification mechanisms, 
lags between cause and effect, and intervening variables (Renn, Klinke, and 
Asselt 2011). One channel through which feedback loops and amplification 
mechanisms operate in the financial system is balance sheet contagion. The 
endogeneity of systemic risk also means that when an individual actor in the 
financial system responds to a particular event, this may trigger shifts in the 
behaviour of other actors and their actions may in turn affect the market through 
a network of feedback loops and amplification mechanisms. In such instances, 
the event itself is not as important as it is the feedback loops and amplification 
mechanisms which create links between the behaviour of market participants, 
which can then exacerbate a single event into a full-blown crisis (Systemic Risk 
Centre 2013a). 
As such, designing more sophisticated models to capture systemic risk may 
not suffice as it is inevitable that modelling cause-and-effect links will lead to 
some degree of reduction of these relationships. Technical risk assessment will 
thus always be selective and partial as it is based on uncertain assumptions and 
calculations—an unavoidable consequence if it is accepted that models 
essentially ‘focus on one or two causal or conditioning factors, exclude 
everything else, and hope to understand how just these aspects of reality work 
and interact’ (Solow 1997, quoted in Mäki 2002, 11). Uncertainty in this context 
relates to the difficulty of accurately quantifying the likelihood of systemic risk 
and identifying the potential consequences of its unintended effects due to the 
lack and limitations of technical knowledge (Renn, Klinke, and Asselt 2011).  
134 
 
Ambiguity also comes into play given the existence of multiple, legitimate 
perspectives in the assessment of systemic risk. Certain risks may be deemed 
acceptable if they are low enough, making additional regulations unnecessary or 
perhaps even cumbersome. Others may be considered tolerable if the perceived 
benefits of undertaking such risks outweigh its costs. However, actors respond 
to these risks in various ways. If complexity and uncertainty make accurate 
technical assessments of systemic risk problematic, ambiguity makes it 
contentious. Conflicting interpretations of systemic risk arise when different yet 
valid viewpoints surface on the existence or possibility of harmful effects from 
systemic risk and whether or not such risks are tolerable or acceptable. 
Ambiguity also results when opinions clash on the importance, implications, and 
application of available risk information and the range of policies under 
consideration (Renn, Klinke, and Asselt 2011). This has important implications 
in terms of global economic governance, as Jacqueline Best (2005) notes that its 
evolution has been significantly shaped by the management and accommodation 
of such ambiguities. Best analyses the evolution of global financial and 
macroeconomic governance through the management and accommodation of 
political-economic ambiguities. Manuela Moschella (2010) makes a relevant 
point as she finds that IMF staff strategically deploy ambiguous knowledge to 
generate support within the Executive Board.  However, these studies do not 
account for the negotiation of ambiguities between regional and global 
institutions tasked to ensure financial and macroeconomic stability. This issue is 
crucial in the context of transboundary risk governance, which will be covered 
later in this chapter. 
5.2.2 Systemic risk as a technical and political construction  
The work of Renn, Klinke, and van Asselt put more emphasis on 
approaching systemic risk as a social construction, going so far as to state that 
‘risks are not real phenomena but mental constructions resulting from how 
people perceive uncertain phenomena and how their interpretations and 
responses are determined by social, political, economic, and cultural contexts, 
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and judgments’ (Renn, Klinke, and Asselt 2011, 237). Evaluating systemic risk 
becomes a potentially contentious process as determining what is acceptable and 
tolerable also involves a discussion on the distribution of the costs and benefits 
of such risks.  
Moreover, it requires reconciling perceptions of what counts as fair or 
unjust allocations between actors whose links to the production of systemic risk 
and its effects are not clear to begin with. The issue of fair distribution of costs 
and benefits is particularly difficult in the case of systemic risk as evidence 
suggests that greater financial integration decreases individual risk whilst 
increasing the severity and damage of systemic risk (Goldin and Vogel 2010). 
Renn, Klinke, and van Asselt argue that how these judgments are rationalised 
largely hinge on worldviews and values and driven by shared ethical and 
ontological positions. In light of this and the high degree of complexity, 
uncertainty, and ambiguity in systemic risk, the authors stress the inadequacy of 
technical evidence in analysing systemic risk.  
In contrast to Renn, Klinke, and van Asselt, Ulrich Beck sees risks as guided 
by both scientific and social rationality—its construction relies not just on social 
expectations and value judgments defining ‘how we want to live’ (Beck 1992, 58) 
but on technical expertise as well. Defining risk also involves debates over the 
political consequences that come with its social construction and the links it 
creates to determine causality and responsibility. In his discussion of the risks of 
health and safety hazards, Beck stresses: 
‘In the fixing of acceptable levels, the numbers of people afflicted as patients 
or victims increase or decrease. By drawing lines of causation, companies 
and occupations are caught in the firing line of accusation. Politicians and 
politics release pressure by holding individuals and not systems 
responsible for the accidents and damage’ (Beck 1992, 46). 
On a global scale, Beck asserts that the more uncertainty there is regarding 
a particular risk, the more important cultural perceptions become. He claims that 
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‘the same risk becomes “real” in different ways from the perspective of different 
countries and cultures—and is assessed differently’ (Beck 2009, 12). However, 
whilst risks are social and political constructions, their existence is still justified 
in terms of technical knowledge. These technical justifications are ‘products of 
struggles of conflicts over definitions within the context of specific relations of 
definitional power’ (Beck 1997, 30). Conflicts over risk definitions are driven by 
specific relations of power which reflect how multiple definitions frame 
‘competing rationality claims of different actors in struggles for national and 
international recognition’ (Beck 1997, 30). Systemic risk analysis is based on 
models which are built on these relations of definition. At the same time, these 
relations of definition foster a sense of ‘organised irresponsibility’ (Beck 1997, 
2009). Institutions recognise the rise in potential and actual risks and 
acknowledge the need to address them; however, they are caught in (and create) 
a dense framework for assigning liability, accountability, and responsibility for 
evidence provision. This allows institutions to reject the existence of certain 
risks, obscure their causes, and deny compensation or any ability to control. 
The aforementioned points on technical constructions of risk being subject 
to ‘specific relations of definitional power’ are analogous to some of the key 
themes presented in Chapter 4. As mentioned in Chapter 1, in Beck’s framework, 
his concerns about the technical construction of risk revolve around questions 
such as:  
‘What kind of knowledge or lack of knowledge of the causes, dimensions, 
actors, and so on is involved? Who lays down the causal norms… which 
decide then a cause-effect relation is to be recognised?... What counts as 
“proof” in a world where knowledge and lack of knowledge of risks are 
inextricably fused and all knowledge is contested and probabilistic?’ (Beck 
2009, 32).  
Likewise, the authority and acceptance of systemic risk analysis is 
grounded in its representation as a mathematical model. This is especially true 
when systemic risk analysis is conducted for the purpose of surveillance, which 
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will be focus of discussions in Chapter 7. This is due to surveillance’s heavy 
emphasis on providing technical and apolitical assessments of countries’ 
economic performance. However, in contrast to Beck, this thesis does not treat 
the technical and political aspects of risk definition as separate processes. The 
representation of systemic risk does not occur in a technical vacuum as the 
expertise required to carry out such analysis is based on political and relational 
knowledge, as argued in Chapter 4. As already mentioned in previous chapters, 
we can observe how these dynamics play out in the debates on economic growth 
in East Asia.  
However, systemic risk modelling poses an additional challenge. The 
process of modelling entails minimising the very feature that makes systemic 
risk ‘systemic’—the extent to which it is embedded in a wide network of social 
processes. The emphasis on monitoring interdependencies and tracing links 
between actors, sectors, or areas which may otherwise appear unrelated mean 
that the discrete categories traditionally used in mathematical models—
including the geographical and sectoral categories analysed in Chapter 2—are  
misleading. Yet as policy justification in global economic governance continues 
to put a premium on model-based analysis, such issues have yet to lead to a 
critical questioning of the proliferation of systemic risk models in institutions 
such as the IMF and AMRO. 
 
5.3 Manoeuvring through systemic risk modelling 
Granted, some have argued that the aforementioned problems concerning 
systemic risk modelling are increasingly recognised even by mainstream 
economists. Chapter 6 will include a discussion of related developments in the 
analysis of macroprudential policy. Whilst ongoing efforts to manage systemic 
risk are still largely restrained and provisional, there is now greater 
acknowledgement of macro-level factors and recognition of complex linkages in 
calculations. However, there are other persistent issues. 
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Aside from the persistent portrayal of systemic risk as an exogenous shock, 
it is also crucial to recognise the distinction between perceived and actual risk. 
Most existing systemic risk models account for perceived risk but overlook actual 
risk—the hidden product of feedback loops and linkages between actors. Some 
examples in the context of macroprudential policy will be included in the next 
chapter. When the economy is performing well, perceived risk is low and 
declining but actual risk is rising due to growing asset bubbles. Once a crisis hits 
and the bubble bursts, volatility and perceived risk rises but actual risk declines 
as prices stabilise and return to its normal levels. Using these models to guide 
financial regulatory reform is also problematic as it assumes that there is one 
verifiable and accurate model and that policymakers should be concerned about 
conflicting risk assessments for the same assets. Scholars working at the London 
School of Economics’ Systemic Risk Centre argue that model homogeneity is not 
necessarily a good thing, especially since it could facilitate excessive 
procyclicality. However, whilst model homogeneity is discouraged, coordinating 
policy responses is encouraged as different policies can potentially act as 
amplification channels when policy objectives are inconsistent with and impact 
each other in unforeseen ways (Systemic Risk Centre 2015).  
Most post-crisis measures dealing with systemic risk still operate within 
the same rationality of mathematical formalism; hence, concerns similar to those 
raised in Chapter 4 regarding the capacity of mathematical models for displacing 
accountability persist. Regardless of the fact that most systemic risk models fail 
to account for the issues listed in the previous paragraph, regulators continue to 
favour such models precisely because they do not account for the subjective and 
currently unconfirmed channels through which endogenous risk develops 
(Systemic Risk Centre 2015). This supports the argument made in Chapter 3 
about the unwavering preference for precision over accuracy in economic policy 
analysis. Despite the fact that the global financial crisis laid bare the fallibility of 
risk models, it appears that the warnings will again remain unheeded. Similar to 
what was observed after the global financial crisis, the propensity of regulators 
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and financial institutions to exaggerate the reliability of systemic risk models and 
downplay their limitations has yet to taper off.  
Chapter 7 will delve deeper into how these mechanics operate in specific 
spillover models used by the IMF, ADB, and AMRO in their surveillance analyses. 
Before we turn to this, it is worth noting the Systemic Risk Centre’s observation 
that regulators deliberately continue using systemic risk models specifically 
because of their shortcomings, whilst simultaneously concealing these models’ 
flaws. Whilst the motivations behind regulators’ use of models is beyond the 
purview of this thesis, their strategic application of the limitations of systemic 
risk models shed light on how such models can be useful for political 
manoeuvring.    
5.3.1 Navigating complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity through strategic means  
There is a wide range of literature that look into how complexity, 
uncertainty, and ambiguity can be used for strategic purposes, although not all 
directly addressing the issue of systemic risk per se. Nonetheless, some of the 
points drawn from these studies offer insights into how it can be applied in the 
case of systemic risk. 
Post-crisis commentary invoked complexity in two ways. Firstly, the term 
was used as a target of blame as it was portrayed as a causal factor that led to the 
crisis. Brett Christophers (2009) illustrated how assigning responsibility to 
complexity (e.g., complexity of financial markets and instruments) shifts the 
blame to an abstract property of an object, instead of holding the actors and 
institutions responsible. Applying ‘complexity’ in this manner also overlooks 
how complexity also operates through spaces, relations, and processes.  
Secondly, the use of ‘complexity’ in describing the crisis also suggests a 
sense of futility and disempowerment. From the side of the general public, 
inadequate comprehension is viewed as both a cause of the crisis and a reason 
for non-experts to be excluded from the dialogue. At the same time, complexity 
is also used as an excuse to absolve actors from genuinely understanding the 
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workings of the crisis (Christophers 2009). In a similar vein, Giselle Datz (2013) 
argues that the prominence of these themes in policy and reform debates allows 
policymakers to use these as qualifiers to give the impression that it was difficult 
to understand and predict the dynamics of the financial sector, thus making 
regulation problematic. This overemphasis on complexity created ‘a widespread 
justification for failure as neither public nor private actors could effectively 
correct disparities they did not see… because they were too difficult to 
understand’ (Datz 2013, 462).  
Other scholars have also observed how the frequent and prominent use of 
the terms ‘complexity’ and ‘uncertainty’ can be manipulated to justify both the 
failure of and the increased reliance on risk models. James Brassett and Chris 
Holmes (2016) make a similar claim in that they see the invocation of uncertainty 
as a way to minimise the room to question the root causes, power dynamics, and 
structural inequalities driving movements in financial markets and the 
appropriate policy measures to regulate them. Moreover, complexity and 
uncertainty also serve to fuel the tendency towards mathematical formalism, 
instead of underscoring the need to be more cautious about the use of such 
models. In this case, complexity and uncertainty widens the prospects for relying 
on ‘augmented, rather than diminished, powers of prediction, powers that are 
oriented toward a defence, rather than a transformation, of existing financial 
market practices’ (Brassett and Holmes 2016, 380).  
Critics may have pointed out that the mathematical precision of risk models 
conceals the flaws of models and the assumptions they are built on (D. Colander 
et al. 2009). Others have also argued that the representation of financial risk in 
mathematical abstract terms leads users of such models to act with a sense of 
false confidence that quantifying risk makes it predictable and manageable (De 
Goede 2004). However, these critiques did not weaken the demand for risk 
models. Instead, complexity and uncertainty were co-opted into the 
mathematical formalism project, treated not as fundamental limitations to 
knowledge but opportunities to push the boundaries of technical interventions 
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in the financial sector. For instance, key figures in the Bank of England (including 
Chief Economist Andrew Haldane [A. G. Haldane and May 2011]) may have 
advocated for an overhaul of theoretical models and tools for financial regulation 
after the crisis but the futility of prediction was not accepted as a fundamental 
limitation to knowledge and regulation. Rather, it was used to bolster calls to 
adapt and apply complex systems theory (as used in ecology) in financial 
regulation. The embrace of complex systems theory, similar to the rise of 
complexity sciences (Tyfield 2014), ultimately serves to reinforce the status quo 
as it supports the traditionally held notion that more sophisticated quantification 
translates to better predictability and manageability.  As a more overt 
methodological issue, complexity also implies that predictions are based on 
conditions that are not fully specified, thus it is not automatic that an accurate 
prediction confirms the validity of a model, nor does an incorrect prediction 
completely invalidate a model if complexity is assumed (Grunberg 1978).  
As for ambiguity, the presence of multiple, legitimate views on the 
assessment of systemic risk have important institutional repercussions, 
especially in light of its transboundary nature. For instance, Best’s (2012) 
analysis of the World Bank governance agenda and IMF structural adjustment 
programmes highlights how ambiguities in policies and institutional practices 
endured, were exploited, and valued as a tool for working around imbalances in 
power relations. This is a tricky line to tread in institutions such as the World 
Bank and the IMF where rationalisation and standardisation are generally 
advocated as policy prescriptions. Nonetheless, Best finds that World Bank and 
IMF staff are aware of such ambiguities and not only tolerated them but also used 
the policy and institutional ambiguities to expand their operational reach and go 
beyond their core mandate and areas of expertise. Ambiguity creates space for 
‘creative mis-recognitions’ (Best 2012, 93), making policy recommendations 




James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2010) make a related point in their 
discussion of ambiguities but focus more on issues concerning compliance and 
its impact on institutional change. As ambiguities are prevalent in the 
implementation and enforcement of institutional rules, these fissures create 
opportunities for institutional change as actors apply existing rules in different 
ways. Ambiguities in institutions become ‘distributional instruments laden with 
power implications’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 8). Hence, institutional 
ambiguities can become an important driver of changes in the balance of power. 
Given the current global governance structure of multiple institutions with 
converging thematic and geographical jurisdictions, such an understanding of 
institutional ambiguity underscores the possibility that actors who are in a 
relatively weaker position in one institution may use their more favourable 
status in other institutions to push for change. Alternative institutions may thus 
be seen as initiatives to push particular interpretations of the disputed and 
ambiguous rules of another institution.  
As outlined above, the complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities 
surrounding systemic risk offer a wide range of possibilities for it to be 
marshalled as a political resource. However, the representation of systemic risk 
in a model conceals any methodological complexities, uncertainties, and 
ambiguities as it is obliged to cohere with the universal economic logic 
embedded in mathematical formalism.  The issues concerning ambiguities are of 
particular interest in this thesis in light of the transboundary nature of systemic 
risk and its repercussions for regional and global surveillance. 
 
5.4 Transboundary nature of systemic risk and implications for shared 
risk governance 
As raised in the previous section, the ambiguities in systemic risk analysis 
suggest that alternative institutions can serve as sites for contesting disputed 
interpretations put forward by another institution.  This creates a challenge for 
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shared risk governance as it involves juggling different sets of conflicting and 
compatible interests, done with the intention of managing risks to promote 
public welfare. Robert L. Heath and Katherine McComas argue that risk 
infrastructures are essentially power structures as shared risk governance is a 
process wherein decisions are made about whose interests are supported and 
whose interests are or can be compromised. Hence, the construction of risk 
definitions under shared risk governance also revolve around actors’ individual 
and collective identities and the relationships between them (Heath and 
McComas 2015). 
Against this backdrop, some scholars underscore the hierarchical nature of 
such relationships. In the context of global security risks, William Clapton notes 
a paradox in the expectations of a cosmopolitan turn in the emerging ‘world risk 
society’ as he observes a new hierarchical relationship in the global order in the 
context of a new ‘social logic of risk’ (Clapton 2014). He asserts that ‘[t]he 
preservation of…security in the face of a range of de-bounded risks’ (Clapton 
2014, 39) was used to justify the West’s self-appointment of the role of global 
risk manager as it intervenes and reshapes the institutions of failed states where 
security risks might originate. Although Clapton applies this concept in the case 
of terrorism, parallels can be drawn in the case of global financial governance as 
IFIs such as the IMF perceive the growing dangers of systemic risk as a valid 
reason to widen and deepen the scope of its surveillance operations. This 
supports Popke’s argument regarding the Fund’s discursive scripting of 
‘developing’ or ‘emerging’ economies as spaces requiring disciplinary 
intervention (Popke 1994). 
However, the growing importance of systemic risk and the rise of regional 
institutions such as AMRO suggest that such statements need to be qualified in 
light of the developments after the global financial crisis. In contrast to previous 
financial crises, the emphasis on systemic risk now puts advanced economies 
under the surveillance radar as potentially sources of risk. Whilst hierarchical 
relationships are certainly still very much embedded in the architecture for 
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global economic governance, it is also important to shed light on how regional 
institutions such AMRO shape, and are shaped by, their participation in the 
process.  
In the context of this thesis’ analysis of regional and global surveillance, the 
representation of the state through ‘the economy’ is key to understanding the 
dynamics of transboundary risk governance. With the existence of multiple 
overlapping surveillance platforms, the possibility of having diverging 
assessment of the sources of and risks to global stability is partially determined 
by spatial representations and the demarcation of regional vs. global space. As 
raised in Chapter 1, tensions over definitions of risk are also driven by conflicts 
over representation of risk and the geographical boundaries and policy 
implications that derive from such representations. Hameiri refers to this as the 
politics of risk management that entails ‘a unique form of territorial politics 
concerned with struggles over the scope of risk and the reach of political 
discussions’ (Hameiri 2011, 383). 
East Asia’s response to early G-20 reform proposals offer a glimpse of how 
these tensions can play out in the region. Following the 2007 crisis, financial 
sector reform in East Asia was also driven by G-20 guidelines, but there were 
concerns amongst developing countries that the issues highlighted in G-20 action 
plans were more relevant for advanced countries with mature financial markets 
(Arner and Park 2010). Even amongst more developed East Asian economies, 
financial markets are still relatively unsophisticated. Developing economies face 
a different set of conceptual and practical challenges with their nascent financial 
systems. In their case, risks largely emanate from their underdeveloped financial 
systems rather than from complex financial instruments and innovations. 
Analysts argue that reform efforts to address this should put more emphasis on 
strengthening banking systems and facilitating financial inclusion (Prasad 2010), 
which the AEC framework for financial sector reform underscores. 
In East Asia, the main challenge is underdeveloped domestic and regional 
capital markets. In addition to the availability of strong equity and debt capital 
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markets, liquidity and capital provision will be increasingly important to the 
region’s continued growth. In this regard, the call for stronger global capital and 
liquidity standards will have significant implications for the region. Banks in 
many East Asian economies, including China, actually satisfy or even exceed the 
higher capital requirements of the new Basel III accord. However, for others, the 
higher capital requirements and risk weighting and measurement methodology 
may aggravate deleveraging and increase the costs of global banks operating in 
East Asian economies, thereby reducing credit and financial market liquidity 
(FSB 2012; Watanagase 2012). Furthermore, there are differences in opinion 
over the levels and form of capital, the nature of liquidity arrangements, and the 
level of leverage limitations (Arner and Park 2010). Although AMRO surveillance 
does not cover these issues, the existence of an alternative institution gives East 
Asian countries room to manoeuvre should they wish to challenge global capital 
and liquidity standards. 
However, any attempts to distinguish what counts as regional risks in 
contrast to global ones are constrained by adherence to the principle of external 
accountability. In other words, in the event East Asian countries do opt to push 
for alternative capital and liquidity standards, they will be expected to justify 
their decision such that the international community is convinced that this 
departure from the prescribed standards will not harm global stability. As 
argued in Chapters 3 and 4, the legitimacy of economic policy largely hinges on 
its technical and apolitical representation, which normally takes the form of 
mathematical models. Yet as discussed in the previous section, the 
methodological complexities and uncertainties of systemic risk mean that 
attempts to capture it in mathematical models will once again lead to the creation 
of ‘artificial realities’.   
Scientific discourse is a central component of transboundary risk 
governance. As systemic risk transcends territorial boundaries, the state finds 
itself negotiating the conditions and methods for regulation in ‘networks of 
power’ (Lidskog, Soneryd, and Uggla 2010) including state and non-state actors. 
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These players jockey to influence the discursive framework in which regulations 
are designed and implemented. When differences emerge, the use of scientific 
discourse can potentially be an effective mediator. With such a reading, 
mathematical models can be seen to foster ‘cognitive stabilisation…[which] 
could be used to counterbalance political destabilisation’ (Lidskog, Soneryd, and 
Uggla 2010, 8). A similar claim is made by Michelle Everson and Ellen Vos as they 
state: 
‘Maintenance of the integrity of scientific discourse is a vital component 
within risk governance regimes. Scientific discourse is a universal 
discourse that creates objective values which may be tested and which in 
turn may be used to test the validity of claims of other political, social, 
ethical discourses; above all, science may be used to unveil hidden 
motivations’ (Vos and Everson 2009, 12).  
 Both sets of authors concede that this is a highly contingent process; it 
should also be borne in mind that they do not apply their analysis to the 
particular context of surveillance. Nonetheless, their respective approaches still 
take the scientific and the political as two separate processes, an assertion that 
was questioned in Chapters 3 and 4. Implementing strategies such as enhancing 
public participation and stakeholder involvement (as proposed in Lidskog et al. 
2009)—whilst obviously not harmful in themselves—gives the mistaken 
impression that the scientific and the political can be disentangled. Given the 
modelling process outlined in the last chapter, the neutrality of scientific 
discourse in surveillance analysis should not be taken as an automatic given. 
Hence, when such technical representations are used as the basis for policy 
justification and to demonstrate commitment to external accountability, the 
mutually reinforcing links between the technical and the political compromises 
the objectivity of surveillance analysis. The capacity of scientific discourse to 
facilitate cognitive stabilisation in the shared governance of transboundary 
systemic risk is more limited than Lidskog, Everson and Vos portray it to be. 
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 As for accountability in the governance of global systemic risk, the 
methodological complexities and uncertainties outlined in the previous section 
suggest such issues can be used to legitimise the use and expansion of systemic 
risk models. At the same time, invoking complexities and uncertainties provide a 
strategic cover for systemic risk models’ limited applicability.  
In terms of ambiguity, the acknowledgement of multiple, legitimate 
perspectives in the assessment of systemic risk—even within the dominant 
institutions in global economic governance such as the IMF and the BIS—makes 
it easier for alternative institutions such as the AMRO to take advantage of the 
conceptual fluidity of systemic risk and financial stability and use this to assert 
the validity of its own risk assessment. Whilst the expertise which led to the 
model’s construction is embedded in political and relational knowledge, the 
technical representation of systemic risk analysis in the form of mathematical 
models lends it an apolitical veneer. Any disagreements which may ensue can be 
dismissed as mere technical differences, issues which are difficult (if not 
impossible) to completely resolve given the methodological complexities and 
uncertainties of systemic risk. Hence, the complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity 
inherent in systemic risk facilitate the displacement of accountability in global 
economic governance.   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
As the essential feature defining systemic risk is its entrenchment in a wide 
network of social, economic, and political processes, it is understandable that 
academics and policymakers alike have found it difficult to capture systemic risk 
as a distinct concept. This chapter explored the implications of the tensions 
surrounding the definition of systemic risk, particularly in light of the 
repercussions in transboundary risk governance and the overlapping domains of 
regional and global surveillance. 
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Early efforts to define systemic risk resorted to vague and circuitous 
conceptualisations, often relating to financial stability or its absence. Moreover, 
the complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities intrinsic to systemic risk create 
a wide range of problems in attempts to exert technical control over systemic 
risk. In Chapter 3, it was pointed out that the rules of mathematical formalism 
require the representation of ‘the economy’ as a closed system. Doing so in the 
case of systemic risk modelling effectively minimises the very nature of systemic 
risk. Nonetheless, this problem has not hindered the use of systemic risk models 
in global economic governance. If anything, the complexities, uncertainties, and 
ambiguities of systemic risk has led to the proliferation of more models (as will 
be demonstrated in Chapter 7). The dimensions of systemic risk also offer a long 
list of possibilities for political manoeuvring; its transboundary nature and the 
significance of territorial politics in representations of risk widens the space 
even further.  
The next chapter expands on these issues in the context of the expansion of 
regional and global surveillance. As one of the main tools for monitoring and 
mitigating systemic risk, Chapter 6 also analyses developments in 
macroprudential policies and the methodological complexities and uncertainties 














Multilateral Surveillance and Macroprudential Policy: 
Managing Internal Stability and External Spillovers 
  
6.1 Introduction                                                          
The global economic governance landscape has changed drastically since 
efforts towards multilateral surveillance first began to take shape in the 1960s, 
yet commitment to the practice of surveillance has not wavered.  The IMF is 
mandated to promote the stability of the international monetary system and 
keep track of the financial and macroeconomic policies of its 189 member 
countries. By signing up to join the IMF, each member country ‘accepts the 
obligation to subject its economic and financial policies to the scrutiny of the 
international community’ (IMF 2018b). As such, the Fund is in a unique position 
to monitor global issues that are a shared concern for its member countries, 
including domestic and cross-border vulnerabilities that could trigger systemic 
disruptions. However, post-crisis evaluations of IMF surveillance found that the 
Fund failed to detect the build-up of systemic risk and warn its members of 
growing vulnerabilities (IEO 2011b). The Fund moved quickly to address these 
shortcomings by emphasising the need for deeper analysis of the linkages 
between sectors (both within and across countries) and spillovers from cross-
border transmission of shocks (IMF 2016b). 
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, systemic risk analysis is ridden with 
complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities. Since systemic risk cannot be 
captured by direct causal links, systemic risk models can aggravate difficulties in 
terms of how surveillance seeks to hold countries accountable to the 
international community for the external effects of their domestic policies. As 
systemic risk analysis moves to the top of the post-crisis surveillance agenda, the 
150 
 
complications of accurately tracing the transmission of systemic risk create 
problems for transboundary risk governance and external accountability.  
In light of the new pressures created by systemic risk on post-crisis global 
economic governance, this chapter examines the recent expansion in regional 
and global surveillance in terms of how the IMF and AMRO are applying the 
principle of external accountability in their respective operations. As an 
important tool for monitoring systemic risk and promoting global stability, 
Chapter 6 also analyses developments in macroprudential policy analysis. 
Methodological complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities plague 
macroprudential policies in ways similar to the previous chapter’s discussion on 
systemic risk. As regional surveillance offers an alternative platform for the 
analysis of methodologically-inconclusive macroprudential policies, it also offers 
an alternative assessment which can be used to justify (or deny) the external 
impact of East Asian countries’ internal policies.   
This argument is developed as follows: Section 6.2 reviews the historical 
evolution of IMF surveillance through the lens of external accountability. This 
principle is also used to investigate the divergence between IMF surveillance in 
theory and in practice. Section 6.3 traces the recent development of regional 
surveillance in East Asia through external accountability but as a process driven 
by different motivations, specifically domestic legitimacy and international 
credibility. Section 6.4 reviews the ongoing work on macroprudential policy and 
its pervading methodological complexities and uncertainties. The conclusion 
synthesises this chapter’s findings by examining how the overlapping regional 
and global surveillance frameworks widen the space for political manoeuvring, 




6.2 Multilateral surveillance as a necessary measure towards global 
financial stability  
As raised earlier in this thesis, the conduct of global surveillance (i.e., 
multilateral surveillance as conducted by the IMF) is described as the ‘analysis 
of, scrutiny over, and advice concerning… countries’ economic situation, policies, 
and prospects…for the benefit both of the international community as a whole 
and of individual member states’ (Crow, Arriazu, and Thygesen 1999, 17). 
Surveillance evolved through the years to adapt to changing views of how the 
global economy operates and how national priorities and responsibilities 
respond in the process. This section gives an overview of the historical 
background of IMF surveillance and the introduction of the 2007 Decision on 
Bilateral Surveillance and the 2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. As the scope of IMF surveillance widens without a 
corresponding expansion in the legal obligations of the Fund’s member 
countries, the section also examines the discrepancy between IMF surveillance 
in theory and in practice. The discussion emphasises the importance of the 
Fund’s role in the development of accepted norms and standards for 
participation in the global economic system. Whilst IMF surveillance has also 
fallen short in this area, the Fund has succeeded in sustaining member countries’ 
commitment to the principle of external accountability. 
6.2.1 Expanding scope of IMF surveillance through the years 
Whilst the practice of monitoring international capital flows precedes the 
founding of the Bretton Woods institutions and dates back to the League of 
Nations, the underlying rationale guiding the conduct of multilateral surveillance 
today was largely shaped within the IMF. The Fund was founded in 1945 but it 
was only in the 1960s26 when the concept of an ‘international monetary system’ 
                                                        
26 Parallel to these developments, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
set up a study group called the Working Party Three (comprised of the same members as the G-
10) with the goal of analysing the impact of monetary and fiscal measures on international 




took form with the creation of the General Arrangements to Borrow by ten 
members 27  of the IMF in 1962. The group agreed to ‘undertake a thorough 
examination of the outlook for the functioning of the international monetary 
system and of its probable future needs for liquidity’ (James 1995, 767). The term 
‘multilateral surveillance’ was first used in this context and was defined as an 
assessment of ‘the various means of financing surpluses and deficits’ in order to 
develop ‘a common approach to international monetary matters’ (James 1995, 
767). With the membership of the Group of 10 (G-10) dominated by Europeans, 
the United States sought to downplay the importance of the group. Its officials 
took action to limit the list of appropriate instruments of economic policy 
covered by the G-10 by insisting that exchange rate adjustments should not be 
used as a tool in resolving balance of payments issues.  
The outbreak of currency crises in the late 1960s and the collapse of the 
par value exchange rate system in 1971 led to a growing concern of the causes 
and effects of speculative capital flows. The IMF increased its engagement in 
multilateral surveillance in response to the currency crises in 1967 and 1968 and 
later developed a Multilateral Exchange Rate Model to calculate appropriate 
parity changes in the face of current account imbalances. Early on, model-based 
analysis was already a central part of IMF surveillance. Following the end of the 
gold standard in August 1971, the par value exchange rate system collapsed and 
the Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System (the Committee 
of Twenty) was formed to study issues concerning speculative capital flows. The 
Committee released a report in 1974 with findings indicating how disruptive 
flows can unsettle flexible exchange rate regimes.  Although capital controls 
cannot be completely rejected, the Committee argued that such policies should 
not be permanent due to the possible damaging effects on trade and investment 
flows. The same year, the IMF Executive Board adopted the Guidelines for the 
Management of Floating Exchange Rates. The guidelines expanded the IMF’s 
                                                        
27 The G-10 was composed of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland (although not yet a member of the IMF at that time), the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
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purview to include other policies that had ‘external monetary effects’, including 
capital controls and fiscal intervention. In 1975, the IMF Articles of Agreement 
were revised to legalise floating exchange rates. The framework for the 
management of the new system of floating exchange rates was created in 1976, 
granting the IMF the role of guarding the system against excessive fluctuations. 
The new Article IV mandated the Fund to ‘exercise firm surveillance over 
exchange rate policies of members’. This led to the 1977 First Surveillance 
Decision, which called for the regular global review of exchange rate and related 
economic developments (Pauly 2008). 
Whilst exchange rate policies were traditionally the main concern 
emphasised in the IMF surveillance framework, references to other policy areas 
with external monetary effects meant that the extent of analysis of issues such as 
those relating to financial and capital markets was limited to its impact on 
macroeconomic policies. The need for a deeper and more systematic focus only 
emerged in the aftermath of the 1994 Mexican and the 1997 Asian financial 
crises. In particular, the role of financial sector vulnerabilities in these crises led 
the IMF to realise that financial sector stability is critical to macroeconomic 
stability as well. One of the main lessons gleaned from the Mexican and Asian 
financial crises was the importance of transparency and the shortcomings in 
surveillance due to gaps in the provision of key statistics in developing countries. 
In particular, IMF analysis attributed the Asian crisis to inadequacies in data on 
reserves and external borrowing, resulting in the development of the Reports on 
the Observance of Standards and Codes and the data-focused Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (IEO 2016). This is consistent with the external narrative 
of the 1997 crisis that put the blame on internal causes (as outlined in Chapter 
2). Such an interpretation of the Asian financial crisis was framed as ‘a more 
modest failure in the information that governments made available to market 
actors, and of a more serious failure in borrowing countries’ institutional quality’ 
(Best 2014, 130). The international community (pushed by the finance ministers 
and central bank governors of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
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Kingdom, and the United States, collectively known as the Group of Seven) called 
for the provision of timely and reliable data on a wide range of financial 
macroeconomic indicators as the IMF argued that improved transparency will 
help lessen the occurrence of financial crises (Kenen 2001). According to Michel 
Camdessus, who was IMF Managing Director at the time of the Asian financial 
crisis, the adoption of global standards ‘could help to “civilise globalisation” by 
creating new “rules of the game” to tame the wilder excesses of the global 
economy’ (Best 2014, 134). 
Despite recognition following the crises during the 1990s that financial 
sector stability is critical to macroeconomic stability, they were still largely seen 
as two distinct policy spheres. The global financial crisis brought into sharp focus 
another set of gaps in IMF surveillance as it became apparent that insufficient 
attention was given to the analysis of spillovers and macro-financial linkages. 
Principles introduced and emphasised in two key surveillance frameworks, 
namely the 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance and the 2012 Integrated 
Surveillance Decision (thereafter referred to as 2007 Decision and 2012 
Decision, respectively), were instrumental to the development of IMF 
surveillance reform after the global financial crisis.  
The 2007 Decision and 2012 Decision have important implications for the 
conduct of IMF surveillance as both explicitly underscore the need for member 
countries to be mindful of the external implications of their domestic policy 
choices. Hence, a country’s financial and macroeconomic policies are assessed 
not only against benchmarks for domestic stability but also against benchmarks 
for global stability. The 2007 Decision rearticulated its members’ surveillance 
commitments with the adoption of the principle of external stability for the 
benefit of ‘both the balance of payments stability of the country and the effects of 
its balance of payments position on the stability of other countries’ balance of 
payments’ (IMF 2007a). The principles outlined in the Review of the 1977 
Decision—Proposal for a New Decision Companion Paper (IMF 2007b) offer 
important details on the conceptualisation of external stability. According to this 
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document, the realisation of external stability is characterised by ‘an underlying 
current account broadly in line with its equilibrium…and a capital and financial 
account that does not create risks of abrupt shifts in capital flow’ (IMF 2007b, 2). 
The paper also lists principles for the guidance of members, indicating that the 
IMF is cognisant of the need to clarify certain controversial terms (e.g., how to 
define ‘fundamentally misaligned’ exchange rates) and recognises that the ‘usual 
uncertainties’ (IMF 2007b, 12) in estimating equilibrium exchange rates 
persist.28 In this context, external stability is key to the IMF’s core mandate of 
promoting global economic and financial stability, which is stressed to be ‘both a 
national and a multilateral concern’ (IMF 2018b). Policies should be 
implemented such that it ‘strik[es] the right balance of domestic objectives and 
external stability’ (Lagarde 2016). In contrast, discussions on regional stability 
in ASEAN circles are largely a matter of ensuring that regional mechanisms act 
as a ‘layer of defence’ (Menon 2012) to safeguard financial and macroeconomic 
stability against threats.   
Another notable point in the Review of the 1977 Decision—Proposal for a 
New Decision Companion Paper’s discussion on external stability is the emphasis 
on promoting external stability through domestic stability and the definition of 
the scope of surveillance by virtue of the ‘principle of proximity’ (IMF 2007b, 8). 
The IMF stresses that domestic stability fosters external stability, and this 
provides the justification for a case-by-case expansion of the scope of 
surveillance.  Surveillance should cover primarily demand policies (i.e., 
monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies) but others identified by the 
proposed principle of proximity will also be deemed as part of the scope of 
bilateral surveillance. The Fund explains the application of the concept as 
follows: 
                                                        
28 The paper emphasises that ‘the Fund would give the member the opportunity to represent the 
purpose of its actions and would give the member’s representations the benefit of any reasonable 
doubt’ (IMF 2007b, 13). However, the final decision rests on the Fund’s independent assessment 
of the validity of the member’s representation.  
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‘[C]ertain policies would automatically be regarded as materially 
influencing external stability prospects: exchange rate policies but also the 
macroeconomic and macroeconomically relevant structural aspects of 
fiscal, monetary, and financial sector policies. Other domestic policies 
would be covered in particular cases, but their bearing on external stability 
would need to be explained’ (IMF 2007b, 5). 
 Whilst the IMF stresses that the decision to expand the scope of 
surveillance will be done depending on the country’s circumstances, the choice 
to do so will be determined by whether these policies are seen to have a bearing 
on both domestic and external stability. As previously mentioned, the IMF is 
careful about acknowledging controversial terms and methodological 
uncertainties and emphasises that all assessments will be done with due 
consideration of members’ respective circumstances. The lack of 
evenhandedness has been a persistent concern in IMF surveillance as a 
substantial minority of members have complained that ‘the Fund is not 
evenhanded in its advice, particularly with respect to the treatment of large 
advanced countries’ (IMF 2014a, 30). Accordingly, the cautious tone evoked in 
the Review of the 1977 Decision—Proposal for a New Decision Companion Paper 
connotes recognition of possible political tensions arising from the framework. 
This issue is not new in IMF operations and has been analysed by Leonard 
Seabrooke (2010) in the context of the Asian financial crisis through the notion 
of a legitimacy gap. 29  Nonetheless, the IMF continues to move forward with 
pushing the boundaries of surveillance. 
A more concrete manifestation of the growing scope for surveillance can be 
seen in the 2012 Decision. Similar to the 2007 framework, the 2012 Decision 
stresses the importance of the stability of a member country’s external account. 
However, it takes a wider view of the sources of domestic instability as the 2012 
                                                        
29  Seabrooke defines a legitimacy gap as ‘the space between claims to the fairness and 
rightfulness of policy actions by those who seek to govern, and the conferral of legitimacy on 
these claims through policy implementation by those being governed’ (Seabrooke 2010, 139). 
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Decision covers other channels in addition to a member’s balance of payments. 
Moreover, for the first time in the Fund’s history, the 2012 Decision specifies that 
Article IV consultations are a vehicle not only for bilateral surveillance but also 
for multilateral surveillance, highlighting the importance of interconnectedness 
and spillovers. The 2012 Decision allows Article IV consultations to cover the 
entire range of potential and actual spillovers from a member country’s domestic 
policies as they impact the effective operation of the international monetary 
system (IMF 2013b). Prior to the global financial crisis, bilateral and multilateral 
surveillance were conducted as separate processes. With the 2012 Decision, the 
IMF established new products and processes (e.g., Spillover and External Sector 
Reports and the introduction of the global risk assessment matrix to guide risk 
analysis in bilateral surveillance) to link the two together (IMF 2014a). 
 The 2012 Decision also specifies that in the event a country’s policies 
promote domestic stability whilst also causing negative spillovers, IMF staff 
‘should discuss with the authorities alternative policies that minimise spillovers 
whilst continuing to promote domestic stability’ (IMF 2014b, 32). This both 
widens and deepens the scope of bilateral and multilateral surveillance with the 
addition of inward and outward spillover analysis. Whilst these developments 
may be construed as a potential intrusion in member countries’ economic 
sovereignty (a sensitive issue amongst East Asian countries, as highlighted in 
Chapter 2), constitutional provisions require the Fund to calibrate their 
approach. The 2012 Decision did not lead to any legal changes that would 
empower the IMF in their conduct of bilateral and multilateral surveillance, as 
Article IV Section 3 states that ‘principles shall respect the domestic social and 
political policies of members, and in applying these principles the Fund shall pay 
due regard to the circumstances of members’. 
6.2.2 IMF surveillance in theory vs. practice 
Hence, despite the repeated expansion of the scope of surveillance since the 
1960s, what remains unchanged is the scope of formal obligations of member 
countries. As observed by Ayse Kaya (2012), post-crisis reforms in global 
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economic governance revealed a ‘paradox of delegation’ in that genuine 
intentions to increase the IMF’s relevance would have resulted in greater 
incursions into the sovereignty of member countries, which would not have been 
tolerated by East Asian countries. The 2012 Decision cannot legally require 
member countries to take into account the spillovers of their domestic policies 
to other countries. The 2014 IMF Triennial Surveillance Review recommends 
that the Fund review possible changes to its structures and mandate to 
encourage a collaborative approach to global growth and risk management. 
However, most members of the Executive Board do not agree that this issue 
should be prioritised given other pressing concerns faced by the IMF (IMF 
2014c).  
Whilst Kaya is right to note a ‘paradox of delegation’ following the response 
of international organisations to the global financial crisis, the failure to support 
the expanding scope of surveillance with a corresponding expansion in member 
obligations should not come as a surprise. Upholding the principle of external 
accountability continues to be touted as the fundamental goal of IMF surveillance 
in theory; however, fears of intrusions into member states’ economic sovereignty 
continue to constrain IMF surveillance in practice. Even in instances wherein 
Article IV imposes legal obligations upon members, there has yet to be a case 
wherein non-compliance was officially reported, nor have sanctions been 
applied. There are also diverging views on the effectiveness of IMF surveillance 
with respect to fostering global policy cooperation (IEO 2009). Despite the heavy 
rhetoric of cooperation that colours IMF surveillance, it is not a legal mechanism 
for enforcing cooperation. At best, surveillance provides ‘what might be seen as 
neutral and reliable data, forecasts, and analysis…[providing] machinery 
through which policy coordination can take place if countries so wish’ (Crow, 
Arriazu, and Thygesen 1999, 21).  
Such contradictions raise questions regarding the relevance of IMF 
surveillance. Domenico Lombardi and Ngaire Woods (2008) list three possible 
ways the IMF can wield influence through surveillance: (i) by exerting direct 
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influence over its members through loan conditionality; (ii) by providing 
information on other members’ economic performance, thereby reducing 
uncertainty about policy decisions of members and fostering cooperation; and 
(iii) by facilitating learning and socialisation with the development of a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ or accepted norms and standards for participation in the global 
economic system.  
On the first channel, direct policy influence through conditionality may be 
the clearest manifestation of the impact of surveillance but it needs to be 
assessed against the changing nature of IMF lending. Whilst four out of five 
member countries have borrowed from the IMF at least once, the number and 
profile of borrowers have vacillated though the years. When the IMF first started 
operations, most of its loans were to advanced industrial countries. The series of 
crises in the 1970s through the 1990s led to an increase in demand for IMF credit 
from low-income and emerging market economies but this dropped significantly 
before the onset of the global financial crisis as many countries began repaying 
their loans, or turned to private capital markets for their funding needs. This has 
greatly diluted IMF surveillance’s ability to wield any policy influence. 
Furthermore, the Fund’s lending framework has gone through major reforms 
since 2009 as it sought to introduce more flexibility into loan conditionality (IMF 
2018a). Another recent development is the rise of alternative liquidity swap 
arrangements, both bilateral and regional. The case of East Asia’s CMIM will be 
discussed in greater detail later in the next section. 
On Lombardi and Wood’s second point, IMF surveillance’s function as 
information provider is one that is frequently raised, but also often contested. As 
mentioned earlier, one of the key reforms pushed in the aftermath of the Mexican 
and Asian financial crises in the 1990s targeted transparency and the timely 
provision of more accurate and granular data. However, the notion that 
transparency is a critical component of stable markets also has several 
limitations (Blyth 2003; Best 2005). The rationale for transparency lies in the 
belief that providing more and better information can solve market instability. It 
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is already questionable that market instability is a result of information 
asymmetries alone; even if this claim is accepted, the assumption is transparency 
will work under the unlikely assumption that the provision of information will 
lead to convergent expectations and actions, and that actors have a shared 
understanding of market fundamentals.  
Promoting transparency can also be problematic as it imposes the 
dominance of a particular set of norms and consequently strengthens the 
authority and legitimacy of the institutions that support this set of norms. Whilst 
cloaked in technical terms, calls for transparency constrain state autonomy as it 
requires compliance with externally defined standards that determine what it 
means to be good economic citizens, both domestically and globally. Reforms are 
framed in such a way that highlights the responsibilities of affected countries in 
maintaining global financial stability as part of a new ‘global ethics’ (Best 2005). 
As pointed out in Chapter 4, this reflects the inherent politics obscured by the 
technical and universal nature of surveillance analysis; at the same time, such 
standards are seen as an important indicator of the international credibility that 
East Asian countries seek.   
On top of this, issues of who the users are and how the information is used 
further complicate IMF surveillance’s role as information provider. A review by 
the IEO (2006) indicates that the World Economic Outlook (WEO) has no 
observable impact on national policy design. As for private market actors, 
Lombardi and Woods (2008) fail to find evidence that they use information from 
IMF surveillance decisions. Regardless of how surveillance findings are actually 
used, Harold James argues that IMF surveillance should be valued as it 
depoliticises the supply of information by ‘leaving thousands of market 
participants rather than any one political body to make judgments about the 
appropriateness of policy’ (James 1995, 789). He underscores the importance of 
the IMF’s authority as information provider as he notes that:  
‘The rule of Bretton Woods has been replaced by knowledge; an 
information standard has succeeded a gold or dollar/sterling or dollar 
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standard; and the influence of the institution at the heart of the 
international financial system depends largely on its ability to provide 
speedy, accurate, and persuasive economic analysis’ (James 1996, 612).  
Another approach highlights IMF’s role as a reputational intermediary. 
André Broome works with the theory of policy credibility to demonstrate how 
IMF surveillance can reduce uncertainty about the nature of domestic economic 
reform and national policymakers’ commitment towards implementing it.  The 
IMF effectively gives a ‘good housekeeping seal of approval’ (Broome 2008, 126) 
which opens doors for countries to access additional sources of funding.30 This 
coincides with Lombardi and Woods’ observation that IMF surveillance is valued 
as a signal to markets about the relative standing of the country within the IMF. 
Such views on the IMF’s role as reputational intermediary hold significant 
implications in the context of policy justification and external accountability, as 
will be discussed further at the end of this section.  
The third channel through which IMF surveillance can wield influence 
relies on the development of accepted norms and standards by which ‘good 
economic practice’ is defined and which govern participation in the global 
economy. Beyond loan conditionalities or overt legal mechanisms, the Fund 
carries significant influence in shaping the interpretive framework for good 
economic practice (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Clift 2018). However, what 
exactly constitutes ‘good economic practice’ is increasingly contested and, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, previously dominant discourse on the ‘appropriate’ 
economic growth model is also being challenged. In relation to East Asia, 
exchange rate and capital control policies are common topics of debate.  
                                                        
30 Whilst these accounts may be valid, market response to IMF surveillance in this context is 
effectively treated as an external process, when the various financial crises over the years have 
shown the dangers of sticking with such an assumption. In this case, the utility of IMF surveillance 
appears to be assessed based on the information it provides to market actors about the state of a 
country’s economic and financial performance, without taking into consideration that this 
performance is also contingent on market reactions. 
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On exchange rate policies, although China agreed in principle that there is 
a need for greater exchange rate flexibility, government officials rejected the idea 
that global imbalances (particularly China’s large surplus) were to blame for the 
global financial crisis (Foot and Walter 2011). Yi Gang, Deputy Governor of the 
People’s Bank of China, argued in 2009 that ‘[t]he current financial crisis, which 
originated in developed countries, has resulted in substantial losses for the 
countries of the world… the failure of major international financial institutions 
to issue timely early warning highlights the consequences of its misfocused 
surveillance’ (Gang 2009). The 2013 Article IV Consultation for China once again 
pointed out that the renminbi is ‘moderately undervalued’ (IMF 2013d, 27). In 
his response to the staff recommendations, IMF Executive Director Tao Zhang 
noted that ‘my authorities view that both the EBA [External Balance Assessment] 
and CGER [Consultative Group on Exchange Rate Issues] methodologies have not 
yet been able to capture the rapid structural changes in many economies, 
including China, and so further work on the subject is needed’ (T. Zhang 2013, 4). 
As for capital controls, the IMF traditionally opposed the use of capital 
controls—a position that one external review considers ‘based more on ideology 
than on a careful consideration of the evidence and the policy alternatives’ 
(Crow, Arriazu, and Thygesen 1999, 39). However, the Fund has adjusted its 
stance to account for what transpired during the crises in emerging economies 
during the 1990s. One of the causes of the Asian financial crisis was the sudden 
outflow of massive short-term capital and the poor monitoring of external 
positions in terms of claims and liabilities (Murase 2007). Recognising the trade-
offs of full capital liberalisation and the different benefits and risks it has for 
developed and emerging economies, the IMF now qualifies its prescriptions with 
a call for ‘well-planned, timed, and sequenced’ liberalisation process. It 
acknowledges that certain circumstances justify the need for ‘capital flow 
management measures’ but holds that it should not be used in lieu of structural 
adjustments (IMF 2014a, 19). 
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In East Asia, the AEC framework calls for ‘freer’ capital flows as ASEAN 
member states do not aspire to completely eradicate all restrictions to capital 
flows. This is consistent with the IMF’s revised view on capital liberalisation and 
the acknowledgment that the use of capital controls can be justified to protect 
domestic financial markets from external shocks. However, there is still some 
objection to the IMF position and recommendation of a specific sequence for the 
use of such tools. One particular point of contention is the IMF’s view that 
measures for capital flow management should only be considered after more 
conventional macroeconomic tools have already been exhausted (Y. C. Park and 
Takagi 2012). Hence, contrary to the ASEAN position, the IMF only recommends 
intervention in capital markets as a last resort. 
Whilst it appears that IMF surveillance has also fallen short in terms of the 
third channel (i.e., by facilitating learning and socialisation with the development 
of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ or accepted norms and standards for participation 
in the global economic system), Pauly invites us to calibrate expectations. As 
raised in Chapter 1: 
‘In practice, the task of defending and deploying [IMF] authority would 
never be easy, straightforward, or finally accomplished, and the actual 
power of the Fund would remain ambiguous and variably applied. 
Nevertheless, agreement on the normative foundation of the core mission 
of the Fund sufficient for it to evolve and adapt to changing circumstance 
represented a signal innovation in modern economic history’ (Pauly 2008, 
190).  
‘…the reality that sovereign states thereafter felt compelled to justify to one 
another both certain actions and their effects represented a novel 
movement toward external accountability’ (Pauly 2008, 193). 
Hence, despite the aforementioned disagreements between the IMF and 
East Asia policy stance on areas such as exchange rates and capital controls, 
policymakers in the region are still motivated to justify their domestic economic 
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policies to the international community—the principle of external accountability 
remains the accepted code of conduct for participation in the global economy. 
Two related points—the IMF’s aforementioned role as reputational intermediary 
and commitment to the principle of external accountability—can account for the 
continued relevance of IMF surveillance across time and member countries. 
Whilst the emergence of regional surveillance may challenge the IMF’s monopoly 
as reputational intermediary, the normative solidarity based on adherence to 
external accountability still drives AMRO surveillance. The next section looks 
into East Asia’s motivations for supporting the principle of external 
accountability.  
 
6.3 Regional surveillance as a necessary measure to support multilateral 
surveillance  
East Asia’s relations with the IMF have been characterised as ambivalent, 
as financial regionalism continues to be ‘motivated by resentment of the 
institution yet facilitated by its presence’ (Henning 2011, 23). The rise of regional 
surveillance in East Asia needs to be analysed in this context, with the ongoing 
progress being framed as both competition and complement to IMF surveillance. 
As argued in Chapter 2, regional surveillance should also be read as an exercise 
of policy justification; however, commitment to external accountability in East 
Asia hinges not just on achieving international credibility but on sustaining 
domestic legitimacy as well. Hence, the following discussion highlights how 
regional surveillance remains reliant on direct state involvement and embedded 
IMF links.  
The concept of financial and macroeconomic surveillance did not pervade 
policy thinking in East Asia until the Asian financial crisis. As was the case in the 
IMF, the crisis gave the impetus for action and reform. When the baht collapsed 
in July 1997, the Japanese government moved quickly to organise and assemble 
bilateral aid from its neighbours to augment the funds Thailand could draw from 
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the IMF. The success opened new opportunities for regional cooperation and 
encouraged Japanese officials to develop the concept of a more permanent 
mechanism for regional liquidity support (Amyx 2008). The proposal to create 
an Asian Monetary Fund was raised. The plan was to create a US$100 billion fund 
with US$50 billion provided by Japan and the rest by China, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Taiwan. This was supported by Malaysia but the United States 
expressed its strong opposition, arguing that such a fund would duplicate IMF’s 
activities and create moral hazard problems.31 Whereas most of the liquidity 
support required by countries affected by the Asian financial crisis was 
eventually provided by the IMF, the conditionality attached to IMF assistance 
created problems within the domestic politics of the borrowing countries and 
prompted severe backlash against the Fund and its policies. The experience also 
led East Asian economies to begin considering self-insurance in the form of 
unilateral reserve accumulation.  
As the proposal for the Asian Monetary Fund failed to take off, a new 
proposition was put forward in November 1997 under the banner of the Manila 
Framework Group. In light of the roadblocks faced by the original proposal, the 
Manila Framework Group was very clear in its intention to complement IMF 
activities and resources as a mechanism for regional surveillance and as a 
cooperative financing arrangement. The Fund was appointed as technical 
secretariat of the Manila Framework Group and was tasked to prepare 
background reports for meetings of ASEAN finance ministers. However, 
evaluation of IMF surveillance during this period showed that the background 
reports were ‘largely an updated replication of consultation material already 
available’ (Crow, Arriazu, and Thygesen 1999, 29). Furthermore, regional 
officials found that the Fund was ‘too ready to see difficulties in stronger regional 
cooperation, particularly in Asia’ (Crow, Arriazu, and Thygesen 1999, 29). Years 
                                                        
31  Instead, Japan extended bilateral financing to its East Asian neighbours through the New 
Miyazawa Initiative. Japan announced in October 1998 that they were ready to extend US$30 
billion to assist countries in the region. A total of US$21 billion in financial support was pledged 
to Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (Kageyama 2000). 
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of regular meetings did not lead to the establishment of an effective surveillance 
system; the Manila Framework Group ultimately became just another forum for 
exchanging views and information on regional and global financial issues 
(Manupipatpong 2002). Advocates for regional surveillance in East Asia stressed 
that an effective regional mechanism would differ from existing global 
surveillance platforms because of the peer review process.  The expectation here 
was that the direct involvement of senior policymakers would facilitate policy 
influence (Kuroda and Kawai 2002; Takagi 2010). As can be expected given the 
significant importance of non-interference in ASEAN affairs, the outcome did not 
meet expectations.32 The Manila Framework Group eventually came to an end in 
2004 but progress in regional surveillance continued under the purview of the 
ADB and ASEAN/ASEAN+3. 
The ASEAN finance ministers established the ASEAN Surveillance Process 
in 1999 with the view of making it an informal peer review mechanism 
complementary to the multilateral surveillance activities carried out by the IMF. 
The ASEAN Surveillance Report is prepared using the same dataset submitted to 
the IMF but surveillance contacts of each member country are given significant 
discretion on the details provided in the report (Anas and Atje 2005).  Full 
reports are not made public but its general structure is known. The ASEAN 
Surveillance Report includes the ASEAN Economic and Financial Review, an 
analysis of the latest economic developments across the region and within each 
member state, and the Surveillance Issues Report, which focuses on a specific 
policy issue. The ASEAN Financial and Macroeconomic Surveillance Unit drafts 
the report with inputs from consultants and sends it to the ASEAN Finance 
Deputies Meeting. Results of the discussion are then shared at the ASEAN 
                                                        
32 For instance, it has been argued that regional surveillance creates room for greater ownership 
of the surveillance process. Poor ownership can weaken the quality of cooperation and the effects 
will be seen in the form of less accurate and timely sharing of data and policy programmes, as 
well as a diminished willingness to engage in a frank exchange of views. A regional process can 
also create a stronger sense of collective action, which is important in fostering mutual trust and 
making peer pressure more effective (Manzano 2001). Whilst this may be the case in theory, it is 
difficult to see how this will play out in the context of ASEAN given the region’s continued 
adherence to the norm of non-interventionism (Jung 2009). 
167 
 
Finance Ministers Meeting (Murase 2007). The ASEAN Surveillance Process was 
clearly very different from IMF Article IV consultations in that the latter was 
essentially a fact-finding mission, whilst the former mainly relied on information 
directly provided by consultants and contacts in the member country’s finance 
ministries and central banks. Furthermore, the peer review process was once 
again weak and ineffective. The deputies were often more concerned about the 
content of the reports on their respective countries, rather than in engaging in 
constructive policy dialogue with their regional counterparts. It was also 
common for deputies to intervene and edit reports when the documents 
contained sensitive issues (Anas and Atje 2005). 
Although the motivations behind and design of the ASEAN Surveillance 
Process were guided by the aim of complementing IMF surveillance, close 
coordination and compliance remained elusive as member countries wavered on 
the implementation of the Fund’s policy recommendations, especially on 
exchange rate policy. Cooperation between the ASEAN+3 and IMF could have 
involved greater participation in Article IV consultations but the ASEAN 
Surveillance Coordinating Unit, a group created to coordinate the activities under 
the ASEAN Surveillance Process, was not allowed to be involved on the grounds 
of the IMF’s confidentiality agreement with member countries (Manupipatpong 
2002). In a third-party report prepared for the ASEAN Secretariat, assessment of 
the ASEAN Surveillance Process attests that ‘[a]lthough the ASEAN Surveillance 
Process was designed to complement IMF’s surveillance mechanism, it is not 
clear that the two institutions coordinate their work to get the maximum benefit 
from their activities’ (Anas and Atje 2005, 3). 
Under the wider ASEAN+3 rubric, the Economic Review and Policy 
Dialogue (ERPD) was launched in 2002 to monitor and evaluate national, 
regional, and global economic conditions, as well as help East Asia represent the 
region’s interests in the reform of the international financial architecture. It was 
introduced in conjunction with the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) reserve pooling 
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arrangement as a supplement to existing multilateral facilities. 33  The 
surveillance process under the ASEAN+3 ERPD involves presentations on the 
regional and global outlook by the IMF. These are delivered during the ASEAN+3 
Finance and Central Bank Deputies Meeting (Kawai and Houser 2007). Aside 
from member states and representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat, attendees 
include the ADB and the IMF. 34 However, representatives from international 
institutions do not take part in the country-by-country surveillance discussions. 
Similar to the ASEAN Surveillance Process, findings from the deliberations are 
later reported to the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting. ADB is also directly 
involved in the ERPD process. The Bank prepares a Confidential Note for 
presentation in ASEAN+3 meetings. It also works with ASEAN+3 to draft 
background reports which member countries use in conducting regional 
financial and macroeconomic monitoring and peer review (ADB 2009).  
As outlined above, early efforts towards regional surveillance in East Asia 
were constrained by weak support from and coordination with external 
partners, as well as an ineffective peer review process. It took another crisis to 
spur ASEAN+3 member countries to take greater strides.  The CMIM regional 
reserve-pooling arrangement re-ignited talks of the Asian Monetary Fund as 
ASEAN+3 finance ministers hastened moves to expand and ‘multilateralise’ the 
original CMI.35 AMRO was established in April 2011 as an independent regional 
surveillance unit to monitor and assess regional economies and provide 
analytical support to the CMIM. During periods of economic stability, AMRO is 
tasked to prepare reports on the overall macroeconomic outlook of ASEAN+3 as 
                                                        
33 The CMI started as a network of bilateral swap and repurchase agreements building on the 
ASEAN Swap Agreement (ASA). The ASA was established in 1977 to provide immediate short-
term swap facilities to participating ASEAN member countries with temporary international 
liquidity problems. The maximum total amount of US dollars initially available for swap 
transactions was US$100 million (ASEAN 1977) but was expanded to US$200 million in 1978 
(ASEAN 1978). The ASA was activated five times—by Indonesia in 1979, Malaysia and Thailand 
in 1980, and the Philippines in 1981 and 1982. However, the funds from this facility were too 
small to be a significant source of liquidity support (Henning 2004).   
34 The inclusion of the IMF only began in November 2005.  
35 Whilst the CMI was already ready for use when South Korea and Singapore needed liquidity 
support in 2008, the central banks of these countries turned to the US Federal Reserve instead to 
arrange a bilateral swap agreement (Grimes 2011).  
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a region as well as individual countries. During times of crisis, AMRO has a critical 
role to play as a provider of economic and financial analysis of the CMIM Swap 
Requesting Country. The office will also monitor the use and impact of the funds 
disbursed under the CMIM agreement and observe compliance by the Swap 
Requesting Country with any lending agreements stipulated in the CMIM.  
The CMIM has yet to be tested but initiatives to build AMRO’s resources and 
capacity to operate effectively as an independent regional surveillance unit has 
progressed significantly, especially in 2016 and 2017. In February 2016, AMRO’s 
status was officially upgraded to that of an international institution, effectively 
strengthening its legal capacity to enter formal cooperation agreements and 
enable the organisation to ensure confidentiality and legal protection, 
particularly when handling confidential and sensitive data. In the early stages of 
AMRO’s operations, critics doubted its capacity to be an effective and credible 
surveillance unit given its limited research capacity and human and institutional 
resources, especially relative to that of the IMF’s (Hill and Menon 2012). 
However, recent changes indicate progress in this front. Staff expansion has been 
a top priority in the last few years, with senior surveillance staff hailing from 
various state financial institutions (e.g., Bank of Thailand, the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation) and 
holding PhD degrees in economics from top US universities (e.g., University of 
Pennsylvania and Yale University). These credentials suggest that heavy weight 
is given to government ties and standard indicators of technical expertise and 
educational prestige.  
AMRO has also been more actively involved in providing technical 
assistance to less developed member countries for surveillance capacity 
building. It has also increased its engagement and visibility with more outreach 
and partnership activities, both in regional platforms as well as in other 
international organisations and multilateral forums such as the IMF and G-20. 
Nonetheless, AMRO still relies on its strategic partners—particularly the ADB—
for assistance. The ADB has been a leading figure in the region’s efforts to build 
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surveillance capacity since 2006. Recent technical assistance projects include 
‘Supporting and Enhancing Regional Surveillance for ASEAN+3 and the CMIM’ 
(ADB 2011) and ‘Enhancing the Capacity of Selected ASEAN+3 Countries for 
Assessing Financial Vulnerabilities’ (ADB 2007). The ADB is currently 
implementing a regional technical assistance project entitled ‘Enhancing 
Regional Capacity for Economic Surveillance and Financial Vulnerability 
Assessment’ (ADB 2016). The project seeks to upgrade the region’s economic 
and financial vulnerability assessment tools (building on its Vulnerability 
Indicators and Early Warning System model or VIEWS) in light of the ‘new 
sources of vulnerabilities emerging after the global financial crisis’ (ADB 2016, 
1). The ADB’s contributions to the development of surveillance models in East 
Asia will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
2016 was a milestone year for AMRO in other ways. It upgraded and 
streamlined its surveillance framework to focus more on risks and 
vulnerabilities. AMRO has also developed ‘its own analytical toolkits’ (AMRO 
2017a, 12) to support its surveillance activities. Country surveillance now 
includes an evaluation of member countries’ macroeconomic developments and 
outlook, as well as an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities particularly 
spillovers, fiscal sustainability, and the stability of external and financial sectors. 
As for regional surveillance, AMRO defines its role as that of ‘assessing region-
wide economic developments and emerging trends that may expose ASEAN+3 
members to significant risks and vulnerabilities within and outside the ASEAN+3 
region’ (AMRO 2017a, 14). This covers a review of macro-financial linkages, 
spillovers, and contagion risks, and its implications for member countries and 
the region in general. As can be seen, the expansion of the AMRO surveillance 
framework parallels that of the IMF’s, yet driven by different end goals. 
AMRO has also put more emphasis on strengthening accountability and 
transparency and now has regular public outputs including country consultation 
reports, thematic studies, and monthly updates. In its early years, AMRO’s 
surveillance products were submitted directly to senior officials of finance 
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ministries and central banks every quarter for purposes of peer review during 
the ERPD and not for public dissemination. These reports were also presented 
during the meetings of vice ministers of finance and deputy governors of the 
central banks of ASEAN+3 economies twice a year (Siregar and Chabchitrchaidol 
2013). This changed in 2017 with the release of the flagship ASEAN+3 Regional 
Economic Outlook. AMRO developed its own publication policy ‘which will 
promote its accountability and visibility beyond the regional platform and 
solidify its presence as an international organisation’ (ASEAN+3 2017). AMRO 
has also taken measures to improve its public presence by organising seminars 
and roundtables, providing updates about the office’s activities through the 
AMRO website, and engaging with media (AMRO 2018a). 
With these steps, it appears that early doubts regarding AMRO will now be 
put to rest. The institution has been more aggressive with its expansion and 
assertive about cementing its place as a key player in global economic 
governance. Nonetheless, two features which shaped earlier regional 
surveillance initiatives—heavy state involvement and persistent IMF links—
continue to figure prominently in AMRO’s operations and agenda. 
On the first point, the extent of AMRO’s self-proclaimed independence 
should be qualified. Despite its practice of hiring and engaging top regional 
bureaucratic and academic economists for senior management posts36 and for 
membership in the Advisory Panel,37 AMRO governance is still largely under the 
direction of the Executive Committee, which counts deputy finance ministers and 
deputy central bank governors as its members. The Executive Committee is in 
charge of ‘strategic oversight of AMRO including providing guidance and setting 
broad policy direction for the management of AMRO’ (AMRO 2018c). The 
                                                        
36 In fact, AMRO Chief Economist Dr Hoe Ee Khor is the former Deputy Director of the Asia and 
Pacific Department of the IMF. AMRO Director Junhong Chang was affiliated with China’s Ministry 
of Finance as Deputy Director General of the Department of International Economic Relations 
before joining AMRO. 
37  Current members include professors in Hitotsubashi University and the University of the 
Philippines, with PhD degrees from Oxford and Columbia, respectively. The Advisory Panel 
reviews AMRO’s surveillance outputs; however, summaries of the discussions are not disclosed. 
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committee’s responsibilities involve appointment of the AMRO Director, who is 
‘accountable to and subject to the general control of the Executive Committee’ 
(AMRO 2018c, italics added). AMRO’s organisational structure thus suggests that 
it still operates within the ASEAN tradition of using regional institutions to 
consolidate state authority, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
On the second point, one of the prominent features of the CMIM is its IMF 
link. As discussed in Chapter 2, the IMF link was retained (despite opposition 
from Malaysia) to address concerns regarding CMIM’s market credibility. When 
it was first launched, guidelines for disbursement indicated that funds dispersed 
through CMIM (except for the first 20% of the allotment) was linked to a program 
with the IMF. Although this was revised in May 2012 with the de-linked portion 
enlarged to 30% with plans of increasing it to 40% up for review, the IMF link 
continues to be a sensitive issue among ASEAN+3 member  states as memories 
of their experience with the Fund in 1997 linger. ASEAN+3 officials have always 
acknowledged that surveillance under AMRO would evolve to complement the 
IMF’s. Yet twenty years after the Asian financial crisis, the region’s relationship 
with the IMF continues to shape policy agenda and discourse. AMRO Director 
Junhong Chang reiterates that: 
‘The memories of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 are still vivid in the 
region, and the so-called “IMF stigma” still lingers here. The global financial 
crisis of 2008 was another wake up call for us to further strengthen our 
regional self-help mechanism and gave birth to the CMIM and its current 
form… the CMIM and AMRO together are our regional responses to these 
global challenges’ (Chang 2016). 
Whilst Chang emphasises that ‘we do not see AMRO and CMIM as replacing 
the IMF in terms of surveillance in financing’ (Chang 2017), the lessons she draws 
from the Asian and global financial crises are quite telling in that, whilst she 
implies that the IMF has learned from the error of its ways, the East Asian 
response suggests that the region continues to rely on self-help mechanisms: 
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‘Taking the lessons from the Asian financial crisis to heart, the IMF has 
become more transparent and accountable. It has sought feedback from its 
members and reviewed its policy advice in programmes and lending 
facilities. ASEAN+3 economies, on the other hand, have strengthened the 
macroeconomic fundamentals, built up buffers, and become more 
confident of their ability to manage risks and external shocks’ (Chang 
2017). 
Since its shaky beginnings after the Asian financial crisis, surveillance in 
East Asia has been characterised by procedural IMF links in the foreground and 
direct state involvement in the background. It was only in the years following the 
global financial crisis, with the hastened efforts to expand CMIM and AMRO, that 
there has been a subtle shift in tone. As shown above, AMRO is becoming more 
confident in securing its nascent position in global economic governance, framed 
against the backdrop of global challenges and the lingering IMF stigma. AMRO’s 
direction thus far stresses the importance of self-help mechanisms alongside IMF 
cooperation. Moreover, in contrast to earlier regional surveillance initiatives, 
AMRO is more keen to establish a public presence with the recent dissemination 
of surveillance outputs and the ongoing efforts to secure partnerships with other 
stakeholders in global economic governance. 
Hence, AMRO offers a promising platform for East Asian countries to 
continue demonstrating their commitment to the principle of external 
accountability, especially since it facilitates policy justification in their own 
terms, but according to accepted global standards of technical expertise.  This 
can be observed in two ways: In terms of organisational structure and staff 
profiles, state links figure prominently in AMRO, as can be expected given the use 
of ASEAN-led initiatives in consolidating state authority (see Chapter 2). In terms 
of AMRO’s new publication policy and its emphasis on promoting ‘accountability 
and visibility beyond the regional platform and solidify[ing] its presence as an 
international organisation’ (ASEAN+3 2017), AMRO surveillance can be viewed 
as an important tool for strengthening international credibility.   
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This account of the rise of regional surveillance illustrates how technical 
policy expertise is also embedded in political and relational knowledge, as 
reflected in the different narratives on the ‘East Asian model’ of economic growth 
that were outlined in Chapter 2. The emergence of AMRO as ‘an authoritative 
interpreter of economic and financial developments in the Asian region’ (Menon 
2012) is based on the region’s reading of the vindication of the East Asian 
approach during the global financial crisis; likewise, AMRO’s policy concerns and 
recommendations are also based on the lessons drawn by its analysts from the 
Asian financial crisis and the lingering IMF stigma. 
  Whereas AMRO’s objective of ‘assessing region-wide economic 
developments and emerging trends that may expose ASEAN+3 members to 
significant risks and vulnerabilities within and outside the ASEAN+3 region’ 
(AMRO 2017a, 14) puts emphasis on regional resilience and stability, the 
expansion of its surveillance scope bears similarities with the IMF in that AMRO 
also counts the assessment of spillovers and systemic risk as a priority. 
Macroprudential policies are a key component of systemic risk analysis and are 
also beset with similar methodological issues as discussed in Chapter 5. The 
following section examines these problems and their implications for external 
accountability.  
 
6.4 Macroprudential policy as a necessary part of the surveillance toolbox 
After the global financial crisis, academics and policymakers alike 
advocated the use of macroprudential policy as an important tool for analysing 
spillovers and containing systemic risk. The appeal seems straightforward: at its 
broadest application, macroprudential policy has been used to effectively refer 
to any policy that limits systemic risk or promotes financial stability. Intuitively 
then, it is easy to accept macroprudential policy as the appropriate next step for 
global financial governance after the crisis. Macroprudential policy is made even 
more attractive by its packaging as a technocratic regulatory project which seeks 
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to develop new technologies to manage financial markets. As both the IMF and 
AMRO put emphasis on tracing and measuring spillovers and systemic risk ,38  
macroprudential policy then seems like the perfect fit.  
However, as a burgeoning policy area, macroprudential policy is still very 
much a work in progress; hence, it is important that we heed the call of Borio to 
temper boldness with realism (Borio 2010). This section reviews the work thus 
far on macroprudential policy, paying particular attention to the need to 
contextualise expectations within its methodological limitations. Whilst many 
scholars have analysed these issues with great depth, there has yet to be any 
focus on the transboundary implications of macroprudential policy. As noted in 
Chapters 2 and 5, the spatial representations embedded in transboundary risk 
governance involve debates over representations of risk and the geographical 
boundaries and governance arrangements that emanate from such 
representations. This is a concern that merits greater attention in 
macroprudential policy than it currently receives, especially in light of the 
developments in regional and global surveillance.  
On the surface, developments in macroprudential policy seem promising as 
they appear to offer more concrete forms of monitoring and regulating systemic 
risk. However, a closer look suggests otherwise. Macroprudential policy as it 
currently stands is beset with issues similar to those plaguing the concept of 
systemic risk. It should be acknowledged at the onset that macroprudential 
policy is a new research and policy area, and that it did shed light on the 
contradictions prevalent in orthodox notions of financial markets. However, 
signs of a rapid and radical intellectual shift should be reconsidered as the 
continued emphasis on the feasibility of intensified technocratic control over 
finance is also problematic, especially since the project is rife with 
methodological issues.  
                                                        
38 Examples include the IMF Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy (IMF 2013c) and the Non-
binding Principles for Macroprudential Policies and Capital Flow Measures which was endorsed at 
the 18th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meeting (ASEAN+3 2015). 
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6.4.1 The story thus far 
The BIS had started using the term ‘macroprudential’ to refer to how 
problems concerning a particular institution can have disruptive systemic 
implications in the wider financial system as far back as 1979 (Clement 2010). 
The first reference to the term defines macroprudential policy as one that 
promotes ‘the safety and soundness of the broad financial system and payments 
mechanism’ (BIS 1986, cited in Clement 2010, 62). Whilst it does not seem to 
differ much from its current usage, the BIS used it with a very specific focus on 
derivatives markets and securitisation. As macroprudential policies took off and 
garnered wide support after the global financial crisis, the term lost its specificity 
and it began to be used in a myriad of ways. BIS officials have noted that 
‘macroprudential is an orientation or perspective of regulatory and supervisory 
arrangements’ (Borio 2010, 2); senior staff at the Bank of England even went 
further by referring to macroprudential policy as ‘a new ideology and a big idea’ 
(Haldane 2009, cited in Goodhart 2015, 281). 
  Macroprudential policy gained traction when it became clearer that the 
efficient market hypothesis that had dominated policy and regulatory thinking 
did not hold. An IEO assessment of IMF surveillance in the lead-up to the 2007 
crisis reveals that one of the main reasons why Fund staff failed to identify the 
build-up of risks is the prevalent groupthink that self-regulation and market 
discipline would be sufficient to ward off crises (IEO 2011b). Andrew Baker 
(2013) attributes this ideational shift to four key principles: (i) the fallacy of 
composition (the understanding that actions done as a response to individual 
incentives do not necessarily lead to positive aggregate results); (ii) 
procyclicality (credit supply rises when least needed); (iii) herding (deferment 
of individual judgement to others); and (iv) complex externalities (unintended 
consequences as a result of the interconnected nature of the global financial 
system). Whilst there seems to be more agreement with regard to the principles 
driving the rise of macroprudential policy, the jury is still out on the usage, 
implementation, and effectiveness of macroprudential policy. This does not come 
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as a surprise as there is also no consensus with regard to the core objectives of 
macroprudential policy. Gabriele Galati and Richhild Moessner (2013) note that 
there appears to be a general agreement that macroprudential policy aims to 
foster financial stability by limiting the costs and risks of systemic crises, with 
variations in the emphasis and language used. The various perspectives can be 
broadly framed in two ways: The first relates to how financial stability is 
understood in relation to the real economy whilst the second can be linked to 
how exactly financial stability should be defined in the first place. 
On the former, Bank of England Chief Economist Andrew Haldane splits the 
debate into purist financial stability objectives (‘to protect the financial system 
from swings and cycles in the real economy’ [A. Haldane 2013, 1]) and overt 
macroeconomic goals (‘to protect the real economy from swings and cycles in the 
financial system’ [A. Haldane 2013, 2]). He compares the case of the United 
States, wherein the use of stress tests shows that macroprudential tools were 
used ‘to provide power to the elbow of microprudential supervision’, with that 
of the United Kingdom, which has a ‘dual but ordered’ mandate in its use of 
macroprudential policy (A. Haldane 2013, 2). In the case of the United Kingdom, 
emphasis is put on financial resilience whilst output and employment 
stabilisation is seen as an important but secondary concern. The experience of 
the United Kingdom is also observed in other countries such as Brazil, Hong 
Kong, India, Israel, and South Korea. Closer to the other end of the spectrum, 
Baker (2013) gives greater priority to macroeconomic concerns. He defines 
macroprudential policy as a ‘system-wide top-down approach to regulation and 
financial stability that seeks to curb the credit cycle through countercyclical 
regulatory interventions by directing and sometimes directly constraining, the 
commercial activities of private institutions in an effort to restrain extreme 
movement in asset prices’ (A. Baker 2013, 418). The focus on the credit cycle 
suggests that his view of macroprudential policy gives precedence to 
macroeconomic goals—whilst it can be argued that the credit cycle is a feature 
178 
 
of the financial system, there are very strong empirical links between 
macroeconomic stability and credit cycles. 
East Asian countries dabbled in macroprudential policies earlier than most 
as the implementation of macroprudential policies started as a response to the 
1997 financial crisis. Whilst the region is similar to the United Kingdom in that 
financial resilience is made the priority, countries such as South Korea tend to 
turn to quantity-based instruments such as loan to income (LTI) and loan to 
value (LTV) ratios, as opposed to the United Kingdom’s preference for price-
based instruments such as countercyclical buffers. This is attributed to South 
Korea’s relative suspicion of unmitigated financial liberalisation, as well as a 
weaker tendency to view property prices as a source of growth and indicator of 
wealth (A. Baker 2015). There is evidence that macroprudential policy has been 
widely used in Asia over the last few years but a closer look at East Asian 
economies show that usage has been quite uneven particularly among the new 
ASEAN member states. An IMF study finds that housing-related measures (e.g., 
LTI ratios and higher risk weight requirements on mortgage loans) are popular 
in Asia but there are differences in policy preferences within the region. For 
example, advanced economies such as Hong Kong and Singapore resort to 
domestic prudential measures (e.g., LTV and debt-to-income ratios) whilst 
emerging Asia prefer a combination of macroprudential tools and monetary 
policy (e.g., reserve requirements on local currency deposits) (L. Zhang and Zoli 
2014). Amongst the new ASEAN member states, namely Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, there are still significant gaps in the 
availability of data for monitoring macroprudential indicators, such as capital 
adequacy and loan to deposit ratios (S. H. Lim and Reyes 2014). For most of these 
countries, volatile capital flows are not a major concern as they have a relatively 
low degree of financial integration with the region and the rest of the world and 
underdeveloped capital and financial markets. Nonetheless, it appears that they 
do recognise the utility of macroprudential tools as they are all in the process of 
setting up a national macroprudential surveillance system. 
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Parallels to the United Kingdom experience, or what Haldane calls the ‘Type 
2 mandate,’ can also be seen at the multilateral level. In this case, the mandate to 
work on macroprudential policy tools and frameworks was given jointly to the 
FSB, the IMF, and the BIS by the G-20. At their meeting in Seoul in November 
2010, the G-20 leaders emphasised that further work on macroprudential 
frameworks should be prioritised. The FSB, IMF, and BIS released a report the 
following year outlining the group’s position on various aspects of the 
macroprudential policy. In this document, the purpose of macroprudential policy 
is stated as the limitation of systemic risk, which is defined as the ‘the risk of 
widespread disruptions to the provision of financial services that have serious 
negative consequences for the economy’ (FSB, IMF, and BIS 2011, 3). This does 
not differ from the IMF’s official position as specified in the document Key Aspects 
of Macroprudential Policy (IMF 2013c). Here, the objective of macroprudential 
policy is ‘to increase the resilience of the financial system to aggregate systemic 
shocks by building buffers that absorb their impact and help maintain the ability 
of the financial system to provide credit to the economy’ (IMF 2013c, 12). Both 
statements appear to give primacy to the financial sector with the real economy 
as a secondary consequence, a consideration in so far as financial instability can 
have significant macroeconomic costs. It should be noted though that such an 
approach towards macroprudential policy is based on the premise that there is 
a clear separation between the financial sector and real economy, a problematic 
assumption as raised in Chapters 2 and 4.  
On defining financial stability, Galati and Moessner (2013) note that studies 
that set out to describe what constitutes financial stability either define it in 
terms of the resilience of the financial system to external shocks or in terms of 
the inherent risks and shocks within the financial system. In a similar literature 
survey conducted by the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System, the 
authors also comment on how there is no widespread agreement on what 
financial stability should look like, particularly as a goal of macroprudential 
policy. As indicated in Chapter 5, the committee points out that ‘the notion of 
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financial stability is often discussed in terms of the concept of systemic risk and 
its sources, for which again there is no consensus definition’ (Committee on the 
Global Financial System 2010, 21). The IMF also admits that arriving at an exact 
definition of systemic risk can be problematic; furthermore, the confusion is 
amplified as the Fund defines systemic risk in terms of financial instability.39  
Despite the widespread support for macroprudential policy, research to 
support its design and implementation is still very much in its early stages. Galati 
and Moessner (2013) list three reasons for the slow development of 
macroprudential research. Chief among these is the problem of defining the goal 
of macroprudential policy and what exactly constitutes financial stability, as 
previously discussed. Baker situates this as a broader issue of social purpose, in 
that there needs to be a clear and compelling articulation of a macrosocial 
ontology to guide the macroprudential project. This macrosocial ontology should 
elaborate on the design and goals of a good economic system, drawing not just 
from rational economic analysis but from ethical reasoning as well (A. Baker 
2018). Another reason is the inadequate understanding of the interactions 
between the financial sector and the macroeconomy, arguably one of the more 
important items on the long list of contested issues in the macroprudential policy 
debate.  Baker also tackles this issue in an article with Wesley Widmaier (A. Baker 
and Widmaier 2014), where they note emerging evidence that demonstrates the 
costs of excessive financialisation to wider macroeconomic performance.  
Consensus is also proving to be elusive in terms of the choice, calibration, 
and effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools. Differences in the choices of 
macroprudential tools are based on which dimension of risk is targeted and how 
the choice should be contingent on country- and context-specific factors. Risk has 
both time-series and cross-sectional dimensions. The former looks at the 
                                                        
39 There are instances wherein the objectives of macroprudential policy and characterisation of 
financial stability are clearer (see Rosengren 2011, cited in Kashyap, Tsomoco, and Vardoulakis 
2014, 22); however, this kind of clarity in the description of macroprudential policy and financial 
stability is a rare occurrence in the existing literature. In general, ambiguity and fluidity are the 
dominant features of the debate. 
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procyclicality of risk or its evolution over time. On the other hand, the cross-
sectional dimension of risk stresses the distribution of risk in the financial 
system at a particular point in time and the common exposures due to balance 
sheet interlinkages. An important point to note is that the relative importance of 
these risk dimensions and the usefulness of the chosen tools vary depending on 
country- and context-specific factors, including the degree of financial 
development, the type of balance sheet vulnerabilities or composition of 
liabilities, the exchange rate regime, and the prevailing sources of risk (FSB, IMF, 
and BIS 2011). Whilst the overall effectiveness of risk models embedded in 
macroprudential policies is still under investigation, many of the 
recommendations on the use of macroprudential policies draw from risk models 
to determine systemic risk surcharges and bank capital (Danielsson et al. 2016). 
Systemic risk models are thus fundamental to the design and implementation of 
macroprudential policies.     
6.4.2 Reconciling expectations with limitations 
Part of macroprudential policy’s appeal is in the absence of controversy 
surrounding the packaging of its non-traditional position. It may appear to 
challenge orthodox views and promote a fundamentally different understanding 
of the operation of the financial system but the policies advocated are ‘presented 
as a series of relatively narrow interventions driven by technical readings of 
systemic data patterns’ (A. Baker 2015, 21). Its highly technical nature and its 
strong backing by the central banking community lend macroprudential policy a 
credibility and authority that makes it readily accepted and politically non-
threatening. Hence, given the aforementioned importance of systemic risk 
models to macroprudential policy, there are significant parallels with the 
discussion in Chapter 4 on how the illusion of distance between the technical and 
political is constructed and maintained through methodological practices. As 
Baker argues, this has made it easier to overlook the methodological issues 
underlying the macroprudential policy project.  
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Firstly, there is a plethora of measurement problems. There is the ongoing 
puzzle of how financial stability (or instability) can be adequately measured and 
how (and whether) multiple measures of systemic risk can be reconciled. Borio 
also mentions the need to distinguish between financial instability and distress, 
wherein the latter is defined as an actual event whilst the former indicates that 
the conditions necessary to produce financial distress are sufficient. As for risk 
and contagion, measurements need to be able to distinguish between actual and 
perceived risk and contagion (Borio 2010; Borio and Drehmann 2009). Efforts to 
incorporate volatility are noted yet caution should still be exercised. Whilst it is 
expected that volatility would directly impact the probability of a crisis, volatility 
indicators (e.g., stock market volatility as measured through the Chicago Board 
of Options Exchange Volatility Index) still use historical data even though there 
is no guarantee that past relationships will hold in the future. Furthermore, 
evidence suggests that the level of volatility is not necessarily a reliable indicator 
but ‘unexpectedly high or low volatility’ would be a better measure. Analysis of 
such market-based data also shows that these indicators respond only after a 
crisis hits, therefore unable to be of much help when it is actually needed the 
most (Danielsson, Valenzuela, and Zer 2015). 
Secondly, there is the danger of overlooking interaction and unintended 
effects. Not only is there a chance that macroprudential policies will 
inadvertently interact with other monetary or fiscal policies, there are also 
potential interactions between other macroprudential tools (e.g., interactions 
between capital-based instruments, LTV tools, and capital requirements). Efforts 
to constrain credit growth and asset concentration may also lead to the build up 
of risk elsewhere in the system (Freixas, Laeven, and Peydró 2015). Unintended 
consequences can also result from the implementation of financial regulations. 
This occurs when the rules and regulations which were created ostensibly to 
limit the build-up of systemic risk end up having the opposite effect as multiple 
rules can unintentionally have incompatible objectives and may interact in 
unforeseen ways (Systemic Risk Centre 2013b). This is already a challenge when 
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managing domestic financial stability; it becomes even more complicated when 
dealing with transboundary spillovers and spillbacks. 40  For instance, the 
mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives through central counterparties (CCP) may 
have inadvertently increased risk exposure as the failure of one CCP can cause 
widespread damage to global financial stability (Genito 2017). There can also be 
cases wherein macroprudential policy can be counterproductive in the long run 
as financial actors learn to capture regulatory reform in their own operations as 
a way to circumvent intervention (e.g., Basel II) (Erturk et al. 2011). 
Thirdly, the first two problems obviously create modelling challenges. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, mathematical modelling involves struggling to find that 
elusive balance between precision and accuracy, and negotiating ontological and 
technical constraints. In relation to the discussion on knowledge limitations in 
Chapter 3, market and behavioural interactions are also not fully understood and 
therefore not adequately captured in existing models (if at all possible). Another 
important issue is the need for models to be both ‘thermometers’ and 
‘barometers’ in the sense that it is crucial that modellers and users both know 
whether the models are portraying current conditions or are giving a picture 
what may happen in the future. Time horizons are also a cause for concern as 
there are lag effects that need to be taken into consideration and their interaction 
effects must also be accounted for. A bigger danger involves the contradictory 
nature of certain indicators. In the case of systemic risk, tools which are effective 
in addressing the time dimension of risk are useless in terms of the cross-section 
dimension, and tools which are effective in the cross-section actually give the 
wrong signals in the time dimension (Borio and Drehmann 2009; Borio 2010).  
Finally, whilst much has been said regarding the complexities surrounding 
sectoral spillovers, the issue of transboundary spillovers has largely escaped 
both technocrats’ and academics’ attention. Granted, transboundary spillovers 
                                                        
40 Spillback is a new term used by the IMF and BIS to refer to situations wherein policies in one 
country spills over to others and creates a negative feedback effect on the source of the initial 
spillover (Caruana 2015; Lagarde 2016). 
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are now a crucial part of IMF and AMRO surveillance coverage. However, to the 
extent that experts have been critical and reflexive about the plethora of 
methodological uncertainties plaguing macroprudential policy, they have been 
silent on the methodological problems surrounding attempts to trace and 
measure transboundary spillovers.  
Despite all these issues, the technical appeal of macroprudential policy 
persists as it is able to acknowledge and accommodate methodological 
complexities and uncertainties. These are used to justify a broader scope for 
technical intervention, whilst also stressing macroprudential policy’s limitations 
in ensuring global financial stability. In a 2013 speech, IMF Financial Counsellor 
and Director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department José Viñals 
stressed that implementation of macroprudential policy ‘will rely on a process of 
trial and error for some time’ (Viñals 2013). Whilst Viñals is upfront about the 
IMF’s reservations about the effectiveness of macroprudential policy, this is 
portrayed as a temporary roadblock given the current state of knowledge about 
systemic risk and spillovers. After ‘a long learning process’, knowledge ‘gaps’ that 
impede existing risk analysis will be overcome. Yet the aforementioned list of 
methodological issues suggests that there are more fundamental knowledge 
limitations at play in efforts to assert technical control over global financial 
stability. Attempts to anticipate and capture volatility or unintended 
consequences in models for macroprudential policy may be futile at best, or 
damaging at worst.  
Furthermore, the persistence of the highly technical interventions in 
surveillance and macroprudential policy is compounded by the proliferation of 
overlapping surveillance frameworks. This is due to the rise of regional 
surveillance in East Asia. In this context, AMRO may appear as a site for 
addressing methodological complexities and uncertainties as it offers alternative 
surveillance toolkits. However, AMRO surveillance also adds to the 
methodological ambiguities and serves as a site for political manoeuvring given 
the region’s long-standing ambivalent relationship with the IMF.  As the scope of 
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both regional and global surveillance expands and the objectives of 
macroprudential policy remain both vague and ambitious, post-crisis 
surveillance has created more opportunities to widen the fictional gap between 
the technical and political, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
6.5 Conclusion  
With the introduction of the 2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision, the IMF 
was given the mandate to expand the scope of its surveillance analysis. The 2012 
Decision also gave the Fund the green light to make more overt assertions 
regarding the need for member countries to be mindful of the external impact of 
their domestic policy decisions. Whilst the principle of external accountability 
has driven the evolution of multilateral surveillance since its inception, the 
dynamics of policy justification under this principle has changed due to two 
particular changes in global economic governance that ensued as a result of the 
2007 crisis. The first is the rise of AMRO surveillance, which effectively gave East 
Asian countries their own platform for policy justification. The second is the 
emphasis on macroprudential policy, as it highlights the need to analyse 
spillovers and contain systemic risk. As a supervisory orientation, 
macroprudential policy does present an appealing agenda. However, as a 
technocratic regulatory project, its potential is diminished by the many 
methodological issues it faces.  
Chapter 6 argued that these two developments aggravate the difficulties of 
holding countries accountable to the wider international community. The 
regional and global surveillance frameworks described in this chapter serve to 
displace accountability in global economic governance in several ways. Firstly, 
the overlapping jurisdictions of IMF and AMRO surveillance and the divergence 
in their respective objectives create different interpretations of what contributes 
to global stability and regional resilience.  In theory, these two goals are not 
mutually exclusive; however, as previously discussed, surveillance findings are 
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also political statements on economic growth. Secondly, such political 
statements are made with two objectives in mind. In the case of East Asia, policy 
justification is made to strengthen domestic legitimacy and international 
credibility. However, the significance of these dual objectives is diminished due 
to the technical representation of surveillance findings. Thirdly, the technical 
representation of surveillance analysis is vital for it to be deemed legitimate, but 
the expertise required for such analysis is also underpinned by political and 
relational knowledge. For East Asia, this knowledge is largely shaped by its 
ambivalent relationship with the IMF. Finally, technical representation of 
economic policy remains de rigueur for it to be accepted in global economic 
governance. Yet, in so far as macroprudential policy is concerned, the validity of 
its technical representation is compromised by methodological complexities, 
uncertainties, and ambiguities.    
As seen from this chapter, we are witnessing the growth of an increasingly 
dense and complicated framework for monitoring spillovers and regulating 
systemic risk.  The importance of methodological issues has been recognised by 
academics and policymakers, yet these same concerns fuelled the further 
expansion of technical control over the financial system. Drawing from the 
arguments developed in Chapters 3 and 4, this chapter claims that the reasons 
for this expansion are explained by the mutually constitutive link between the 
technical and political, specified in the five points listed in the previous 








Systemic Risk and Spillover Analysis:  
Blurring and Reifying Dichotomies  
through Mathematical Models  
 
7.1 Introduction   
As ‘an imperfect understanding of macrofinancial linkages’ was deemed to 
be the ‘key reason that many institutions, including the Fund, did not foresee the 
crisis’ (IMF 2017a, 3), the expansion and proliferation of regional and global 
surveillance frameworks can be seen as just another step in the necessary 
pursuit of analytical rigour. Yet alongside this movement is also a growing 
realisation of the challenges of achieving a ‘perfect understanding’ of such 
linkages. Chapter 6 underscored the methodological complexities and 
uncertainties intrinsic in the macroprudential policy project. In light of these 
concerns, a subtle shift in tone can be gleaned from recent IMF surveillance 
documents, with its emphasis on the need for a pragmatic approach towards 
surveillance and policy advice. However, this pragmatism is not an indication of 
a weakening faith in mathematical models; rather, it is driven by the 
acknowledgement of ‘knowledge and data gaps’ and ‘the diversity of financial 
systems across countries and a wide range of transmission of channels’ (IMF 
2017a, 7). The IMF may concede41 ‘the difficulties of embedding the financial 
sector into traditional modelling frameworks’ (IMF 2017a, 29–30) but these 
problems are mainly framed in terms of knowledge gaps, as opposed to the more 
fundamental issue of knowledge limitations (see Chapter 3).  
                                                        
41 Similar realisations apply in the IMF’s work on fiscal policy as Fund staff acknowledge the need 
to account for issues such as non-linearities and hysteresis in models, as well as the difficulties 
of doing so (Clift 2018). 
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In response to these knowledge gaps, the IMF and AMRO have developed a 
range of mathematical models to underpin the spillover analysis in their 
respective surveillance reports. This chapter examines the specific case of 
spillover models used by the IMF, ADB, and AMRO after the global financial crisis, 
and how distinct geographical and sectoral categories persist alongside 
acknowledgement of deepening and growing interdependencies. As raised in 
Chapter 4, discrete geographical and sectoral categories are fundamental to the 
modelling process due to the ontological and technical constraints imposed by 
mathematical formalism. These constraints determine how ‘the economy’ is 
represented. The rationale for the use of such categories is also reflected in how 
various discursive strands on the causes of and solutions for economic growth 
and decline in East Asia (as outlined in Chapter 2) are underpinned by a 
discussion of whether the causes and solutions should be treated as internal or 
external, whether they lie in the real or financial sector, or whether they are 
within the domain of the state or the market.  
Chapters 5 and 6 showed how lessons from the global financial crisis 
challenged conventional understandings of these categories, as the depth and 
breadth of interdependencies and feedback loops were revealed. There has been 
some progress in understanding these links; however, these mechanisms cannot 
be properly translated into mathematical models because of ontological and 
technical constraints. As argued in Chapter 4, commitment to mathematical 
formalism imposes a range of constraints (e.g., with respect to ontological 
presuppositions concerning how ‘the economy’ works and how this can be 
translated into a working model) that determine how mainstream economists 
develop mathematical models. The inherent limitations of such models have 
been recognised, but this realisation has only led to the proliferation of various 
spillover models rather than a more cautious and critical approach towards their 
use. Chapter 7 draws on the discussions from these previous chapters to 
illustrate how they apply in IMF, ADB, and AMRO spillover models.   
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The chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 examines the specific case 
of spillover models used by the IMF, ADB, and AMRO, and traces how ontological 
and technical constraints are negotiated in the modelling process.  Section 7.3 
analyses how the results of these spillover models have been translated into 
surveillance reports and policy recommendations. Two case studies are covered 
to illustrate different implications for policy justification and external 
accountability, depending on how geographical and sectoral categories are 
represented in spillover models. To address the former, the discussion will focus 
on the 2017 IMF Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and the Pacific and the 2017 
ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook. As for the latter, the analysis will tackle 
deliberations on debt sustainability in China as reflected in the 2017 IMF Article 
IV Consultation report for China and the AMRO working paper High Corporate 
Debt in China: Macro and Sectoral Risk Assessments.   
It was argued in Chapter 4 that modelling involves making deliberate 
choices to comply with the demands of mathematical formalism. However, in the 
case of surveillance, these choices effectively also set the boundaries on what ‘the 
economy’ is and what the state has jurisdiction over. Hence, the spillover models 
covered in this chapter are both technical representations of and political 
statements on the sources of and risks to economic growth. In the first case study, 
the surveillance reports of IMF and AMRO offer different assessments of internal 
and external risks. In the second case study, IMF and AMRO offer similar 
evaluations of the level of debt in China, but provide diverging analyses as to 
whether this is public debt or not. Whilst these distinctions are important, it is 
important not lose sight of the broader implications in terms of policy 
justification and external accountability. As both sides foreground the technical 
credibility and authority of their respective analyses, any disagreements that 
may arise can be reduced to apolitical methodological differences. Taken 
separately, spillover models may help define accountability in global economic 
governance; however, the proliferation of overlapping surveillance frameworks 




7.2 Reasoning behind the design and development of spillover models  
With the introduction of the 2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision and the 
rise of macroprudential policy, both the IMF and ASEAN+3 (through ADB—one 
of the organisation’s key sources of technical assistance—and AMRO) are placing 
more importance on spillover analysis and are developing different 
mathematical models to support this. Official surveillance outputs do not 
necessarily draw from all these models. Nonetheless, many of the key findings 
and policy recommendations in the main surveillance reports of these 
institutions use one or several of the spillover models created by their staff. 
Examining the methodological details of these models as outlined in working 
papers and other supporting policy reports offers a glimpse into the rationale 
and process behind the development of spillover models in the IMF and AMRO.  
This section will review the various initiatives undertaken by the IMF, ADB, 
and AMRO to measure and monitor the transmission of shocks within and across 
sectors and across borders. A wide range of studies (albeit not exhaustive) is 
covered to analyse how their respective staff theorise and construct not just 
spillover models (when specifically labelled as such) but others which trace 
similar processes (e.g., financial contagion, business cycle synchronisation) as 
well. As methodological strengths and limitations are outlined and justified, the 
modelling choices give us insight into how modellers accommodate and navigate 
the complexities and uncertainties of accurately measuring and monitoring 
spillovers. Whilst the IMF, ADB, and AMRO have developed different models, 
there are still important similarities in how these institutions approach the 
modelling process and draw policy implications given their shared emphasis on 
mathematical formalism.  These underlying similarities will be unpacked to 
challenge the notion that the proliferation of different models is a sign that global 
economic governance is on the path towards normative fragmentation (Sohn 
2012). Rather, the packaging of such ‘fragmented norms’ as part of a broader 
apolitical technocratic project should be examined as an exercise in policy 
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justification represented in the internationally accepted form of mathematical 
models. 
7.2.1 Model overview  
In Chapter 3, we discussed the post-crisis debates on mathematical 
modelling and underscored how economists overcame any reservations they 
had about the ‘artificial realities’ depicted in their models, as long as these 
models are ‘useful tool[s] for whatever purposes there may be’ (Mäki 2001a, 10). 
This is the same logic underlying the modelling process in the IMF, ADB, and 
AMRO. The model overview that follows illustrates how the economists in these 
institutions acknowledge the shortcomings of their respective models and 
explain them as a necessary compromise given the strictures of mathematical 
formalism. However, whilst these models are united in their compliance with the 
standards for mathematical formalism, all spillover models are developed with a 
specific policy objective in mind.  
The aspects of the modelling process which are highlighted in the following 
discussion shed light on how IMF, ADB, and AMRO economists make particular 
methodological choices to address particular policy objectives. Within these 
parameters, model specifications reflect what these institutions (as represented 
by the economists) consider as harmful/harmless falsehoods and 
significant/insignificant truths (see Chapter 4).  
7.2.1.1 IMF models 
In light of the Fund’s mandate to ensure global economic and financial 
stability, IMF spillover models tend to focus on global interdependencies. This is 
clearly a daunting task considering the country coverage and transmission 
channels that fall within the IMF’s purview. Even as far back as the late 1980s, 
the IMF was already concerned about spillover effects, but this was mainly 
confined to the impact of shocks or policy changes in advanced economies. The 
MULTIMOD was built to support global analysis in the WEO and designed 
specifically to ‘generate plausible and consistent scenarios’ (Isard 2000, 7) 
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following pre-determined shocks or policy changes, such as a change in oil prices 
or a drop in capital flows. Earlier IMF documents outlining the design philosophy 
behind the modelling process emphasise the need to build models strictly for its 
intended use (e.g., either simulation or forecasting). The importance of 
‘translating policy questions in meaningful ways’ (Isard 2000, 22)—that is, policy 
questions should be defined as exogenous shocks—is also underscored. With 
this approach, the IMF acknowledged that different policy issues require the 
construction of different models. After the global financial crisis, it became clear 
that even the same policy issues can be analysed using different models (IMF 
2017a). Coupled with the realisation that models also needed to take into 
account cross-border and cross-sector linkages, the Fund’s analytical toolkit 
expanded even further with the addition of a growing list of models.  
One of the main models in the IMF’s current toolkit is the Global Economy 
Model (GEM). GEM was one of the forerunners of large-scale DSGE models based 
on a microeconomic framework with optimising consumers and producers. It 
incorporates nominal and real price and wage rigidities and combines it with 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand and full trade and financial integration. 
The synthesis of the microeconomic foundations with macroeconomic features 
‘creates a coherent theoretical structure for the analysis of global 
interdependencies, with clear mechanisms for shock transmission’ (Botman et 
al. 2007, 5) even at short-run quarterly intervals. The focus on developing a 
‘satisfactory initial representation of international macroeconomic 
interdependencies’ (Botman et al. 2007, 4) imposes certain theoretical 
limitations to ensure that the model does not become ‘too much of a “black box”’ 
(Bayoumi 2004, 24). In this case, the criticisms regarding DSGE model’s 
unrealistic theoretical foundations (as raised in Chapter 3) are overlooked to 
maintain clarity and coherence.  
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The Fund acknowledges the limitations given GEM’s theoretical structure. 
The choice between using a representative-agent42 framework and the inclusion 
of nominal and real rigidities was seen as a compromise between analysing 
short-term and long-term dynamics (Botman et al. 2007). The Global Integrated 
Monetary Fiscal Model (GIMF) was designed with these concerns in mind, as the 
IMF Research Department sought to build a multi-country macro model with 
overlapping-generations households43 instead of a representative agent facing 
an infinite planning horizon. Similar to GEM, GIMF is also a DSGE model but it 
differs with its intertemporal stock-flow accounting. This allows the depiction of 
a global economy where private saving behaviour and fiscal policy shape both 
short- and long-run conditions, and countries can be long-run creditors or 
debtors. Spillover channels are clearly articulated and determined by bilateral 
trade linkages, uncovered interest parity, and long-term trends in the world real 
interest rate (D. Anderson et al. 2013). Simulations using GIMF feature 
prominently in WEO scenario analyses as well as other IMF risk assessment 
studies since 2008. The model is also being used outside the walls of the IMF, 
with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority taking the lead in East Asia. Other 
central banks in the region have also indicated interest44 in using GIMF for their 
own policy simulations (Kumhof et al. 2010). Despite the GIMF’s wide use, it is 
important to point out the political significance of choosing between short- and 
                                                        
42 Representative agent models generate economic outcomes based on the optimising behaviour 
of a single individual assumed to have fixed and exogenous preferences. Possible variations 
between individual and aggregate behaviour are not accounted for (Janssen 2008). 
43 In an overlapping-generations framework, the economy is assumed to operate on an infinite 
horizon; choices made in the present-day hinge on expectations about future outcomes which are 
imposed exogenously (Janssen 2008). Models based on this framework are useful for capturing 
possible interactions between different generations, as well as for investigating changes in 
national debt. 
44 The reception of policy officials towards macroeconomic modelling in the IMF is varied. In 
general, those who collaborated with IMF staff to refine models to fix their respective countries’ 
particular context are more positive. Others have noted that ‘the models seemed to come out of 
a black box and they expressed concern that models have been used in ways that did fit their own 




long-term considerations, especially if the model is used by elected government 
officials to justify policy recommendations.  
Due to the incorporation of full structural detail and the tracking of bilateral 
trade flows of multiple goods, the number of countries that can be included in 
both GEM and GIMF is significantly restricted. The Flexible System of Global 
Models (FSGM) addresses this problem as each of its three core modules can 
accommodate 24 countries/regions (compared to six in GEM and GIMF).45 The 
creation of FSGM supports the G-20 Mutual Assessment Programme (Andrle et 
al. 2015), a framework for policy collaboration that seeks to assess whether the 
policies of G-20 countries are ‘collectively consistent with more sustainable and 
balanced trajectories for the global economy’ (G-20 2009). However, a wider 
country coverage also meant that FGSM has to sacrifice some of the structural 
details found in GEM and GIMF. Some of the microeconomic features (e.g., in 
terms of private consumption and investment) have been retained but other 
variables (e.g., trade, labour, and inflation) appear in the model as reduced-form 
components (Andrle et al. 2015). Whilst it is acknowledged that ‘giving up 
structure comes at cost in terms of economic tractability and coherence’ (Andrle 
et al. 2015, 4), IMF staff point out that this creates room to include more variety 
in the behaviour of each country than possible with the usual DSGE models. For 
purposes of G-20 objectives, allowing for wider country coverage and inclusion 
of country specificities were deemed as more important.  
However, none of the models discussed thus far account for feedback 
effects and nonlinearities. Conventional linear DSGE models are also ill-equipped 
at analysing macroprudential policies. As seen during the global financial crisis, 
interactions and nonlinearities between bank lending, asset prices, and the real 
economy can amplify the effects of shocks. DSGE models generally do not capture 
these nonlinearities, and do not consider the role of banks in propagating these 
                                                        
45 The G-20 module includes an individual block for each G-20 member and four more to cover 
the rest of the world. The euro area module consists of 11 euro area countries in addition to 13 
other blocks. The emerging markets module contains more blocks to represent different 
emerging market regions and economies (Andrle et al. 2015). 
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vulnerabilities (Benes, Kumhof, and Laxton 2014a). Whilst linearisation can be 
useful in tracing the impact of shocks (and related economic policies that 
respond to such shocks) under normal circumstances, it is unreliable during 
crisis periods (Benes, Kumhof, and Laxton 2014b). With these limitations in 
mind, the IMF designed the MAPMOD model as a small open economy with a 
representative competitive bank constituting the financial sector. The 
specification of the role of banks and balance sheets are central to MAPMOD; the 
model’s main feature (in contrast to conventional linear DSGE models) is its 
ability to integrate nonlinear and endogenous feedback mechanisms between 
borrower balance sheets, bank balance sheets, and the real economy. Spillovers 
from the financial to real sector as assumed to operate through credit expansions 
(Benes, Kumhof, and Laxton 2014a). As noted in Chapter 6, one important 
challenge in macroprudential policy is being able to differentiate between 
essentially sound and extreme asset price bubbles and credit expansions. 
MAPMOD was designed to address this issue, as well as explore alternative policy 
scenarios to both prevent and mitigate crises (Benes, Kumhof, and Laxton 
2014a). Whilst MAPMOD represents a step forward in macroprudential 
modelling, depicting the financial sector as a representative bank with specific 
links to the real economy means that the model still maintains that the real 
economy and financial sector are self-contained spheres despite evidence (e.g., 
based on East Asia’s experience) that this does not hold in reality.      
Furthermore, although the design of MAPMOD enables it to incorporate 
nonlinear and endogenous feedback mechanisms between the real and financial 
sectors, it does not account for cross-border spillovers. IMF staff also use event 
study analysis to trace cross-border macrofinanancial spillovers resulting from 
credit, liquidity, and sectoral macroprudential policy measures (Kang et al. 
2017). Event study analysis was also used in the 2013 IMF Spillover Report, 
which focuses on tracing the spillover effects of policy uncertainty in the United 
States and Europe (IMF 2013a). IMF staff recognise the difficulties of trying to 
quantify policy uncertainty: one involves the need to verify the direction of 
196 
 
causality (i.e., policy uncertainty in the United States and Europe is not a reaction 
to events elsewhere) and the second relates to disentangling the effects of policy 
uncertainty from broader economic uncertainty (e.g., changes in consumer or 
business confidence). However, there is no acknowledgement of the 
contradictions in pre-determining the form and source of uncertainty for 
modelling purposes, an issue that was raised in Chapters 3 and 6.  
IMF staff indicate that necessary tests and adjustments were undertaken to 
ensure that these issues are accounted for in the model. One such measure is the 
addition of control variables (e.g., volatility index). The impact of events was also 
studied in relation to changes in bond and equity flows in emerging markets and 
advanced economies. A Bayesian dynamic latent factor model was used to 
simultaneously estimate how 42 country factors, nine regional factors shared 
across aggregated groups, and a world factor common across all countries and 
regions (e.g., changes in global liquidity and risk conditions or specific crisis 
events) influence volatility in bond and equity flows (IMF 2013a). A different 
approach is taken in the 2015 IMF Spillover Report, which focuses on spillovers 
from monetary policies in systemic advanced economies. 46  In this case, the 
model seeks to measure the impact of good news of the growth prospects of 
systemic advanced economies on other countries. ‘Good news’ in this respect is 
estimated as ‘positive real shocks’,47 reflected as an increase in both bond yields 
and stock prices (IMF 2015, 8). These recent attempts to quantify the impact of 
events and ‘news’ suggest a growing recognition within the Fund that the 
complexities of spillover effects cannot be captured by relying solely on 
traditional macroeconomic and financial variables, yet the challenge of 
‘translating policy questions in meaningful ways’ usually means that these 
unconventional metrics still need to represented in conventional ways.  
                                                        
46 These include the euro area countries, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. 
47 The other factors included in the model are money shocks (‘an unanticipated tightening of 
monetary conditions’) and risk shocks (‘changes in risk appetite’ linked to shifts in the volatility 
index) (IMF 2015, p. 8). 
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7.2.1.2 ADB and AMRO models 
In East Asia, the modelling process puts less emphasis on theoretical 
coherence as compared to the IMF. Instead, the region’s concerns are determined 
by past experiences and the impact of external factors. This links to a previously 
mentioned point of divergence between ASEAN+3 and the IMF, in that the former 
is preoccupied with regional resilience and the latter with global stability. 
Specifically, AMRO’s mission is ‘to contribute to securing the economic and 
financial stability of the region through conducting macroeconomic surveillance 
and supporting the implementation of CMIM’ (AMRO 2017a, 2). Despite this 
difference, upholding the principle of external accountability in global economic 
governance means that these two goals intersect with each other. However, as 
mentioned previously, AMRO’s motivations for upholding external 
accountability are driven by concerns regarding domestic legitimacy and 
international credibility. 
ADB took the lead in the early years of regional surveillance so most of the 
models used to support surveillance were designed by ADB staff and consultants. 
With the establishment of the ASEAN Surveillance Process in 1998, ASEAN 
finance ministers tasked the Bank to provide training and capacity-building 
assistance to the ASEAN Secretariat and selected staff in the central banks and 
finance ministries of member countries. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
regional surveillance in East Asia puts a heavy emphasis on model-based 
economic analysis as it ‘allows an independent surveillance mechanism or unit 
to take a position on politically sensitive but critical issues and put them on the 
table for discussion’ (ADB 2009, 56). ADB highlights the importance of model-
based economic analysis in crisis situations as ‘this is where an objective 
approach that allows for independent verification can be extremely useful’ (ADB 
2009, 56). The objectivity seen to be inherent in mathematical models provides 
‘both the right incentive and protection to encourage the staff of the 
independence surveillance unit to be candid in raising issues that authorities 
may find uncomfortable discussing openly’ (ADB 2009, 57). Within the ADB, the 
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Regional Economic Monitoring Unit (REMU)48 spearheaded the first attempt at 
developing a regional surveillance model. The VIEWS model is based on the work 
of Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart49 (1999) and adapted to suit the 
regional context.  
ADB continues to support ASEAN+3 surveillance activities by assisting 
AMRO, particularly in terms of capacity building. The latest technical assistance 
project50 aims to widen the scope of VIEWS’ country and indicator coverage and 
upgrade the framework to VIEWS++. The upgrade was deemed necessary in light 
of the ‘new sources of vulnerabilities emerging after the global financial crisis’ 
(ADB 2016, 1). The project will ‘use recent lessons learned and knowledge 
obtained about channels of contagion in East and Southeast Asia to assist policy 
makers…to gain a holistic understanding of the propagation mechanisms that 
amplify pro-cyclicality and vulnerability’ (ADB 2016, 1). Whilst the project 
involves consultations with the BIS and the IMF, as well as an inception 
workshop to ‘discuss global-regional best practices and techniques on financial 
vulnerability assessments’ (ADB 2016, 3), relevance to the regional context is 
still emphasised as VIEWS++ is packaged as ‘a new regional surveillance and 
vulnerability assessment tool that will be better suited to the emerging economic 
and financial environment in Asia’ (ADB 2016, 4, italics added). Drawing on 
‘lessons learned and knowledge obtained about channels of contagion’ and 
ensuring that they are based on objective model-based analysis depicts regional 
surveillance as an apolitical exercise. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 6, it should be 
noted that the lessons learned from the global financial crisis are still understood 
                                                        
48 REMU was renamed the Office of Regional Economic Integration in 2005. It was subsequently 
subsumed under the former Economics Research Department, forming the Economic Research 
and Regional Cooperation Department in 2014. REMU was responsible for ‘monitoring of 
economic and sector policies, conditions of financial markets, and macroeconomic performance 
in a regional/subregional context’. Its terms of reference also states that ‘regional/subregional 
economic monitoring complements existing models of national and global economic surveillance’ 
(ADB 2009, 60). 
49 Kaminsky and Reinhart are academic economists affiliated with George Washington University 
and the University of Maryland, respectively.  
50  In February 2016, ADB launched the project ‘Enhancing Regional Capacity for Economic 
Surveillance and Financial Vulnerability Assessment’ (ADB 2016).  
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in terms of the lessons learned from the Asian financial crisis. Against this 
backdrop, the continued reference to the ‘IMF stigma’ belies the portrayal of 
regional surveillance in purely technical and apolitical terms.  
Nonetheless, East Asian surveillance remains wedded to model-based 
analysis, and the 2007 crisis spurred interest in spillover analysis within ADB 
and AMRO as it did in the IMF. One such study examines ‘the threat of financial 
contagion’ emanating from shock and volatility spillovers in bond markets in 
advanced economies to bond markets in emerging Asian economies (Azis et al. 
2013). The analysis is based on a multivariate Generalised Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedastic51 model, chosen due to its ability to accommodate 
irregularities usually found in financial time series data. The model is used to 
estimate direct and indirect spillovers from advanced economies to emerging 
Asian economies, as well as cross-Asian-market spillovers from the Japanese 
government bond market. For direct spillovers, the main sources of shocks were 
the US Treasury and US corporate bond markets for the Lehman collapse period, 
and German Bunds, EU composite government bonds, and European corporate 
bonds for the Eurozone debt crisis period. The same applies in the analysis of 
indirect spillovers but instead of just looking at the impact on local bond markets 
in emerging Asian economies, it also considers the impact on domestic equity, 
domestic currency, and domestic money markets. The decision to include 
indirect spillovers in the study was borne out of the recognition of interactions 
and feedback mechanisms during crisis periods. However, the analysis 
disregards indirect cross-border transmission as it only looks at transmission 
across domestic asset markets. In this study, the focus on specific advanced 
economies as sources of shock and volatility reflects East Asia’s concerns about 
securing regional growth and resilience against global risks, whilst dismissing 
                                                        
51  A Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic model is a popular tool for 
analysing and forecasting volatility in financial time series (Fryzlewicz 2007). This econometric 
model contains a more flexible structure that allows conditional variance to vary across time 
based on past errors (Bolleslev 1986). 
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the growing impact of emerging economies (especially China) on global 
conditions (Mwase et al. 2016).  
Another ADB study approaches spillover analysis through the concept of 
‘decoupling’. The decoupling debate that emerged after the global financial crisis 
offered different views as to whether emerging economies were still dependent 
on US markets for their own economic growth (The Economist 2009a). ADB staff 
examined the validity of the decoupling hypothesis by measuring 
macroeconomic interdependence between emerging East Asia 52  and G-3 
economies (European Union, Japan, and the United States). Findings were used 
to inform two policy questions:  
‘In a narrow setting, it is a question of whether or not the regional economy 
will maintain strong growth regardless of the US slowdown in particular. 
In a broader sense, it is about the emergence of regional economic 
dynamics in emerging East Asia that is independent of economic swings in 
major industrial countries’ (C.-Y. Park 2017, 1). 
A combination of different quantitative methods are employed to address 
these questions, including export decomposition, bilateral business cycle 
correlations, VAR, Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC), and variance 
decomposition. Trade, investment, and financial linkages are analysed using a 
VAR model (see Chapter 3 for overview of VAR). This model estimates the impact 
of different structural shocks (e.g., global financial risk, US output, Chinese output 
[used to represent a regional shock], and global trade volume growth) on each 
country’s output. These shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated although no 
empirical justifications are offered; the ordering of the variables (i.e., the 
sequencing of the effects which are taken to be linear) are ‘regarded as a natural 
one’ (C.-Y. Park 2017, 24). Whilst these assumptions are clearly debatable—
especially considering the impact changes in Chinese output have on the global 
economy (Mwase et al. 2016)—working within the constraints of VAR models 
                                                        
52  The study defines emerging East Asia as China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand (Park 2017). 
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mean that such flawed assumptions are unavoidable due to the need to adhere 
to modelling restrictions.   
Financial linkages are examined using the DCC model on equity and bond 
market returns, a new method that is capable of ‘simultaneous modelling of 
variances and conditional correlations of several series’ (C.-Y. Park 2017, 15). 
The results allow users to ‘infer how the region’s financial markets move in 
relation to financial fluctuations in these systemic countries’ (C.-Y. Park 2017, 
15). Variance decomposition is used to determine the extent to which regional 
or global shocks can explain the variance in emerging East Asia’s equity and bond 
market returns. The model for this is constructed such that the returns of 
individual equity (bond) markets reflect an expected and unexpected 
component. The error terms from the former constitute the latter, which is then 
disaggregated into a local shock, a response to regional news, and a response to 
global news. The findings from this study formed the basis of the financial 
spillovers analysis of the ADB Asian Economic Integration Report 2017.53 Whilst 
this model is sophisticated in its attempts to distinguish between local, regional, 
and global factors, the issue here is that there is no consideration of the 
possibility that there are links between these three categories.  
The ability of VAR models to capture the evolution and transmission of 
shocks along multiple time series makes it a useful model for many of the policy 
issues tackled by the ADB (including productivity shocks and food and 
commodity prices). However, as with all other models, VAR has methodological 
limitations particularly in terms of analysing global interdependencies within a 
                                                        
53 Whilst ADB reports served as the main output of regional surveillance since it began in East 
Asia, ADB is slowly making efforts to create more specialised reports, possibly to make room for 
AMRO’s own surveillance reports. Since 2015, the Bank has been publishing the Asian Economic 
Integration Report, which focuses on the ‘progress of Asian governments’ efforts to integrate 
their economies and improve cooperation on a variety of levels’ (ADB 2017). Aside from trade 




structural framework.54 This can be seen as an acceptable shortcoming from the 
perspective of East Asian policymakers as their focus is not on global 
interdependencies but on the transmission of shocks to regional economies.  
ADB staff now also use the global VAR (GVAR) in response to these 
constraints. One such study uses a GVAR model to forecast key macroeconomic 
variables (e.g., real GDP, inflation, and short-term interest rates) of the ASEAN-
555 countries given the effects of three external shocks (proxied by changes in US 
real equity prices, US interest rates, and world commodity prices) (Han and Ng 
2011). The purpose of this study was not to address a particular policy issue but 
to demonstrate the accuracy of GVAR forecasts compared to those generated by 
VAR models. The appeal of GVAR also reached AMRO as it used a similar model 
in the spillover analysis of its first regional surveillance report. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following section.  
7.2.2 Different models, similar approach 
This survey of IMF and ADB/AMRO spillover models shows how the 
economists affiliated with these institutions deliberate over their 
methodological choices and choose between deleterious/innocuous falsehoods 
and relevant/irrelevant truths. As IMF and ADB/AMRO economists must comply 
with the requirements of mathematical formalism, their approach towards 
dealing with the ontological and technological constraints of modelling is driven 
by their respective policy objectives, which consequently determine 
‘permissible’ falsehoods and ‘insignificant’ truths. In light of IMF’s mandate and 
the lessons East Asian policymakers have drawn from the region’s experience 
with financial crises, the points of divergence (e.g., focus on global 
interdependencies in the case of the Fund, concern regarding impact of external 
                                                        
54 A structural VAR model is one that is constrained by specific economic structures, rendering it 
more sensitive to changes in theoretical assumptions and parameter estimates (Han and Ng 
2011). 
55  These are the original ASEAN member countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and the Philippines.  
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factors in the case of East Asia) that were outlined above are expected. However, 
it is important not to dismiss the areas of convergence. 
As mentioned earlier, one of the objectives driving regional surveillance in 
East Asia is the need to develop surveillance tools that are ‘better suited to the 
emerging economic and financial environment in Asia’ (ADB 2016, 4). This 
suggests a departure from IMF surveillance tools; the different models outlined 
above appear to support this. However, a closer look reveals notable overlaps 
between the models used by IMF and ADB and AMRO staff. One of IMF’s early 
warning system models is also based on the work of Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(Berg, Borensztein, and Pattillo 2004), the same economists who developed the 
model ADB’s VIEWS is drawn from. A more recent example can be seen in the 
financial GVAR model used by AMRO as this model is based on an IMF working 
paper (Chen et al. 2010). 
 This should not come as a surprise given the discussion of the modelling 
process presented in Chapter 4. The commonalities in theoretical and academic 
influences show how IMF and ASEAN+3 economists all belong to the same closed 
community of experts, where the terms of dialogue and quality of work are 
determined by adherence to mathematical formalism. As a result, similarities can 
be observed not just in the choice of models but also in the underlying theoretical 
assumptions of these models; its treatment of linkages and interdependencies; 
its approach towards the trade-off between precision and accuracy; and its 
methods for quantifying surprises, volatility, and uncertainty.  
On the underlying theoretical assumptions of the cited models, both IMF 
and ADB/AMRO models can be criticised on the grounds that their models fall 
significantly short of accurately representing reality. Whilst proponents of such 
models argue that incorporating microeconomic foundations gives the model 
structural coherence, basing macroeconomic models on microeconomic 
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foundations is also problematic 56  as the latter is biased towards individual 
interests instead of public welfare (Best and Widmaier 2006). Watson (2014) 
also criticises DSGE as it promotes a political narrative that supports a particular 
imaginary or interpretation of the economy—one that provides little or no role 
for the government. In the case of GEM, IMF staff recognise some of these issues 
as they note that the assumption of a representative agent constrains the model 
in terms of analysing income inequalities (Bayoumi 2004). The concern is this 
critical shortcoming is sacrificed as they put more weight on ‘the need for 
theoretical consistency’ (Bayoumi 2004, 9).  
On the other hand, ADB and AMRO’s preference for VAR can also be 
criticised as these models are perceived as atheoretical, as previously mentioned 
in Chapter 3. VAR models emerged as a response to scepticism about the validity 
of a priori theoretical restrictions embedded in general equilibrium and rational 
expectations modelling. In certain applications, such models have been useful 
but in terms of impulse response (shock transmission) analysis and variance 
decomposition, identifying conditional correlations rely on causal ordering. This 
can be justified ‘under a predeterminedness assumption which is unstable in the 
absence of prior restrictions derived from theory’ (Cooley and Leroy 1985, 301). 
Even when making a distinction between structural or non-structural VAR 
models (where the ADB GVAR is purportedly somewhere in between): 
‘…whether VAR models are interpreted as structural or non-structural, 
which given the looseness of exposition, is largely a matter of the personal 
preference of the reader. If the models are interpreted as structural… the 
restrictions on error distributions adopted in atheoretical 
macroeconometrics are not arbitrary renormalisations, but prior 
                                                        
56  With respect to policy implications, there is also a lack of agreement on the relationship 
between microprudential and macroprudential policy. For example, there is no clear agreement 
on whether macroprudential policy should be considered as a separate policy strand in itself  
(FSB, IMF, and BIS 2011). There are those who believe that the variations are mostly semantic as 
long as prudential policy frameworks explicitly target systemic risk. Even Borio holds that ‘the 
term “macroprudential” does not refer so much to a new policy but to an intellectual orientation 
or lens through which the task of achieving financial stability is understood’ (Borio 2014, 31).  
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identifying restrictions. As such, they require justification from theory. 
Failing such justification (and it is seldom offered), the conclusions are 
equally without support’ (Cooley and Leroy 1985, 307). 
Despite ADB staff’s claim that their understanding of the causal ordering of 
shock transmission should be ‘regarded as a natural one’ (C.-Y. Park 2017, 24), 
assuming a linear transmission of shocks from US output, global volatility, global 
trade volume, to Chinese output can be construed as a political view of the 
sources of risk in the global economy. 
Theoretical assumptions are also important in relation to how models 
represent linkages and interdependencies—across sectoral (state vs. market, 
real vs. financial) and geographic (internal vs. external, local/regional vs. global) 
categories—as these have implications in terms of the conclusions drawn 
regarding causality. As outlined in Chapter 2, these technical categories are 
driven by political distinctions that have shaped how such categories are 
perceived in East Asia. At the same time, whilst nonlinear models are now being 
used and feedback effects incorporated in certain models, technological 
constraints such as modelling practicalities create restrictions in terms of how 
these complex mechanisms can be operationalised. Moreover, as raised in 
Chapter 6, these mechanisms are still poorly understood; the need to account for 
unintended consequences also suggests that completely capturing such 
mechanisms is just not possible despite the pretence that new models are 
capable of going so.  
These issues have important consequences in terms of how the IMF and 
ADB/AMRO navigate the trade-offs between precision and accuracy As 
repeatedly reiterated throughout this thesis, such compromises are a 
fundamental part of the modelling process. Nonetheless, the approach both sides 
have taken in constructing their respective models (e.g., prioritising ‘theoretical 
consistency’ whilst dismissing income inequality in the case of the IMF) and 
define certain variables (e.g., how ‘regional’ and ‘global’ shocks are defined by the 
ADB) are political as well. The trade-off between precision and accuracy is also 
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reflected in the methods employed to incorporate variables such as uncertainty, 
volatility, and surprises. Instead of accepting fundamental knowledge 
limitations, these spillover models give the impression that such nebulous 
indicators can be accurately accounted for. At the same time, the nature of 
modelling means that economists can also justify their portrayal of artificial 
realities as an inevitable outcome of complying with mathematical formalism. 
That said, these are problems that plague model-based analysis in general. 
The issue in this context is not whether one side offers a better model over the 
other; the relative usefulness of these models is not being evaluated here. Rather, 
the main point of interest is how both the IMF and AMRO can use their respective 
model-based analyses to validate the ‘objectivity’ of their politically-laden policy 
recommendations, whilst using the same models to justify the limitations of their 
findings. The political dimensions of these issues are concealed as the 
sophistication and the technical details of these models are in the foreground. 
The spillover models are portrayed to be more effective at capturing 
complexities and uncertainties (relative to pre-crisis models) but this will always 
be incomplete given the nature and objectives of economic modelling, as well as 
the fundamental limitations of knowledge of the economy and financial markets.  
 
7.3 Representing ‘the economy’ in IMF and AMRO surveillance reports 
The direct impact of financial and macroeconomic surveillance is mixed 
(IEO 2006, 2011b) and has yet to be verified (in the case of AMRO). Nonetheless, 
due to the endurance of the principle of external accountability, the relevance of 
surveillance continues as a platform for policy justification to the international 
community. As spillover analysis makes an implicit statement about the sources 
and recipients of risk, it can be interpreted as a strong message in this respect, 
especially when presented in official surveillance documents. When the AMRO 
reports are analysed against their IMF counterparts, we can also see echoes of 
the themes explored in Chapter 2. In particular, the spillover models featured in 
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these reports illustrate how the use and inaccurate portrayal of geographical and 
sectoral categories define acceptable accounts of economic processes and 
appropriate policy responses, whilst also validating the legitimacy of the 
authorities tasked to govern particular spaces.  Hence, spillover models are a 
useful resource as they provide technical and purportedly apolitical support for 
policy justification. When overlapping spillover models emerge—as is currently 
the case with the expansion of regional and global surveillance frameworks—
they facilitate the displacement of accountability in the maintenance of global 
economic and financial stability.  
Whilst AMRO’s operations started in 2011, it was only in 2017 when it 
started making its surveillance outputs public. As AMRO begins to assert itself as 
an independent regional surveillance unit, its work will inevitably overlap with 
the IMF’s. Two documents—the 2017 ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook and 
the working paper High Corporate Debt in China: Macro and Sectoral Risk 
Assessments—offer a glimpse into how AMRO complements and contradicts IMF 
surveillance. This section illustrates how IMF and AMRO’s model-based spillover 
analyses can define and displace accountability in these two cases. The first case 
focuses on the implications of the debate between IMF and AMRO in terms of 
geographical categories and the attendant consequences for local/regional vs. 
global accountability. The second examines the repercussions of the debate in 
terms of sectoral categories and the concomitant ramifications for state 
accountability. 
7.3.1 Geographical spillover analysis: global vs. regional surveillance reports 
IMF’s area departments produce Regional Economic Outlook reports twice 
a year to provide a more detailed analysis of the state of the five major regional 
economies in the world. 57  A review of the highlights and policy 
recommendations and spillover analysis of the 2017 IMF Regional Economic 
Outlook for Asia and the Pacific and the 2017 ASEAN+3 Regional Economic 
                                                        
57 The five regional groupings are Asia and the Pacific; Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe; 
Middle East and Central Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa; and the Western Hemisphere. 
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Outlook reveals some insights into how surveillance reports can define and 
displace accountability. Whilst the geographical coverage of these reports is not 
exactly the same, the significance of East Asian economies means that the IMF 
report devotes substantial analysis to the region and also includes a spillover 
model specifically for the ASEAN-5 countries.   
The 2017 IMF Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and the Pacific gives the 
same level of consideration to the short- and medium-term challenges shaping 
the region’s economic prospects. In terms of the former, the risks emanating 
from global uncertainty are recognised as the IMF warns:  
‘In the near term, tighter global financial conditions could trigger capital 
flow volatility, which could interact with and exacerbate balance sheet 
weaknesses in a number of economies. More inward-looking policies in 
advanced economies would significantly impact Asia, given the region’s 
trade openness. A bumpier-than-expected transition in China would also 
have large spillovers’ (IMF 2017d, xiii). 
As for medium-term challenges, two chapters review the structural issues 
facing the region, specifically the aging population and slow productivity growth. 
Policy recommendations call for both demand support and structural reforms ‘to 
help reduce external imbalances, mitigate domestic and external vulnerabilities, 
and promote faster and more inclusive growth’ (IMF 2017d, xiv) such as labour 
market and pension system reforms. The IMF report also reiterates its position 
on exchange rate flexibility, arguing that it ‘should generally remain the main 
shock absorber against a sudden tightening in global financial conditions or a 
shift toward protectionism in major trading partners’ (IMF 2017d, xiv). This 
aligns with the general tone of the 2017 Global Financial Stability Report which 
calls for member countries ‘to get the policy mix right…whilst avoiding politically 
expedient but ultimately inward-looking policies’ (IMF 2017b, x). In particular, 
the IMF Regional Economic Outlook states that ‘recent episodes of financial 
volatility have shown that even large reserve buffers can be insufficient to arrest 
such volatility’ (IMF 2017d, 24). This is tantamount to saying that East Asia’s 
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reliance on self-help mechanisms to preserve financial stability are misguided 
and will not suffice. The level of reserve buffers in the region remains a 
contentious issue as the Fund’s ASEAN-5 Cluster Report states:  
‘The reserve buffers built up during the great moderation and UMP 
[unconventional monetary policies, specifically quantitative easing by the 
Federal Reserve] period were also drawn down in some cases close to the 
lower bound of the Fund’s reserve adequacy metric range, albeit with a 
number of countries continuing to maintain reserves above the range, at 
significant quasi-fiscal costs’ (IMF 2016a, 3).  
The IMF’s approach to spillover analysis supports this policy narrative of 
the importance of internal structural reform. The report uses a principal 
component model to determine the global variables that determine the 
variations in a set of domestic financial indicators and shows that, whilst 
‘domestic financial conditions in the ASEAN-5 economies are sensitive to global 
factors’ (IMF 2017d, 29), domestic factors still play a significant role. Analysis of 
the determinants of sovereign bond yields in the ASEAN-5 before and after US 
UMP presents evidence that around 50-70% can be explained by domestic 
factors, with the exception of Singapore (40% both pre- and post-UMP) and 
Malaysia (40% but only pre-UMP).  
The principal component model is based on a paper by Silvia Miranda-
Agrippino and Hélène Rey58, which interestingly begins with the line ‘[w]e are 
not wedded to a model’ (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2012, 3). The authors draw 
from several other models with different methodological approaches. Similar to 
the other IMF models discussed above, there are certain problematic features 
(e.g., assumption of procyclicality of leveraged financial intermediaries’ balance 
sheets without accounting for emerging countercyclical measures and the 
                                                        
58 Miranda-Agrippino and Rey were colleagues at the London Business School at the time their 
paper was released. Whilst Miranda-Agrippino has no affiliations with the IMF, Rey has a long 
history of working the Fund having worked as a Resident Scholar and participating in several 
lectures and conferences organised by the IMF (Rey 2018). 
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uncertainty regarding how banks will actually respond to these new 
regulations). In terms of accounting for common (regional or global) and 
idiosyncratic (local) factors, the two are estimated assuming that there is some 
degree of autocorrelation (i.e., the similarity between two variables are related 
to the time lag between them). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine 
whether this adequately captures feedback effects given the complex linkages 
and interdependencies between countries in the global economy. The more 
salient point is that these technicalities are obscured when policy findings 
highlight that ASEAN-5 economies are sensitive to global factors but domestic 
factors play a more significant role. Hence, IMF surveillance findings argue that 
the onus is on regional policymakers to enact politically-sensitive internal 
structural reforms, for both internal (to ensure continued growth and stability) 
and external reasons (to minimise external balances).59 
 This contrasts with the analysis presented in the ASEAN+3 Regional 
Economic Outlook. The foreword by AMRO Chief Economic Hoe Ee Khor is 
forthright about the report’s focus on external shocks as he states: 
‘[W]e have chosen to focus on how policymakers in the region have rebuilt 
buffers and policy foundations for economic growth after the AFC [Asian 
financial crisis] that enabled them to weather the ramifications of the 
subsequent GFC [global financial crisis]. These include developing more 
robust monetary policy frameworks against external shocks; undertaking 
financial, fiscal, and structural reforms; and the adoption of 
macroprudential measures to deal with financial vulnerabilities where 
appropriate…Mindful of the sharp increase in capital flow volatility and its 
destabilising effects, the ASEAN+3 members have come together to develop 
a regional safety net supported by enhanced macroeconomic surveillance 
                                                        
59 It is worth noting that IMF’s indication of both internal and external consequences differs from 
earlier reports. IEO commissioned a review of the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook reports 
between 2003 and 2009. In his assessment of the reports prepared by the Asia-Pacific 
Department, Montiel argues that the IMF failed to make a clear case to support the 
recommendations such that it addressed the self-interest of the Asian countries themselves, 
rather than merely highlighting the benefits in a global context (Montiel 2011). 
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which together with their own strengthened domestic policy frameworks 
and buffers, will improve resilience against shocks and allow their 
economies to sustain relatively strong growth’ (AMRO 2017b, 3). 
The AMRO report recognises global policy uncertainties (with more direct 
references to the Trump administration and Brexit) similar to those mentioned 
in the IMF report; however, the focus is on the spillovers of these uncertainties 
to the ASEAN+3 economies through trade and financial channels. As befits the 
thematic focus on the 20th anniversary of the Asian financial crisis, the AMRO 
reports also underscores the relevance of the lessons from the 1997 crisis given 
the prevailing global uncertainties. One such lesson is ‘the need for a more 
flexible and responsive policy framework domestically, and also greater financial 
cooperation within the region to deal with external shocks’ (AMRO 2017b, 5). 
Structural reform is given relatively limited consideration; to the extent that it is 
analysed, its urgency is framed in the context of the external environment (i.e., 
the tapering growth of global trade) and the limitations of short-term demand 
management policies. On the subject of reserve buffers, whilst the report 
concedes that they: 
 ‘are high by conventional metrics… these buffers should be maintained in 
the face of potential capital outflow pressures… exchange range flexibility 
combined with judicious intervention to moderate the pace of adjustment 
would continue to be the appropriate response to risks of external shocks’ 
(AMRO 2017b, 5, italics added). 
As for AMRO’s own spillover analysis, it uses a GVAR model to illustrate the 
impact of real and financial shocks from the United States, China, and Japan on 
emerging ASEAN+3 economies. The GVAR model for real shocks estimates the 
scale and transmission of unexpected shocks from these three countries in terms 
of short-term interest rates, imports, and industrial production growth rates. The 
GVAR model for financial shocks focuses on short-term interest rates, equity 
prices, and bank/corporate distress from the same countries plus the United 
Kingdom, but the coverage of the recipient countries excludes Brunei, Laos, and 
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Myanmar because of data unavailability. As ‘foreign’ variables are derived based 
on the other country’s domestic variables, the AMRO GVAR model ‘can describe 
the interactions of variables not only within a country but also between 
countries’ (AMRO 2017b, 63). Whilst the results show that real and financial 
shocks from all three countries have significant repercussions for regional 
economies (with real shocks from Japan being less significant), it does not make 
any specific reference to the role of domestic conditions—a sensitive topic given 
ASEAN’s norm of non-interference—as done by the IMF. The concern here is 
similar to the one raised earlier in reference to the IMF. The AMRO GVAR model 
assumes a certain ordering of causality when estimating these interactions 
between variables. Furthermore, it is also not clear that the wide network of not 
just financial and economic but also regulatory, technical, and political feedback 
loops can be captured (if ever) in the model.  
Separately, IMF and AMRO spillover models define accountability as they 
perpetuate the domestic vs. global/internal vs. external divide in tracing sources 
of systemic risk, and consequently also drawing lines for causality and 
accountability. However, once the IMF and AMRO surveillance reports are 
interpreted as parallel accounts, their respective analyses displace 
accountability. This is because both the IMF and AMRO do not give explicit 
consideration to the possibility of feedback effects not captured in their 
respective spillover models in their discussion of policy recommendations. 
Despite indications of greater reflexivity amongst economists about the 
complexities and uncertainties in the global economy, the IMF’s status as the 
foremost technical authority on economic policy also means that reservations 
need to be moderated lest they compromise perceptions of IMF expertise. It is 
likely that the same concerns apply on the AMRO side, as East Asia is keen to 
assert its own technical expertise in matters of global economic governance. This 
is further aggravated by the need to package spillover analyses in mathematical 
models, as the rules for reasoning and representation in such models do not 
allow for the full incorporation of feedback effects as well.   
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7.3.2 Sectoral spillover analysis: IMF Article IV report vs. AMRO thematic study 
The preoccupation of post-crisis surveillance on interdependencies and 
feedback effects is not confined to spillovers across territorial boundaries; as 
stressed in the previous discussion on MAPMOD (and in greater detail in Chapter 
5), spillover analysis is also increasingly concerned with incorporating the 
financial sector in models to better understand and monitor transmission 
mechanisms between the real and financial sectors.  
One important link is a country’s capacity to fund its policy objectives and 
manage any resulting debt, without resorting to disruptive and damaging 
adjustments that could jeopardise the country’s stability. IMF and AMRO 
surveillance also covers such issues through their respective debt sustainability 
analyses. In this context, state boundaries and jurisdiction are still points of 
contention (similar to the first case) although the focus shifts from geographical 
to sectoral boundaries. Setting aside the theoretical and methodological 
implications of approaching the real/financial sectors and state/market divide 
as separate spheres, recall the discussion in Chapter 2 regarding the distinct and 
crucial role played by various East Asian states in mobilising funds into 
particular industries viewed as critical to economic growth. In the case of China, 
the symbiotic relationship between China’s real and financial sectors is 
manifested in the way the Chinese government maintains tight control over the 
financial sector to use it as a tool for industrial development and macroeconomic 
policy (Gruin 2013). 
The following discussion uses the case of debt sustainability in China to 
assess how sectoral spillovers are also being debated by the IMF and AMRO. The 
dichotomies being challenged in this case relate to real vs. financial sector and 
state vs. market categories. Granted, this is not the first time China and the IMF 
disagreed on surveillance methodology (see Chapter 6)—what is new in this 
instance is the involvement of AMRO in the discussion. Any conflict between the 
Chinese government and the IMF can be easily seen as an overt political matter. 
As AMRO is being touted as an independent regional surveillance unit, its views 
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in this matter can be presented as technical justification for the official Chinese 
position. It has already been argued that there are convincing reasons to doubt 
this independence, as pointed out in Chapter 6. Yet as AMRO’s analysis both 
converges and diverges from the IMF’s, such interpretations need to be further 
examined. 
The 2017 Article IV Consultation report for China notes the country’s 
strong growth momentum but warns that ‘this comes at the cost of further large 
and continuous increases in private and public debt, and thus increasing 
downside risks in the medium term’ (IMF 2017c, 1). This finding is based on the 
IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis, which argues for the need to create an 
indicator called ‘augmented debt’ due to ‘uncertainty about the perimeter of 
general government’ (IMF 2017c, 51). The narrow definition of public debt in 
China covers central government debt and ‘on-budget’ local government debt as 
defined by officials. IMF staff calculate augmented debt using a broader definition 
that also includes other types of local government funds, ‘including off-budget 
liabilities (explicit or contingent) borrowed by Local Government Financing 
Vehicles (LGFVs) via bank loans, bonds, trust loans, and other funding sources… 
debt of government-guided funds and special construction funds, whose 
activities are considered quasi-fiscal and are new additions to this Article IV’ 
(IMF 2017c, 51). If assessed based on the narrow definition, Chinese government 
debt is gradually increasing but still moderate (at 37% of GDP in 2016). However, 
the IMF argues that augmented debt (significantly higher at 62% of GDP in 2016) 
‘provides a more accurate estimate of the fiscal impulse and potential debt 
burden on public finances’ (IMF 2017c, 22–23) as LGFVs ‘financed spending that 
appeared to be mostly non-market based with uncertain returns and by entities 
that are largely government-controlled’ (IMF 2017c, 23). On this basis, China’s 
public debt is growing rapidly and poses significant risks if not consolidated 
soon.  
Unsurprisingly, these findings were met with strong opposition from China. 
The response from relevant IMF directors contend that: 
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‘The concept and estimation of “augmented” debt and deficit may be a 
prudent approach from staff’s perspective, but is highly debatable under 
China’s circumstance… We have a different view on the “augmented” 
concept in the staff report, which prefers to define government debt on the 
purpose of the borrowing and presumed government backup, rather than 
on actual and legal repayment liabilities. Staff’s approach to debt analysis 
is useful in keeping us vigilant to potential risks associated with 
“augmented debt”. But ignoring country-specific institutional setup could 
cause exaggerated fiscal vulnerabilities and underestimated long-term 
growth’ (Zhongxia, Sun, and Chen 2017, 2–3). 
The main point of contention here is not the level of augmented debt itself 
as the extent of these off-budget liabilities is not a secret. However, the IMF’s 
insistence on including contingent debt (or what the Chinese side has referred to 
above as ‘presumed government backup’) means that the government should be 
held responsible for implicit government guarantees (The Economist 2016). 
These guarantees are soft budget constraints faced by LGFVs, SOEs, and selected 
private firms considered local champions, allowing them credit access regardless 
of the state of their finances (X. Wang 2017). Hence, this case demonstrates how 
the usual analytical categories of real vs. financial sectors and state vs. market 
are problematic. As the IMF insists on including off-budget liabilities in its model 
for augmented debt and uses this as the basis for its unfavourable assessment of 
debt sustainability in China, it puts pressure on the state for allowing implicit 
government guarantees to reach such risky levels. The Chinese authorities 
disagreed with the 2017 Article IV report, stating that: 
‘… domestic concerns, such as high financial sector leverage [are] 
manageable considering ongoing reforms and Chinese-specific strengths, 
such as high domestic savings. They saw the external environment as facing 
many uncertainties, such as unexpected fall in global demand or a retreat 
from globalisation’ (IMF 2017c, 12–13).  
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The point on ‘Chinese-specific strengths’ is also echoed in an AMRO 
working paper (Poonpatpibul et al. 2017) published a few months after the 
release of the 2017 Article IV consultation report. The paper begins by stressing 
that the rapid rise in corporate debt in China is driven by factors ‘understandably 
linked to China’s current stage of economic and financial development and are 
country-specific’ (Poonpatpibul et al. 2017, i). However, it would be a mistake to 
assume that the AMRO paper is just a straightforward rebuttal of the IMF 
report—both publications frame their assessment and policy recommendations 
as a modelling issue of which indicators should be used and what should or 
should not be included in the analysis. The areas where AMRO and IMF analyses 
converge and diverge demonstrate how the increase in surveillance outputs may 
not explicitly reflect conflicting political agendas, yet this is precisely why it can 
be a more effective tool for displacing accountability.  
To start with, the AMRO paper differs from the official Chinese position as 
it does not directly engage with modelling issues concerning the incorporation 
of augmented debt. Instead, AMRO staff modelling choices focused on corporate 
debt.  They agree that corporate debt in China is indeed rapidly increasing with 
their own calculations showing that it reached as high as 155% of GDP in 2016. 
The paper concedes that estimates vary significantly depending on the 
institution carrying out the study and whether or not it includes LGFVs. In 2015, 
the estimates range from 122% (Standard Chartered, excluding LGFV) and 183% 
(Morgan Stanley, including LGFV). It should be noted that AMRO and IMF figures 
for 2015 are actually the same at 144% and both measures include LGFV debt.60 
Yet the definition of LGFVs clearly departs from the IMF position as it only 
includes those ‘explicitly guaranteed by the government’ (Poonpatpibul et al. 
2017, 4).  
                                                        
60  Unfortunately, the accompanying methodological appendix does not provide a clear 
comparison of the AMRO and IMF computations for LGFV debt. The IMF figure for total LGFV debt 
is provided (18% of GDP in 2016); AMRO uses this whilst calculating its own figure for LGFV debt 
under the local government (10% of GDP) to arrive at an estimate for LGFV liabilities under 
corporate debt. Level figures are not provided (Poonpatpibul et al. 2017). 
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Despite coming up with the same figure for corporate debt-to-GDP ratio in 
China and conceding that such high levels pose important risks to the country’s 
financial system, the main policy findings drawn by the AMRO is fundamentally 
different from those presented by the IMF. The AMRO study justified this by 
using firm-level data to analyse the level and distribution of corporate debt 
across different sectors. Focusing on the sectoral level allows AMRO to cohere 
with its position on rising corporate debt whilst also arguing that it is not the 
systemic issue the IMF is portraying it to be. Instead, AMRO’s sectoral analysis is 
used to claim that there are ‘pockets of vulnerabilities associated with declining 
profits and debt repayment capacities… surfacing within the mining, real estate, 
construction, and steel sectors’ (Poonpatpibul et al. 2017, i).  
As highlighted in the accompanying press release: 
‘Based on various financial indicators and non-performing loan ratios, the 
bulk of corporate debt is not risky. However, vulnerabilities are 
concentrated in several sectors under the investment-led growth model 
with declining profitability and debt repayment capacities, such as SOEs in 
steel, mining, utilities, transport, and manufacturing as well as some private 
firms in real estate and construction… Whilst high corporate debt is 
unlikely to lead to a systemic crisis in the short-term, the authorities should 
take targeted and concerted efforts to reduce debt in the vulnerable sectors 
and financial institutions’ (AMRO 2017c). 
Whilst the first case highlights how the domestic vs. global/internal vs. 
external divide is perpetuated, the case of debt sustainability in China brings the 
real vs. financial sectors and state vs. market dichotomies to the fore. This is 
reflected in how IMF and AMRO surveillance analyses frame the Chinese state’s 
involvement in debt (e.g., ‘government-guided funds’ in the IMF report in 
contrast to debt ‘explicitly guaranteed by the government’ in the AMRO paper). 
Moreover, in AMRO’s firm-level model for debt analysis, the authors clearly 
indicate that the troubled sectors involve both SOEs and private firms.  
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To a certain extent, both sides can be lauded for their recognition of the 
nuances in applying sectoral categories in the case of China. The IMF and AMRO 
also agree that corporate debt in China is high; however, they offer different 
assessments as to whether the risk is immediate and systemic, and whether the 
Chinese government should be held accountable for its unmanageable levels. By 
depicting the risks associated with rising corporate debt as a contained sectoral 
issue rather than a systemic one, AMRO effectively exonerates the Chinese 
government from taking the blame should a debt crisis ensue. Yet as AMRO does 
not directly address the debate between the IMF and Chinese officials given its 
choice of indicators and modelling methodology, AMRO can present its findings 
as a technical matter whilst downplaying the politics inherent in its model. 
Hence, debt sustainability analyses as conducted by the IMF and AMRO 
define accountability as their respective models are used to implicate (or 
exonerate in the case of the latter) the Chinese government in their involvement 
in the country’s rising debt. At the same time, the IMF and AMRO’s overlapping 
models displace accountability as their technical analyses converge in one area 
(i.e., share of corporate debt) and diverge in others. The points of divergence may 
appear to be a result of technical decisions concerning what should be 
considered harmful/harmless falsehoods and relevant/irrelevant truths in the 
debt sustainability analysis. However, as the IMF and AMRO documents are also 
statements about the Chinese state’s role in the event of a debt crisis, the debate 
is clearly also political. Moreover, as the IMF is increasingly vocal about its 
concerns regarding spillovers from the Chinese to the global economy, these 
surveillance reports carry significant implications as instruments of policy 
justification in global economic governance.  
 
7.4 Conclusion  
By examining the spillover models used by the IMF, ADB, and AMRO, this 
chapter demonstrated how the use of these models in surveillance analysis can 
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simultaneously define and displace accountability in global economic 
governance. The first part focused on the reasoning behind the modelling 
process. The differences in the surveillance objectives between the IMF (with its 
focus on global stability) and ADB/AMRO on the regional side (with their 
emphasis on regional resilience against external shocks) influence the 
methodological choices made by their respective staff as they build spillover 
models. Whilst these choices result in different modelling priorities, the IMF and 
ADB/AMRO staff’s shared penchant for mathematical formalism generate 
important similarities, especially in terms of how they account for linkages and 
interdependencies and rationalise the trade-off between precision and accuracy.    
The second part of the chapter unpacked two sets of IMF and AMRO 
surveillance reports to analyse the representation of ‘the economy’ in their 
respective spillover models. The first case focused on the construction of spatial 
categories in IMF and AMRO spillover models. It underscored the tendency of 
both sides to disregard or minimise the extent of feedback loops and 
interdependencies in their respective reports’ discussion of internal vs. external 
or local/regional vs. global factors in the transmission of systemic risk. The 
second case tackled the analysis of debt sustainability in China as the discussion 
compared the assessment of IMF staff in contrast to the findings of AMRO staff. 
Here the attention shifts to the depiction of the state vs. the market and the real 
vs. financial sectors in the IMF and AMRO models for debt sustainability analysis. 
The technical differences in the IMF and AMRO analyses effectively result in 
diverging claims about the accountability of the Chinese government for the 
rising debt levels. Variations in modelling choices also result in different 
assessments on whether the rising debt levels is an immediate concern that the 
state needs to address, or whether it is a sector-specific concern that does not 
require state action. Whilst these divergences may appear to be a simple result 
of methodological choices, the two cases demonstrate the inherent politics 
involved in the modelling process.  
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As this thesis laid out the building blocks of its argument from Chapters 2 
through 6, Chapter 7 presented the final piece as it illustrated how a particular 
technical intervention that became prominent in post-crisis global economic 
governance can serve as a useful tool for policy justification. Spillover models are 
an important component of both IMF and AMRO surveillance toolkits. In the 
context of the principle of external accountability, these models are especially 
relevant as they seek to trace the transmission of systemic risk—in its various 
dimensions and definitions—across borders and across sectors. Hence, spillover 
models generate political statements about the sources and impact of systemic 
risk. In this sense, spillover models define accountability in global economic 
governance. However, overlapping surveillance frameworks displace 





















Figure 2 – IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus with Indonesian President Suharto (15 January 1998, 
Jakarta). Photographer: Agus Lolong/AFP via Getty Images. Source: Bloomberg. 
 
The passing of time and emergence of hindsight should normally caution 
us against making sweeping and deterministic proclamations, yet crises are 
states of exception; both the Asian and global financial crises are testament to 
this. The photo above shows Suharto signing a bailout agreement resulting in 
drastic spending cuts and damaging reforms in Indonesia as Camdessus looks 
down with folded arms. This is an image that remains ingrained in the minds of 
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policymakers in the region over two decades later.61 The phrase ‘never again’ 
was prominent in the minds of Indonesian policymakers (Moss 2017) who had 
front-row seats to the painful process wrought by IMF intervention and the 
subsequent downfall of Suharto.  
In 2008, a similar mantra spurred the IMF into action. This time around, 
John Lipsky, who served as First Deputy Managing Director of the Fund at the 
peak of the global financial crisis, declared: 
‘”Never again can we let ourselves be caught unprepared by an economic 
and financial crisis of such global magnitude.’ This was the spirit in which 
G-20 Finance Ministers in late 2008 tasked the IMF and the newly-formed 
Financial Stability Board to jointly develop an Early Warning Exercise [an 
important part of the Fund’s expanding surveillance toolkit]’ (Lipsky 
2010).  
Although the discussions that followed took a more qualified tone, the 
rallying cry of ‘never again’ is an effective way of consolidating political support 
in difficult situations; in the case of the aforementioned financial crises, appeals 
to technical expertise and authority were also useful. Yet, as this thesis shows in 
the case of mathematical modelling in surveillance, perceptions of change in 
technical expertise and its role in global economic governance after the 2007 
crisis need to be re-examined through a lens that can accommodate both 
coherence and contradictions in the use of modelling in economic policy, that is, 
the politics of economic methodology.    
By arguing for the importance of bringing in the politics of economic 
methodology, this thesis investigated the expansion of regional (East Asia 
                                                        
61 Despite the implied symbolism of the photo depicting a compliant debtor from a Third World 
country succumbing to the demands of the powerful lender from the West, IMF historian James 
Boughton explains that the scene is much more mundane than it appears. Apparently, it was just 
a matter of not having enough chairs so Camdessus had no choice as Suharto took the available 
one. Nonetheless, the photo is part of the region’s memory of the IMF stigma as it supported the 
narrative of ‘the Fund… being the bad boss, and they jetted in from a long way off and started 
issuing orders’ (Boughton, quoted by Curran 2017).  
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through ASEAN+3) and global (IMF) surveillance frameworks after the global 
financial crisis to address the following question: 
How can the persistence and expansion of technical interventions in post-
crisis global economic governance be used as a political resource? 
This chapter will recap the main findings of this thesis and outline its key 
contributions. As with most research endeavours, this study began as an attempt 
to address a specific question and will now end by raising a few more. As such, 
this chapter closes by noting the limitations of the thesis and identifying 
prospects for future research.   
 
8.1 Main findings 
Despite the widespread critique of modelling after the global financial 
crisis, this has not weakened the dominance of mathematical models in 
surveillance analysis. This remains to be the case even with the emergence of 
alternative surveillance platforms, as seen with the rise of AMRO in recent years. 
Drawing on the analytical framework presented in Chapter 4, this thesis sought 
to demystify these developments by foregrounding the importance of the politics 
of economic methodology in global economic governance. Given its focus on 
unpacking the economic and political logics driving the form of reasoning and 
representation in mathematical models, the framework was used to analyse IMF 
and AMRO surveillance with respect to three specific questions: 
(i) In what ways are mathematical surveillance models political representations 
of economic growth? 
The arguments developed in this thesis are based on an understanding of 
surveillance that departs from existing analyses. Whilst it agrees that the 
endurance and widespread conduct of surveillance across countries is driven by 
a sense of normative solidarity, this is not derived from a consensus about the 
IMF’s legitimacy and ‘an underlying and broadly shared sense of the rightness of 
its prescriptions’ (Pauly 2008, 190). Rather, this thesis (as raised in Chapter 1 
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and discussed in greater depth in Chapter 6) emphasised the centrality of the 
principle of external accountability, in that countries need to justify the external 
impact of their internal policy choices. Surveillance thus can be viewed as a 
platform for policy justification. As such, the rise of regional surveillance 
institutions such as AMRO should not be seen as a threat to the normative 
solidarity underlying global economic governance. If analysed as a manifestation 
of commitment to the principle of external accountability, AMRO should instead 
be seen as the emergence of another avenue for policy justification. 
Building on the notion that surveillance can be used as a tool for policy 
justification, the thesis illustrated how the use of mathematical models in 
surveillance analysis provides technical justifications for political claims of 
economic growth. Chapter 2 showed how variations in the conceptualisation of 
sources of risks to economic growth were framed using artificially-distinct 
spatial (e.g., regional vs. global, internal vs. external) and sectoral (e.g., state vs. 
market, real vs. financial sectors) dichotomies. Analysis of different discursive 
strands on economic growth in East Asia from the early 1990s to 2018 revealed 
how the inaccurate construction of such categories can be used for policy 
justification. As policymakers and academics use and highlight particular 
categories over others, this allows them to establish the variables, actors, and 
institutions that determine the economic growth (or collapse) of countries in the 
region. This subsequently feeds into how ‘the economy’ is depicted in 
mathematical models and in surveillance analyses that make use of such models. 
  Thus, with the expansion of regional surveillance, policymakers in East 
Asia can tap AMRO as an alternative platform for policy justification whilst 
maintaining their support for external accountability. Given the prominence of 
concerns regarding domestic legitimacy and international credibility in the 
region, ASEAN-affiliated institutions such as AMRO allow their member 
countries to use such mechanisms to consolidate state authority whilst asserting 
their place in the international community. AMRO surveillance provides 
policymakers in East Asia with the stage to present their own assessment of 
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economic growth; however, they do so whilst complying with the 
internationally-accepted technical standards for economic analysis. The use of 
mathematical models in surveillance allows the IMF and AMRO to foreground 
their technical expertise and authority in global economic governance.  
At the same time, the thesis argued that the use of mathematical models 
and its tendency to privilege precision over accuracy has crucial political 
significance, especially after the global financial crisis. Chapters 3 and 4 
demonstrated how the methodological choices embedded in mathematical 
formalism mean that models can simultaneously strengthen perceptions of 
expert authority and provide a rationale for its limitations. Due to the 
compromises made to comply with mathematical formalism, model-based 
surveillance is both precise (e.g., in terms of how specific dimensions of risk are 
quantified as model variables) and inaccurate (e.g., in terms of offering a realistic 
representation of systemic risk). As repeated throughout this thesis, the analysis 
of surveillance models is predicated on Mitchell’s (1998) claim that ‘the 
economy’ as depicted in models is a representation of the nation-state and this 
creates important implications with regard to the depiction of the extent of state 
jurisdiction. With the post-crisis focus on spillover analysis, the use of 
surveillance models to identify causality in managing economic stability within 
and across countries can potentially become more contentious, as tracing the 
external impact of domestic policies becomes more problematic.    
(ii) To the extent that post-crisis surveillance reform focuses on systemic risk and 
macroprudential policy, how has this changed efforts to exert technical 
control over regional and global economic growth and stability? 
Monitoring systemic risk is a fundamental component of spillover analysis; 
macroprudential policy is a crucial tool for mitigating systemic risk. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, the very nature of systemic risk means that it is entrenched in a 
dense network of economic and political processes characterised by feedback 
loops and amplification mechanisms. Certain channels such as balance sheet 
contagion can be specified; others remain elusive and are identified after the fact 
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as ‘unintended consequences’. The dimensions of systemic risk (Renn et al 
2011)—namely, complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity—thus create problems 
for model-based analysis of systemic risk. The process of modelling involves 
minimising these very features; at the same time, the importance of tracing 
interdependencies mean that the discrete categories (as per Chapter 2) or 
variables normally used in mathematical models (due to the ontological and 
technical constraints imposed by mathematical formalism, as per Chapter 4) can 
be misleading representations of systemic risk. 
Chapter 6 showed that similar concerns plague macroprudential policy as 
the validity of its technical analysis is burdened with methodological 
complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities. These issues have been 
acknowledged by policymakers and academics alike, yet instead of spurring a 
fundamental questioning of the use and effectiveness of mathematical models in 
macroprudential policy, methodological problems have led to the proliferation 
of spillover models and the expansion of efforts of assert technical control over 
the global financial and macroeconomic system. Akin to the arguments put 
forward in Chapters 3 and 4, the technical appeal of macroprudential policy 
continues as the use of mathematical models can serve a dual function. On the 
one hand, it strengthens impressions of technical authority; on the other, the 
capacity of models to incorporate the aforementioned methodological issues in 
precise yet inaccurate ways provides a built-in excuse for its limitations. With 
this reading, complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities in systemic risk and 
macroprudential policies are co-opted to justify a broader scope for technical 
intervention in post-crisis global economic governance; however, these 
limitations are also emphasised to underscore the constraints faced by 
policymakers in ensuring global financial and macroeconomic stability.  
These concerns are compounded by the rise and expansion of overlapping 
regional and global surveillance frameworks. As raised in Chapter 5, defining 
systemic risk is both a technical and political exercise. The representation of 
systemic risk in mathematical models involves resolving conflicts over the 
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geographical boundaries of risk and the policy mechanisms that stem from such 
representations. Hence, AMRO is not just an alternative platform for 
surveillance; it also acts as a site for political manoeuvring given East Asia’s 
ambivalent relationship with the IMF. As outlined in Chapters 2 and 6, the fallout 
from the IMF’s intervention during the 1997 Asian financial crisis continues to 
shape the region’s policy agenda even though over two decades have passed. 
Since the 2007 global financial crisis, AMRO surveillance has been driven by the 
region’s preoccupation with maintaining domestic growth and strengthening 
internal (regional) resilience amidst external (global) risks. However, the region 
is also increasingly keen to assert itself as a responsible member of the global 
community. Given the perceptions of objectivity and evenhandedness that are 
attributed to the use of mathematical models, IMF and AMRO spillover models 
thus become crucial tools for policy justification and can be used to demonstrate 
commitment to the principle of external accountability.  
(iii) How does the recent proliferation of regional and global surveillance models 
define and displace accountability in global economic governance? 
Whilst Chapter 6 offered a broad analysis of how the overlapping domains 
of IMF and AMRO surveillance and the methodological issues surrounding 
macroprudential policy exacerbate the difficulties of upholding the principle of 
external accountability after the global financial crisis, Chapter 7 analysed 
various IMF, ADB, and AMRO spillover models to investigate how these serve to 
simultaneously define and displace accountability in global economic 
governance. Whereas the first part delved into the reasoning behind the 
methodological choices made by these institutions and the subsequent 
implications for the design of spillover models, the second part unpacked two 
sets of IMF and AMRO surveillance documents to illustrate how spatial and 
sectoral representations in spillover models simultaneously define and displace 
accountability. 
The first case used the 2017 IMF Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and 
the Pacific and the 2017 ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook to analyse the 
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implications of spatial representations. If these IMF and AMRO reports are 
analysed separately, their respective spillover models define accountability as 
they draw clear lines for causality and accountability by establishing distinct 
domestic vs. global and internal vs. external spheres in their analysis of the 
sources of systemic risk. However, the IMF and AMRO spillover models displace 
accountability if they are read as parallel assessments of systemic risk. The policy 
recommendations provided by both institutions in the aforementioned reports 
do not give explicit consideration to the impact of feedback effects that are not 
accounted for by their respective spillover models. Furthermore, this omission 
can be justified on the basis of the ontological and technical constraints imposed 
by mathematical formalism, as precision needs to be prioritised over accuracy. 
Whereas the first case focused on the domestic vs. global/internal vs. 
external divide, the second looked at the case of debt sustainability in China to 
examine the construction of sectoral dichotomies, specifically the real vs. 
financial sectors and state vs. market. The second case examined the 2017 IMF 
Article IV Consultation report for China and the AMRO working paper High 
Corporate Debt in China: Macro and Sectoral Risk Assessments. Close inspection of 
these documents revealed that the IMF and AMRO analyses effectively define 
accountability as their respective models associate (or absolve in the case of 
AMRO) the Chinese government with the country’s rising debt levels. However, 
the IMF and AMRO models also serve to displace accountability as their findings 
cohere in certain aspects (i.e., that corporate debt in China is high) but contradict 
each other in other aspects. In particular, the IMF and AMRO present different 
judgements in terms of whether the risk is widespread and whether the Chinese 
government is responsible for its unwieldy levels.  
As outlined above, the main findings of this thesis offer novel insights into 
the development and use of technical interventions such as surveillance models 
in post-crisis global economic governance. The analysis provided here 
emphasised that the methodological and political are inextricably linked—it 
focused on the politics inherent in methodological choices rather than the 
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political consequences that follow from the application of surveillance models. 
As such, this thesis makes unique contributions to relevant debates in IPE 
literature, which are outlined in the following section.  
 
8.2 Contributions 
The broad themes informing this thesis—specifically the politics of 
expertise, surveillance, and the interplay between regional and global 
institutions—have been covered by a wide range of IPE scholars. Whilst these 
studies have yielded valuable insights, existing literature tend to overlook the 
role of methodological choices in fostering the coherence and resilience of the 
dominant structures for global economic governance, even after the 2007 crisis.  
Martijn Konings comments on this topic are helpful: 
‘The endogenous nature of financial policymaking is something of a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, it means that the governance of finance 
always falls short of an imagined version that works through external 
observation and intervention and delivers a neutral financial structure. 
Financial governance is forever plagued by its embeddedness: the 
impossibility of cleanly extricating itself from the processes that it seeks to 
regulate. On the other hand, the fact that financial authority is not an 
external imposition, but organically connected to lower-level financial 
practices, means that at times of intense uncertainty, it can operate with 
tremendous immediacy, activating embedded chains of connections’ 
(Konings 2016, 275–76, italics added). 
This thesis is motivated by similar observations and also aligns with 
Konings’ point that assessments of post-crisis developments generally give 
insufficient emphasis to the endurance of neoliberal reason as ‘a degree of 
cohesion at the level of practice and the imaginaries that orient it’ (Konings 2016, 
270). IPE approaches also tend to take for granted that these ‘lower-level 
financial practices’ are not just determined by certain forms of expertise but are 
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also fundamentally grounded in particular processes of knowledge production. 
Hence, this thesis makes a case for foregrounding the importance of economic 
methodology in the study of global economic governance. It calls for a deeper 
examination of specific mechanisms for knowledge production, particularly 
those rooted in the practice of mathematical formalism as it continues to be a 
prominent feature of mainstream economics. IPE scholars have yet to study 
methodological choices in economic policy in such a manner. Given the heavy 
reliance of global economic governance on perceptions of technical expertise and 
authority, this is a crucial oversight that this thesis sought to address.     
As useful as IPE literature has been, dissecting the politics of economic 
methodology requires disrupting disciplinary boundaries and bringing 
perspectives from economic sociology and philosophy of science into the 
conversation. By doing so, this thesis contributed to ongoing debates on post-
crisis global economic governance in three ways. 
First, the politics of economic methodology offers an alternative 
explanation for the persistence of mathematical modelling after the 2007 crisis. 
Prevailing accounts analyse the continued dominance of mathematical models in 
terms of the institutional factors that facilitate the legitimation of certain forms 
of expertise over others. Whilst such claims are valid, they are inclined to treat 
models themselves as empty vessels for knowledge production. These 
discussions neglect to consider that the methodological choices that underpin 
the process of modelling ultimately determine how we produce knowledge and 
which variables and mechanisms get included or excluded, minimised or 
amplified in knowledge production. This is key to a better understanding of the 
endurance of mathematical modelling. In the case of surveillance, this thesis 
showed that the use of surveillance models can bolster claims of technical 
authority and provide a defence for its limitations at the same time. The 
framework developed for analysing the politics of economic methodology thus 
allows us to appreciate the conflicting ways in which models can be a useful 
political resource in and of themselves. Moreover, it does so by going beyond 
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narratives of disciplinary and institutional embeddedness. Whilst such factors do 
play an important role in preserving the coherence and resilience of the global 
financial and macroeconomic architecture, highlighting the politics of economic 
methodology brings the analysis to a deeper level as it traces the mutually 
constitutive logics behind knowledge production and the attendant 
repercussions given the tendency to privilege precision over accuracy. To link it 
back to the quote above from Konings, the politics of economic methodology 
sheds light on certain dimensions of the endogenous nature of financial 
policymaking, but also suggests that its entrenchment (at least as far as 
surveillance models are concerned) can be traced through specific mechanisms 
(as done in the analytical framework). In this regard, this thesis aspires to 
contribute to other IPE projects which are interested in understanding the 
different links tying financial governance to the processes that it seeks to 
regulate. 
The second contribution of this thesis is to the study of surveillance as it 
makes a case for reconsidering the normative basis for its continued relevance, 
despite evidence that surveillance has fallen short in terms of making a 
consistent impact in global economic governance (see Chapter 6). Whilst Pauly 
underscores the centrality of the principle of external accountability, this thesis 
pushed Pauly’s claim further by providing an in-depth investigation into how 
shared commitment to this principle drives not just the post-crisis expansion of 
IMF surveillance (particularly the 2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision) but the 
rise of AMRO surveillance as well. Furthermore, this thesis grounded the support 
for external accountability in strategic terms as it examined surveillance as an 
exercise in policy justification. Such a reading allows us to understand 
developments in regional surveillance as yet another manifestation of the 
embeddedness of global economic governance, and not as a threat to normative 
solidarity as feared by Pauly.  
On a related note, the third contribution of this thesis is in the area of multi-
layered governance in the aftermath of the 2007 crisis. As mentioned in Chapter 
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1, studies on the impact of the global financial crisis on East Asian regionalism 
vary in their assessments, but are inclined to focus either on claims of stronger 
regional cooperation in the pursuit of resilience and stability, or observations of 
a shift from regional to national and global mechanisms. The findings in this 
thesis suggest that national, regional, and global dynamics should not be 
analysed as isolated processes. This is especially true in the case of ASEAN-led 
initiatives such as AMRO. Whilst the overarching agenda of ASEAN has changed 
since its inception during the Cold War, the consolidation of state authority 
remains at the core of the institution, even as the region plays a bigger role in the 
international community.   
Whilst these contributions are significant, it is hoped that other curious 
researchers will appreciate the broader implications of this thesis’ findings. The 
next section intends to get the conversation started as it suggests some avenues 
for future research. 
 
8.3 Limitations and prospects for future research 
The latest developments in regional and global surveillance provide fertile 
ground for research on the intricacies of post-crisis global economic governance. 
However, given the early stages of the implementation of the 2012 Integrated 
Surveillance Decision and ongoing changes in AMRO operations (particularly 
their recent move to improve transparency), this thesis had to work with limited 
documentary resources to support its analyses. Nonetheless, the analytical 
framework enabled an in-depth analysis of the available material, producing 
important insights that can serve as the groundwork for further study of IMF and 
AMRO surveillance.  
As useful as the analytical framework was, it should also be noted that this 
was created specifically with surveillance models in mind. Be that as it may, the 
core thrust the framework advances—that methodological practices should be 
examined as a process wherein the illusion of distance between the technical and 
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political is constructed and maintained—holds relevance in other areas of 
economic policy aside from surveillance, especially in light of these policies’ 
heavy reliance on claims of technical and apolitical authority and expertise. 
Future studies interested in the implications of methodological choices in 
economic policy may find some of the components included in the framework 
useful in their own research, or may tweak it as they deem appropriate for their 
own purposes.  
Whilst laying out the specifics of a possible agenda for the politics of 
economic methodology is beyond the scope of this thesis, the insights gleaned 
from this project generated some preliminary ideas. The rest of this section lists 
three possible research trajectories that could build on the results of this thesis: 
(i) How does the interplay between international organisations influence the 
production of metrics and models in other areas of global governance? 
Conversely, how does this process reconfigure the interdependencies between 
international organisations as members of a broader knowledge network? 
Whereas this thesis was interested in analysing international organisations 
that are clearly located in different rungs in the hierarchical structure of global 
governance, the dynamics of cooperation and competition also operate between 
international organisations which are of similar stature and background, such as 
the World Bank and UNICEF. For example, this thesis’ analytical framework 
could be modified to better fit the case of global poverty indicators.  The recent 
collaboration between the World Bank and UNICEF on the development of global 
indicators for child poverty (UNICEF and World Bank 2016) suggests subtle 
shifts in knowledge and expertise in the making of global poverty policies. 
UNICEF is generally seen as the authority on matters relating to child welfare 
whilst World Bank is known for its technical expertise in poverty indicators. 
During the 1990s and the height of the implementation of structural adjustment 
programmes, UNICEF published a report (Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987) which 
was widely seen as a direct attack on World Bank practices and triggered a 
hybridisation of previously disparate policy narratives. With the recent shift 
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from Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals, there 
have been signs of areas of convergence and divergence between World Bank 
and UNICEF research as both institutions strive to play the leading role in the 
framing and measurement of child poverty and how it gets translated into policy 
recommendations. It would be interesting to investigate how international 
organisations both compete and derive authority from working with each other 
as they stake their claim as leaders in various areas of global governance. An 
approach inspired by the politics of economic methodology could be applied in 
future studies in this area.   
(ii) How can the politics of economic methodology inform other discussions on 
the role of international organisations in depoliticisation strategies? 
This thesis has obvious parallels with work on depoliticisation (Burnham 
2001), and international organisations are important sites for investigation of 
this topic.  Indeed, the IMF has already been the subject of related studies. One 
such example is Chris Rogers’ (2012) examination of the role of the Fund in 
managing financial crises that hit developed countries in Europe. As Rogers 
adopts a domestic statecraft framework in his analysis, there are also clear 
overlaps with this thesis’ focus on surveillance as policy justification. The 
findings of this thesis can complement such literature by presenting a case for 
external rather than internal policy justification. In response to Jim Buller and 
Matthew Flinders’ (2006) comment about the conceptual and methodological 
challenges surrounding depoliticisation research, this thesis’ analytical 
framework for the politics of economic methodology can also be further 
developed by other scholars working on this topic.  
(iii) What is the significance of methodological choices in studies on the politics 
and sociology of ignorance and non-knowledge? 
The issue of knowledge limitations is a central component of this thesis, 
specifically in relation to how the complexities and uncertainties of systemic risk 
are dismissed, minimised, or co-opted in mathematical models. When such 
knowledge limitations are acknowledged in model-based policy justification, 
235 
 
mathematical models can be used to lend credibility to policy analysis whilst 
defending its narrow applicability. In this regard, there are important parallels 
with Davies and McGoey’s argument that the global financial crisis led to the 
further rise of rational economic knowledge to prevent the recurrence of what 
was construed as ignorance about the origins and extent of financial sector 
instabilities. At the same time, there were stronger calls for a softer rationalism 
which accommodates complexities and uncertainties. This highlights how 
ignorance can be manipulated by experts in such a way that it can be framed as 
a gap that can be filled with their technical expertise, or an inevitability in the 
financial system that can be used to exonerate experts from any failures in their 
analysis (Davies and McGoey 2012).  
Davies and McGoey’s overarching point on rational economic knowledge is 
instructive and this thesis’ analytical approach complements their argument on 
the contradictory yet strategic effects of the simultaneous demands for the 
expansion of rational economic knowledge and softer rationalism after the crisis. 
However, the approach presented in this thesis suggests that ignorance is not 
simply a political tool that can be manoeuvred as a separate object. In the same 
way that mathematical models have co-opted complexities and uncertainties in 
the economy, ignorance can be constructed and maintained through specific 
methodological practices that are reinforced by political logics as well. As such, 
the insights developed in this thesis can be expanded so that they can contribute 
to the emerging dialogue on the politics and sociology of ignorance and non-
knowledge (McGoey 2012; A. H. Kelly and McGoey 2018)  
*** 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the passing of time and 
emergence of hindsight should normally caution us against making sweeping and 
deterministic proclamations. Crises are states of exception; however, the same 
cannot be said about PhD theses. This thesis in particular was built on 
complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities. As such, it seems fitting to end with 
this quote from John Law: 
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 ‘Perhaps we will need to rethink our ideas about clarity and rigour, and 
find ways of knowing the indistinct and the slippery without trying to grasp 
and hold them tight. Here knowing would become possible through 
techniques of deliberate imprecision’ (Law 2004, 3). 
Whilst this thesis supports Law’s call for studying social science through 
techniques of deliberate imprecision, it is acknowledged that the authority of 
institutions such as the IMF and AMRO will collapse if they adopt such an outlook. 
This thesis refrains from providing sweeping and deterministic claims on the 
sustainability of the IMF’s and AMRO’s current approach, nor will it comment on 
the broader implications of global economic governance’s general preference for 
the illusion of precision over the pursuit of elusive accuracy. Nonetheless, by 
raising the importance of such issues, this thesis offers a provocation that may 
stimulate greater interest amongst IPE scholars in the politics of economic 
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